Arbitration Agreements in Jewish Law

שֹׁפְטִ֣ים וְשֹֽׁטְרִ֗ים תִּֽתֶּן־לְךָ֙ בְּכׇל־שְׁעָרֶ֔יךָ אֲשֶׁ֨ר יְהֹוָ֧ה אֱלֹהֶ֛יךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לְךָ֖ לִשְׁבָטֶ֑יךָ וְשָׁפְט֥וּ אֶת־הָעָ֖ם מִשְׁפַּט־צֶֽדֶק׃

You shall appoint magistrates and officials for your tribes, in all the settlements that the ETERNAL your God is giving you, and they shall govern the people with due justice.

וְאַתָּ֣ה תֶחֱזֶ֣ה מִכׇּל־הָ֠עָ֠ם אַנְשֵׁי־חַ֜יִל יִרְאֵ֧י אֱלֹהִ֛ים אַנְשֵׁ֥י אֱמֶ֖ת שֹׂ֣נְאֵי בָ֑צַע וְשַׂמְתָּ֣ עֲלֵהֶ֗ם שָׂרֵ֤י אֲלָפִים֙ שָׂרֵ֣י מֵא֔וֹת שָׂרֵ֥י חֲמִשִּׁ֖ים וְשָׂרֵ֥י עֲשָׂרֹֽת׃ וְשָׁפְט֣וּ אֶת־הָעָם֮ בְּכׇל־עֵת֒ וְהָיָ֞ה כׇּל־הַדָּבָ֤ר הַגָּדֹל֙ יָבִ֣יאוּ אֵלֶ֔יךָ וְכׇל־הַדָּבָ֥ר הַקָּטֹ֖ן יִשְׁפְּטוּ־הֵ֑ם וְהָקֵל֙ מֵֽעָלֶ֔יךָ וְנָשְׂא֖וּ אִתָּֽךְ׃

You shall also seek out, from among all the people, those who are capable and who fear God—trustworthy ones who spurn ill-gotten gain. Set these over them as chiefs of thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens, and let them judge the people at all times. Have them bring every major dispute to you, but let them decide every minor dispute themselves. Make it easier for yourself by letting them share the burden with you.

אֵ֥לֶּה הַדְּבָרִ֖ים אֲשֶׁ֣ר תַּֽעֲשׂ֑וּ דַּבְּר֤וּ אֱמֶת֙ אִ֣ישׁ אֶת־רֵעֵ֔הוּ אֱמֶת֙ וּמִשְׁפַּ֣ט שָׁל֔וֹם שִׁפְט֖וּ בְּשַׁעֲרֵיכֶֽם׃

These are the things you are to do: Speak the truth to one another, render true and perfect justice in your gates.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, שְׁנֵי דַיָּנִין בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד. זֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּנוֹ שֶׁל זֶה וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּנוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא עֲלֵיהֶן רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְסוּלִין, אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְשֵׁרִים אוֹ מֻמְחִין, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפָסְלָן. זֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא עֲלֵיהֶם רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִים אוֹ פְסוּלִים. אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְשֵׁרִים, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפָסְלָן: אָמַר לוֹ נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אַבָּא, נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אָבִיךָ, נֶאֱמָנִין עָלַי שְׁלֹשָׁה רוֹעֵי בָקָר, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ. הָיָה חַיָּב לַחֲבֵרוֹ שְׁבוּעָה וְאָמַר לוֹ דּוֹר לִי בְחַיֵּי רֹאשְׁךָ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵין יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר בּוֹ:

Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three. They are chosen in the following manner: This litigant chooses one for himself and that litigant chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge for themselves. This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as judges or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them. This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one litigant disqualify the other’s witnesses? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from bearing witness for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as witnesses, he cannot disqualify them. If one litigant says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha, are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract it, but must accept their verdict. Similarly, one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, which is done while grasping a sacred object, and the latter said to him: Instead of taking an oath, merely vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and demand that the other litigant take an oath, as he is obligated to do by Torah law. And the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer. Once he has agreed to accept a vow, which is of less severity than an oath, he cannot retract his agreement.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: בִּיצּוּעַ בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פְּשָׁרָה בְּיָחִיד. סַבְרוּהָ, לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר: דִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּמָר סָבַר: דִּין בִּשְׁנַיִם? לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא דִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין, וּמָר סָבַר לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן פְּשָׁרָה לְדִין. לֵימָא: תְּלָתָא תַּנָּאֵי בִּפְשָׁרָה, דְּמָר סָבַר בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּמָר סָבַר בִּשְׁנַיִם, וּמָר סָבַר בְּיָחִיד. אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יֵימַר בַּר שֶׁלֶמְיָא: מַאן דְּאָמַר תְּרֵי – אֲפִילּוּ חַד נָמֵי, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר תְּרֵי – כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיהְווֹ עֲלֵיהּ סָהֲדִי. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ פְּשָׁרָה אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן, לְמַאן דְּאָמַר צְרִיכָה – תְּלָתָא לְמָה לִי? תִּסְגֵּי בִּתְרֵי וְלִיקְנֵי מִינֵּיהּ! וְהִלְכְתָא: פְּשָׁרָה צְרִיכָה קִנְיָן.

§ The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as detailed in the following baraita: Mediation can be performed by a panel of three judges; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromise can be performed by even a single judge. The Sages assumed that everyone agrees that we compare compromise to judgment, and require the same amount of judges for each process. What, is it not that they disagree in this matter, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed by a minimum of three judges, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that judgment and compromise can be performed even by two judges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: No, it is that everyone holds that judgment must be performed by a minimum of three judges, and here, they disagree with regard to this matter: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that we compare compromise to judgment, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we do not compare compromise to judgment. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that there are three opinions of tanna’im with regard to mediation leading to compromise, as one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that mediation must be performed by a panel of three judges; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that it can be performed by two judges; and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it can be performed by a single judge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who says mediation must be performed by two judges would say that it may even be performed by one. And the reason that he says two is merely that there would be two witnesses to the proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise. Rav Ashi says: Learn from that discussion that compromise does not require a formal act of acquisition, which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. As if it enters your mind that compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms, according to the one who says it requires an act of acquisition, why do I need a formal court of three judges? Let it suffice with two judges, and let one litigant perform an act of acquisition with the other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: But nevertheless, the halakha is that a compromise requires an act of acquisition to finalize its terms.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בַּחֲמִשָּׁה, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. אַטּוּ בִּתְלָתָא מִי לָא גָּמַר דִינָא בִּתְרֵי? הָכִי קָאָמַר: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁגְּמַר דִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר: תְּלָתָא כִּי כְּתִיבִי – בִּגְמַר דִינָא כְּתִיבִי. מְגַדֵּף בַּהּ רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, תְּהֵא סַנְהֶדְרִי גְּדוֹלָה צְרִיכָה מֵאָה וְאַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין בְּשִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד? וּתְהֵא סַנְהֶדְרִי קְטַנָּה צְרִיכָה אַרְבָּעִים וַחֲמִשָּׁה, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה וְעֶשְׂרִים? אֶלָּא ״אֶסְפָה לִּי שִׁבְעִים אִישׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, מִשְּׁעַת אֲסִיפָה שִׁבְעִים. ״וְשָׁפְטוּ הָעֵדָה וְהִצִּילוּ הָעֵדָה״ נָמֵי, מִשְּׁעַת שְׁפִיטַת הָעֵדָה. הָכִי נָמֵי: ״וְנִקְרַב בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אֶל הָאֱלֹהִים״, מִשְּׁעַת קְרִיבָה שְׁלֹשָׁה. אֶלָּא, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי: ״אֲשֶׁר יַרְשִׁיעֻן אֱלֹהִים״ – תְּרֵי. נֶאֱמַר ״אֱלֹהִים״ לְמַטָּה וְנֶאֱמַר ״אֱלֹהִים״ לְמַעְלָה. מָה לְמַטָּה שְׁנַיִם, אַף לְמַעְלָה שְׁנַיִם. וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין שָׁקוּל – מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶם עוֹד אֶחָד. הֲרֵי כָּאן חֲמִשָּׁה.

§ The Sages taught: Cases concerning monetary law are adjudicated by three judges. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: They are adjudicated by five judges, so that a verdict can be issued with three judges. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with a court of three judges a verdict cannot be issued by two judges? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by five judges, due to the fact that a verdict must be issued by three. In other words, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the judges who form the majority that decides the verdict must themselves be eligible to constitute a court. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when the requirement for three judges is written in the Torah, it is written with regard to the number of judges necessary to issue the verdict. Rabbi Abbahu would ridicule [megaddef ] this suggestion. If that is so, then the Great Sanhedrin would need to consist of 141 judges, so that the verdict can be issued by seventy-one, and a lesser Sanhedrin would need to consist of forty-five judges, so that the verdict can be issued by twenty-three. But these assertions contradict the halakha as derived from the verses. Rather, the Merciful One states: “Gather Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel” (Numbers 11:16), and this means that from the time of gathering, there must be seventy. Likewise, the verse states: “And the congregation shall judge…and the congregation shall save” (Numbers 35:24–25), from which it is derived that cases of capital law are adjudicated by twenty-three judges, and this also means that from the time that the congregation judges there must be twenty-three. Similarly, with regard to a case of monetary law, the verse states: “The owner of the house shall come near to the court” (Exodus 22:7), and this means from the time of coming near to judge the cases there must be three judges. Consequently, there is no requirement that the verdict be decided by a majority who could themselves form a court. Therefore, the previous explanation must be rejected. Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: It is stated in the next verse: “He whom the court shall condemn” (Exodus 22:8) in the plural, which means there must be two judges. Consequently, it is stated: “The court,” in the verse below and it is stated: “The court,” in the verse above. Just as below it is referring to two judges, as the word: “Shall condemn,” is written in the plural, so too above it is referring to two judges, making a total of four. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, they add another one to them, so there are five judges here.

אֶחָד מִבַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין שֶׁאָמַר אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי יָדוּן לִי וְאָמַר בַּעַל דִּינוֹ פְּלוֹנִי יָדוּן לִי הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שְׁנֵי הַדַּיָּנִים שֶׁבֵּרֵר זֶה אֶחָד וְזֶה אֶחָד הֵם בּוֹרְרִים לָהֶן דַּיָּן שְׁלִישִׁי וּשְׁלָשְׁתָּן דָּנִין לִשְׁנֵיהֶן שֶׁמִּתּוֹךְ כָּךְ יֵצֵא הַדִּין לַאֲמִתּוֹ. אֲפִלּוּ הָיָה הָאֶחָד שֶׁבָּרְרוּ בַּעֲלֵי הַדִּין חָכָם גָּדוֹל וְסָמוּךְ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לָכוֹף אֶת בַּעַל דִּינוֹ שֶׁיָּדוּן אֵצֶל זֶה אֶלָּא גַּם הוּא בּוֹרֵר מִי שֶׁיִּרְצֶה: מִי שֶׁקִּבֵּל עָלָיו קָרוֹב אוֹ פָּסוּל בֵּין לִהְיוֹתוֹ דַּיָּן בֵּין לִהְיוֹתוֹ עֵד עָלָיו. אֲפִלּוּ קִבֵּל אֶחָד מִן הַפְּסוּלִים בַּעֲבֵרָה כִּשְׁנֵי עֵדִים כְּשֵׁרִים לְהָעִיד עָלָיו אוֹ כִּשְׁלֹשָׁה בֵּית דִּין מֻמְחִין לָדוּן לוֹ. בֵּין שֶׁקִּבֵּל עַל עַצְמוֹ לְאַבֵּד זְכֻיּוֹתָיו וְלִמְחל מַה שֶּׁהָיָה טוֹעֵן עַל פִּיהֶן. בֵּין שֶׁקִּבֵּל שֶׁיִּתֵּן כָּל מַה שֶּׁיִּטְעֹן עָלָיו חֲבֵרוֹ בְּעֵדוּת זוֹ הַפָּסוּל אוֹ בְּדִינוֹ. אִם קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ עַל זֶה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ. וְאִם לֹא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין. נִגְמַר הַדִּין וְהוֹצִיא הַמָּמוֹן בְּדִין זֶה הַפָּסוּל אוֹ בְּעֵדוּתוֹ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר:

The following law applies when one of the litigants says: "Let so and so act as a judge for me," and the other litigant says: "Let so and so act as a judge for me." Together the two judges which were chosen by each of the litigants respectively choose a third judge and the three of them adjudicate the case for the two litigants. In this manner, a true judgment will emerge. Even if the judge chosen by one of the litigants is a great sage who has received semichah, the one litigant cannot compel the other litigant to have him adjudicate the case. Instead, he also chooses a judge he desires. The following rules apply when a litigant accepts his own or an opposing litigant's relative or another person who is unacceptable to serve as a judge or a witness in his case. If he affirms his commitment with a kinyan, he cannot retract his consent. If he did not affirm his commitment with a kinyan, he can retract his consent until the case is concluded. Once the verdict is rendered and the unacceptable judge ruled in his verdict - or a verdict was rendered on the basis of the testimony of an unacceptable witness - that money should be expropriated, the litigant may not retract. The above laws also apply if a litigant accepted a person who is disqualified because he committed a transgression as two witnesses to testify concerning him or as a court of three judges to rule concerning his interests. Similarly, it applies regardless of whether he gave his consent at the risk of forfeiting rights and waiving a claim that he is pressing or he gave his consent at the risk of having to pay what the plaintiff demands of him because of the testimony of this unacceptable witness or because of the ruling of this unacceptable judge.

וכותבים פלוני בירר לפלוני ופלוני לפלוני שכל זמן שלא כתבו יכולין לחזור בהן ומשכתבו אין יכולין לחזור בהן: הילכך אין כותבין אלא מדעת שניהם ושניהם נותנין שכר הסופר וטוענין לפניהם:

כיצד בוררים הדיינים כשאין בעלי דינין מסכימין יחד. ובו ז סעיפים: א' מבעלי דינים שאמר איש פלוני ידון לי ואמר בעל דינו פלוני ידון לי הרי אלו שני דיינים שברר זה א' וזה א' בוררים להם דיין שלישי וא"צ שיהי' הדיין השלישי ברצון הבעלי דינים ושלשתם דנים אותם שמתוך כך יצא הדין לאמתו אפילו (לא) הי' הא' שבירר בעל הדין חכם גדול וסמוך אינו יכול לכוף את בעל דינו שידון אצל זה אלא גם הוא בורר מי שירצה: הגה שמתוך שזה בורר לו א' וזה בורר לו א' הבעלי דינים צייתין להם וגם הדיינים כל אחד מהפך בזכות אותו שברר אותו בכל מה שאפשר מצד הדין והג' שומע טענות שניהם ופוסקים האמת (טור) אם אינם יכולים להשוות עצמם לברור להם שלישי מנהיגי העיר יתנו להם ג' ואם אין מנהיגים בעיר ילך התובע לפני ג' ויכופו הנתבע לדון לפניהם וכן אם הנתבע מערים לברור דיין שאינו הגון כדי לשבת אצל דיין הגון כופין אותו לדון לפני ג' כמו שנתבאר לעיל סי' ג' או שיברור דיין הגון (טור) ואם השנים הבוררים יכולים להשוות עצמן י"א דא"צ לברור שלישי (מהרי"ו סי' י"א) וי"א דאם הנתבע אומר שהוא יברור שנים והתובע ג"כ שנים והם יבררו חמישי הרשות בידו דכל זמן שהדיינים רבים יותר יוצא הדין לאמתו (רמב"ן בפירושו לתורה): כותבים פלוני בירר את פלוני ופלוני בירר את פלוני וכל זמן שלא כתבו יכולין לחזור בהם ומשכתבו אין יכולין לחזור בהם לפיכך אין כותבין אלא מדעת שניהם ושניהם נותנים שכר הסופר: הגה וה"ה אם קנו מידו (נ"י פ"ק דב"מ) וי"א דמשטענו בפניהם אינם יכולים לחזור אף ע"פ שלא כתבו (שם בשם הירושלמי) ונ"ל דבמקום שאין דרך לכתוב פלוני בירר פלוני וכו' משטענו בפניהם א"י לחזור לכ"ע וכ"מ שא"י לחזור לא יוכל ג"כ לומר שיוסיפו הדיינים (ר"י נט"ו ח"ג):

[If] one of the litigants said, 'Let So-and-so act as Judge for me,' and his fellow-litigant said, 'Let So-and-so act as Judge for me,' — then these two Judges each of whom were chosen respectively by the litigants nominate a third Judge; and it is not necessary that the third Judge [should be nominated] with the consent of the litigants; and all three of them [the Judges] try them [the litigants], for in this wise a true judgment will be rendered. Even if the one [Judge] whom the litigant chose was a distinguished and ordained scholar, he cannot compel his fellow-litigant that he [the latter] be tried by this [distinguished Judge], but he [the fellow-litigant] too, may choose whomever he desires [to act as Judge on his behalf]. Gloss: For since each party chooses a Judge, the litigants obey them, and the Judges, too, will each examine [points] in favour of the one who chose him whereever it is possible [to do so] from the legal point of view, and the third [Judge] hears the [legal] arguments of both of them [and compromises between them] and [thus together] they render a true verdict. If they [the two Judges] cannot reach an agreement in nominating the third Judge, [then] the town leaders appoint for them a third [Judge]. And if there are no leaders in the town, [then] the plaintiff may go before three [Judges] and they compel the defendant to be tried before them. And likewise if the defendant deliberately selects a Judge who is unworthy in order that he sit in judgment with a worthy Judge, they may compel him to be tried before three Judges as has been explained supra § 3, [par. 4], or that he select a worthy Judge. However, if the two arbiters can reach an harmonious decision [in the case], some say that they are not required to nominate a third [Judge]. Some say that if the defendant states that he will select two [Judges] and [that] the plaintiff should likewise select two [Judges], and they [the selected Judges] will nominate a fifth [Judge], — he is permitted to do so, for as long as there is a greater number of Judges, a true judgment will be rendered. A document is prepared [in which it is stated], 'So-and-so chose So-and-so [to act as Judge] and So-and-so chose So-and-so [to act as Judge].' And so long as they did not write [this document], they [the contesting parties] may retract, but once they prepared [this document], they cannot retract. Therefore, they do not write [this document] save with the consent of both parties, and both pay the scribe's fee. Gloss: And likewise if they made [each party] obligate himself by means of a Kinyan. Some say that once they stated their pleas before them [the Judges], they cannot retract even if they did not prepare a document. And it seems to me that in a locality where it is not the practice to prepare a document [in which it is stated], 'So-and-so chose So-and-so etc., [then] once they [the contesting parties] stated their pleas before them [the Judges], all agree that neither of them can retract. And where one cannot retract, one likewise cannot state that the number of Judges should be increased.

מצוה לומר לבעלי דינים בתחלה הדין אתם רוצים או הפשרה אם רצו בפשרה עושים ביניהם פשרה וכשם שמוזהר שלא להטות הדין כך מוזהר שלא יטה הפשרה לאחד יותר מחבירו וכל ב"ד שעושה פשרה תמיד הרי זה משובח בד"א קודם גמר דין אע"פ ששמע דבריהם ויודע להיכן הדין נוטה מצוה לבצוע אבל אחר שגמר הדין ואמר איש פלוני אתה זכאי איש פלוני אתה חייב אינו רשאי לעשות פשרה ביניהם אבל אחר שאינו דיין רשאי לעשות פשרה ביניהם שלא במושב דין הקבוע למשפט ואם חייבו ב"ד שבועה לאחד מהם רשאי הב"ד לעשות פשרה ביניהם כדי ליפטר מעונש שבועה (ואין ב"ד יכולין לכוף ליכנס לפנים משורת הדין אע"פ שנראה להם שהוא מן הראוי) (ב"י בשם ר"י ובשם הרא"ש) וי"ח (מרדכי פ"ב דמציעא): אע"פ שנתרצו הבעלי דינין בפשרה בב"ד יכולים לחזור בהם כ"ז שלא קנו מידם דפשרה צריכה קנין אפי' בשלשה אבל אם קנו מידם אין יכולים לחזור בהם אפילו ביחיד וי"א דדוקא בשנים: הגה וקנין לאו דוקא אלא ה"ה אם נתן שטר עליו (ב"י בשם תשובת ריטב"א) או א' משאר דרכי הקניה (רשב"א בתשובת שאלה) י"א כשמקבל קנין על הפשרה צריך להקנות לו החפץ שלא יהא קנין דברים (מרדכי) כמו שיתבאר לקמן ריש סימן ר"ג:

It is a religious duty to say to the litigants at the outset, 'Do you wish [to resort to] law or [to submit to] arbitration?' If they consented [to submit to] arbitration, they bring about a settlement between them. And just as [the Judge] is cautioned not to pervert judgment, so too, is he cautioned not to direct the arbitration [in favour of] one party more than the other. Every Court of Law that always brings about a settlement is considered praiseworthy. When does this apply? — Before the conclusion of the trial, — even though one has heard their pleas and knows which way the judgment will incline, — it is a religious duty to attempt a settlement; but after the Judge concluded the trial and made the pronouncement, 'So-and-so, you are innocent, So-and-so, you are guilty,' he is not permitted to attempt a settlement between them. However, another person who is not a Judge is permitted to attempt a settlement between them, [provided] that this is not [attempted] in a Court sitting that is appointed for the purpose [of holding] legal [sessions]. If the Court of Law imposed an oath upon one of them, the Court of Law is permitted to bring about a settlement between them [even after the conclusion of the trial], so that [the one who is bound to take an oath] should be exempt from the responsibility thereof. The Court of Law cannot compel one to fall in with [the principle of equity, i.e., actting] beyond the requirements of the line of justice, although that would appear to them to be the proper thing [to do]. However, some differ with [this opinion]. Although the litigants consented [to submit their case] to arbitration before the Court of Law, they can retract so long as a formal agreement was not made with them by means of a Kinyan, for [the law is that] arbitration requires a Kinyan, even if made before three. However, if a formal agreement was made with them by means of a Kinyan, they cannot retract even if made before one. And some say that [they cannot retract] only if made [at least] before two. Gloss: [And this has reference] not only to a formal agreement made by means of a Kinyan, but likewise, if he [the defendant] gave a note of indebtedness [thus] obligating himself [to carry out the settlement], or [by any] one of the other modes of transference of rights. Some say that when he assumes [liability by means of] a Kinyan relative to the arbitration, he must give him acquisition rights in the article so that it should not be a [mere] verbal agreement as will be explained infra § 203 beg.

בספר משלי (י') שמחה לצדיק עשות משפט ומחתה לפועלי און. שלמה המלך רצה לומר כאשר העולם נוהג במשפט שיש דין בין איש לחבירו דבר זה הוא שמחה אל הצדיק אשר חפץ ואוהב היושר, לכך המשפט שמחה אליו כי המשפט הוא היושר בעצמו, ומחתה לפועלי און, ר"ל אשר אינם רוצים במעשה היושר הוא מחתה עליהם:

ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם (כא, א). כדי לבאר זה, נראה לי לבאר מקודם משנה (אבות פ"א מי"ח), על ג' דברים העולם קיים על הדין ועל האמת ועל השלום שנאמר (זכריה ח, טז) אמת ומשפט (ו)שלום שפטו בשעריכם.