Halachaהלכה

Ownership, Rights, and Responsibility in Halacha

These sources explore the foundational principles of ownership (kinyan) in Jewish law, including how ownership is acquired through various conditions and transfers, the different forms and rights associated with possession, and the legal framework establishing that owners bear responsibility for damage caused by their property or objects in their control.

אִם נִתְקַיְּמוּ הַתְּנָאִין נִקְנָה הַדָּבָר שֶׁהֻקְנָה

15 sources · all verified

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What the sources say

The foundational concept of ownership in halacha centers on an object entering a person's domain (reshut): the Derekh Chayyim (6:10) defines kinyan as the moment something is separated from others and reaches one's reshut, and notes that even wealth never formally acquired from another is still called one's "kinyan" precisely because it has entered and been distinguished within one's domain.

Ownership established through kinyan can be made conditional — Mishneh Torah, Sales 11:1 rules that when a transferor stipulates terms that are capable of being fulfilled, the acquisition takes effect only if those conditions are actually met, and if the condition is not fulfilled, no acquisition occurs at all.

The clearest expression of the link between ownership and liability appears in Mishneh Torah, Damages to Property 1:1–4, which derives from Shemot 21:35 that whenever a living animal within a person's reshut causes damage, the owner must pay, because "his property caused the damage" — establishing the principle that legal ownership of a damaging object is itself the source of financial responsibility.

Mishnah Bava Kamma 1:1–2 generalizes this principle across four archetypal categories of damage — Ox, Pit, Maveh, and Fire — and states the common denominator explicitly: "it is their nature to cause damage and the duty of safeguarding them is upon you," so that Mishnah Bava Kamma 1:1–2 and the Gemara (Bava Kamma 4b) together add that a person likewise bears personal responsibility for safeguarding his own body.

The duty of safeguarding is not absolute and is calibrated to circumstances: Mishnah Bava Kamma 6:1–4 exempts an owner whose pen was breached by bandits at night yet holds him liable if he failed to lock it properly, while Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 378 and the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 378) further specify that damaging another's property is forbidden whether done intentionally or inadvertently, though the location of the damage — the victim's domain versus the tortfeasor's domain — alters the liability calculus significantly.

Source 1 · Chazal
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Mishnah Bava Kamma 1:1-2

משנה בבא קמא א׳:א׳-ב׳

Mishnah Bava Kamma 1:1-2

These opening mishnayot distinguish categories of damage and responsibility, including the classic cases of an ox, pit, and fire, laying the groundwork for liability arising from what one owns or controls.

אַרְבָּעָה אֲבוֹת נְזִיקִין, הַשּׁוֹר וְהַבּוֹר וְהַמַּבְעֶה וְהַהֶבְעֵר. לֹא הֲרֵי הַשּׁוֹר כַּהֲרֵי הַמַּבְעֶה, וְלֹא הֲרֵי הַמַּבְעֶה כַּהֲרֵי הַשּׁוֹר. וְלֹא זֶה וָזֶה, שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן רוּחַ חַיִּים, כַּהֲרֵי הָאֵשׁ, שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ רוּחַ חַיִּים. וְלֹא זֶה וָזֶה, שֶׁדַּרְכָּן לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַזִּיק, כַּהֲרֵי הַבּוֹר, שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַזִּיק. הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁדַּרְכָּן לְהַזִּיק וּשְׁמִירָתָן עָלֶיךָ. וּכְשֶׁהִזִּיק, חָב הַמַּזִּיק לְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי נֶזֶק בְּמֵיטַב הָאָרֶץ: כָּל שֶׁחַבְתִּי בִשְׁמִירָתוֹ, הִכְשַׁרְתִּי אֶת נִזְקוֹ. הִכְשַׁרְתִּי בְמִקְצָת נִזְקוֹ, חַבְתִּי בְתַשְׁלוּמִין כְּהֶכְשֵׁר כָּל נִזְקוֹ. נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם מְעִילָה, נְכָסִים שֶׁל בְּנֵי בְרִית, נְכָסִים הַמְיֻחָדִים, וּבְכָל מָקוֹם חוּץ מֵרְשׁוּת הַמְיֻחֶדֶת לַמַּזִּיק וּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק וְהַמַּזִּיק. וּכְשֶׁהִזִּיק, חָב הַמַּזִּיק לְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי נֶזֶק בְּמֵיטַב הָאָרֶץ:

There are four primary categories of damage: The category of Ox; and the category of Pit; and the category of Maveh, which, based on a discussion in the Gemara refers either to the tooth of an animal that causes damage or to a person who causes damage; and the category of Fire. Each of these categories is unique; therefore, the halakhot of one cannot be derived from another. The defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Maveh, and the defining characteristic of the primary category of Maveh is not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Ox. And the defining characteristics of this category of Ox and that category of Maveh, in which there is a living spirit that causes damage, are not similar to the defining characteristic of the category of Fire, in which there is no living spirit. The mishna continues: And the defining characteristics of this primary category of Ox and Maveh and that primary category of Fire, in which the typical manner of their components is to proceed from one place to another and cause damage, are not similar to the defining characteristic of the primary category of Pit, in which the typical manner of its components is not to proceed from one place to another and cause damage; rather, it remains in place and the damage is caused by the injured party proceeding and encountering the obstacle. The common denominator of the components in all of these primary categories is that it is their typical manner to cause damage, and the responsibility for their safeguarding to prevent them from causing damage is incumbent upon you, the owner of the animal or generator of the fire or the pit. And when a component of any of these categories causes damage, the owner or generator of the component that caused the damage is obligated to pay restitution for damage with best-quality land. With regard to anything for which I became responsible for safeguarding it to prevent it from causing damage, if it in fact causes damage, it is considered as if I actively facilitated that damage, and accordingly I must pay for it. In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused. One is liable only with regard to damage caused to property for which, were he to use it for a non-sacred purpose, he would not be liable for the misuse of consecrated property; with regard to damage caused to property that belongs to members of the covenant, i.e., Jews; and with regard to assigned property, the meaning of which the Gemara will explain. And one is liable for damage caused in any place except for a domain designated exclusively for the use of the one responsible for the damage. And one is liable for damage caused in a domain designated for the joint use of the injured party and the one liable for the damage. When an animal or item one is responsible to safeguard causes damage, the one liable for the damage caused by insufficiently safeguarding it is obligated to pay payments of restitution for damage with his best-quality land.

Source 2 · Chazal
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Bava Kamma 2a-3a

בבא קמא ב׳ א:א׳

Bava Kamma 2a:1

The Gemara begins by analyzing the Torah categories of damage and the legal logic of attributing liability to the owner or keeper of a damaging object. It is foundational for understanding how ownership creates duty of care.

מַתְנִי׳ אַרְבָּעָה אֲבוֹת נְזִיקִין: הַשּׁוֹר, וְהַבּוֹר, וְהַמַּבְעֶה, וְהַהֶבְעֵר.

MISHNA: There are four primary categories of damage: The category of Ox; and the category of Pit; and the category of Maveh, which, based on a discussion in the Gemara refers either to the tooth of an animal that causes damage or to a person who causes damage; and the category of Fire.

Source 3 · Chazal
Verified

Bava Kamma 4b-5a

בבא קמא ד׳ ב:א׳

Bava Kamma 4b:1

This sugya discusses the responsibility of a person's ox and the degree to which ownership, possession, and guarding determine liability. It is central for the link between owning an object and being accountable for its harm.

הָכָא נָמֵי, תְּנִי: אָדָם – שְׁמִירַת גּוּפוֹ עָלָיו.

here too, teach the mishna: And with regard to man, responsibility for safeguarding his body is incumbent upon him.

Source 4 · Chazal
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Mishnah Bava Kamma 6:1-4

משנה בבא קמא ו׳:א׳-ד׳

Mishnah Bava Kamma 6:1-4

These mishnayot continue the laws of fire and other damaging agents, showing how an owner may be liable even when the damage is indirect. They illustrate the breadth of responsibility attached to owned sources of harm.

הַכּוֹנֵס צֹאן לַדִּיר, וְנָעַל בְּפָנֶיהָ כָּרָאוּי, וְיָצְאָה וְהִזִּיקָה, פָּטוּר. לֹא נָעַל בְּפָנֶיהָ כָּרָאוּי, וְיָצְאָה וְהִזִּיקָה, חַיָּב. נִפְרְצָה בַלַּיְלָה אוֹ שֶׁפְּרָצוּהָ לִסְטִים, וְיָצְאָה וְהִזִּיקָה, פָּטוּר. הוֹצִיאוּהָ לִסְטִים, לִסְטִים חַיָּבִים: הִנִּיחָהּ בַּחַמָּה, אוֹ שֶׁמְּסָרָהּ לְחֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, וְיָצְאָה וְהִזִּיקָה, חַיָּב. מְסָרָהּ לְרוֹעֶה, נִכְנָס רוֹעֶה תַּחְתָּיו. נָפְלָה לְגִנָּה וְנֶהֱנֵית, מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁנֶּהֶנֵית. יָרְדָה כְדַרְכָּהּ וְהִזִּיקָה, מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה. כֵּיצַד מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה, שָׁמִין בֵּית סְאָה בְּאוֹתָה שָׂדֶה, כַּמָּה הָיְתָה יָפָה וְכַמָּה הִיא יָפָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, אָכְלָה פֵּרוֹת גְּמוּרִים מְשַׁלֶּמֶת פֵּרוֹת גְּמוּרִים. אִם סְאָה סְאָה, אִם סָאתַיִם סָאתָיִם:

In the case of one who brought his flock of sheep into the pen and locked the door before it in a manner that is appropriate, and despite this sheep went out and caused damage in another person’s field by eating produce or trampling it, the owner is exempt, since he safeguarded the animals appropriately. If he did not lock the door before the sheep in a manner that is appropriate, and sheep went out and caused damage, the owner is liable, since his negligence led to the damage. If the owner locked the door appropriately but the wall of the pen was breached at night, or bandits breached it, and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage by eating or trampling, the owner of the sheep is exempt from liability. If the bandits themselves took the sheep out of the pen and the animals subsequently caused damage, the bandits are liable. If the owner left the animal in the sun, causing it to suffer, or if he conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who are not able to safeguard it, and the animal went out and caused damage, the owner is liable because he was negligent. If the owner conveyed the animal to a shepherd to care for it, the shepherd enters in his place and is responsible for the damage. If the animal fell into a garden and derives benefit from produce there, its owner pays for the benefit that it derives and not for other damage caused. If the animal descended into the garden in its usual manner and caused damage there, its owner pays for what it damaged. How does the court appraise the value of the damage when the owner pays for what it damaged? The court appraises a large piece of land with an area required for sowing one se’a of seed [beit se’a] in that field, including the garden bed in which the damage took place. This appraisal includes how much it was worth before the animal damaged it and how much is it worth now, and the owner must pay the difference. The court appraises not only the garden bed that was eaten or trampled, rather the depreciation in value of the bed as part of the surrounding area. This results in a smaller payment, as the damage appears less significant in the context of a larger area. Rabbi Shimon says: This principle of appraisal applies only in a case where the animal ate unripe produce; but if it ate ripe produce, the owner pays the value of the ripe produce. Therefore, if it ate one se’a of produce, he pays for one se’a, and if it ate two se’a, he pays for two se’a.

Source 5 · Chazal
Verified

recovered from “Bava Kamma 22a-23b

Bava Kamma 22a-23b

בבא קמא מ׳ א — ד"ה אִי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – דַּעֲבַד לֵיהּ

Bava Kamma 40a:1

The passage discusses disputes among the Sages regarding the standard of care required of guardians for different types of animals (tam and muad), and whether guardianship status can change based on the guardian's circumstances, ultimately exploring how liability for damage caused by animals is determined and whether it depends on the condition of the injured party or the damaging party.

אִי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – דַּעֲבַד לֵיהּ שְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה, וְלָא עֲבַד לֵיהּ שְׁמִירָה מְעוּלָּה. אִי לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב – דְּלָא עָבֵיד לֵיהּ שְׁמִירָה כְּלָל; דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד תָּם וְאֶחָד מוּעָד שֶׁשְּׁמָרָן שְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה – פְּטוּרִין. וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב – דְּמַעֲמִידִין (לָהֶן) אַפּוֹטְרוֹפִּין לְתָם, לִגְבּוֹת מִגּוּפוֹ. רָבִינָא אָמַר: רְשׁוּת מְשַׁנָּה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ – כְּגוֹן דַּהֲוָה מוּעָד; וְנִתְפַּקֵּחַ הַחֵרֵשׁ, וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה הַשּׁוֹטֶה, וְהִגְדִּיל הַקָּטָן. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: הֲרֵי הוּא בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ, רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: רְשׁוּת מְשַׁנָּה.

There are two scenarios in which the baraita could be interpreted as referring to an innocuous ox. If one wants to interpret it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it can be discussing a case where he provided reduced safeguarding for it and did not provide superior safeguarding for it. If one wants to interpret it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, it can be discussing a case where he did not provide safeguarding for it at all. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: With regard to both an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox whose owner provided reduced safeguarding for them, he is exempt. The owner is liable only if he did not safeguard them at all. And accordingly, Rabbi Ya’akov teaches us this, that the court appoints stewards for the owners of an innocuous ox to enable the injured party to collect damages from the proceeds of the sale of its body. Ravina himself said a different explanation of the baraita: The practical difference between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Ya’akov is with regard to whether a change of custody changes the status of the ox. For example, in a case where the ox was forewarned while in the custody of the steward and subsequently the deaf-mute regained his hearing, or the imbecile became halakhically competent, or the minor reached majority, and the ox returned to its owner’s custody. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is still in its previous status, the change of custody notwithstanding, and that therefore the owner is liable for the full cost of the damage. By contrast, Rabbi Ya’akov holds that the change of custody changes the status of the ox, which reverts to innocuousness, and so the owner pays only half the cost of the damage.

Source 6 · Rishonim
Verified

Mishneh Torah, Sales 11:1

Mishneh Torah, Sales 11:1

One who transfers ownership of real property or movables and stipulates conditions that can be fulfilled acquires ownership only if the conditions are met; if the conditions are not fulfilled, ownership is not acquired.

הַמַּקְנֶּה בֵּין קַרְקַע בִּין מִטַּלְטְלִין וְהִתְנָה תְּנָאִין שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לְקַיְּמָן. אִם נִתְקַיְּמוּ הַתְּנָאִין נִקְנָה הַדָּבָר שֶׁהֻקְנָה. וְאִם לֹא נִתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי לֹא קָנָה.

Source 7 · Rishonim
Verified

Mishneh Torah, Sales 11:13

Mishneh Torah, Sales 11:13

When a buyer seizes the seller's rights in court as a pledge of acquisition from the seller's hand, this constitutes a valid acquisition, provided that the buyer actually takes hold of those rights in court.

אַסְמַכְתָּא שֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ עָלֶיהָ בְּבֵית דִּין חָשׁוּב הֲרֵי זֶה קָנָה. וְהוּא שֶׁיִּתְפֹּס זְכֻיּוֹתָיו בְּבֵית דִּין.

Source 8 · Rishonim
Verified

Mishneh Torah, Damages to Property 1:1-4

משנה תורה, הלכות נזקי ממון א׳:א׳-ד׳

Mishneh Torah, Damages to Property 1:1-4

Rambam defines the main categories of damage and sets out the legal framework for a person's liability for damage caused by his property. This is a key codification of the relationship between ownership and responsibility.

כָּל נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה שֶׁהִיא בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם שֶׁהִזִּיקָה הַבְּעָלִים חַיָּבִין לְשַׁלֵּם שֶׁהֲרֵי מָמוֹנָם הִזִּיק שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כא לה) "כִי יִגֹּף שׁוֹר אִישׁ אֶת שׁוֹר רֵעֵהוּ". אֶחָד הַשּׁוֹר וְאֶחָד שְׁאָר בְּהֵמָה חַיָּה וְעוֹף. לֹא דִּבֵּר הַכָּתוּב בְּשׁוֹר אֶלָּא בַּהוֹוֶה: וְכַמָּה מְשַׁלֵּם. אִם הִזִּיקָה בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁדַּרְכָּהּ לַעֲשׂוֹתָם תָּמִיד כְּמִנְהַג בְּרִיָּתָהּ. כְּגוֹן בְּהֵמָה שֶׁאָכְלָה תֶּבֶן אוֹ עָמִיר אוֹ שֶׁהִזִּיקָה בְּרַגְלָהּ בְּדֶרֶךְ הִלּוּכָהּ חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם נֵזֶק שָׁלֵם מִן הַיָּפֶה שֶׁבִּנְכָסָיו שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כב ד) "מֵיטַב שָׂדֵהוּ וּמֵיטַב כַּרְמוֹ יְשַׁלֵּם". וְאִם שִׁנְּתָה וְעָשְׂתָה מַעֲשִׂים שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכָּהּ לַעֲשׂוֹתָם תָּמִיד וְהִזִּיקָה בָּהֶן. כְּגוֹן שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אוֹ נָשַׁךְ. חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֵזֶק מִגּוּף הַמַּזִּיק עַצְמוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כא לה) "וּמָכְרוּ אֶת הַשּׁוֹר הַחַי וְחָצוּ אֶת כַּסְפּוֹ" וְגוֹ': הָעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ תָּמִיד כְּמִנְהַג בְּרִיָּתוֹ הוּא הַנִּקְרָא מוּעָד. וְהַמְשַׁנֶּה וְעָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁאֵין דֶּרֶךְ כָּל מִינוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹת כֵּן תָּמִיד כְּגוֹן שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אוֹ נָשַׁךְ הוּא הַנִּקְרָא תָּם. וְזֶה הַמְשַׁנֶּה אִם הִרְגִּיל בְּשִׁנּוּיוֹ פְּעָמִים רַבּוֹת נַעֲשָׂה מוּעָד לְאוֹתוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁהִרְגִּיל בּוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כא לו) "אוֹ נוֹדַע כִּי שׁוֹר נַגָּח הוּא":

Whenever a living animal owned by a person causes damages, the owner is required to pay, for the damage was caused by his property. [This is implied by Exodus 21:35:] "When a person's ox will gore an ox belonging to a colleague...." These laws apply equally to an ox and to any other animal, beast or fowl. The verse mentions an ox only because that is a common instance. How much must [the owner] pay? If [the animal] caused damage through the performance of an act that it performs frequently and that is its natural habit - e.g., an animal ate straw or fodder, or it caused damage by [treading on an object] with its feet while walking - [the owner] is obligated to pay the full amount of the damage, [giving up, if necessary,] his most choice property, as stated in [Exodus 22:4]: "Payment should be exacted from his choice field and his choice vineyard." If [the animal] deviated from its ordinary habit and performed acts that it does not usually perform and caused damage in this manner - e.g., a ox gored or bit [another animal] - the owner is obligated to pay half the damages caused. [The payment must be exacted] from the animal that caused the damage, as [Exodus 21:35] states: "And they shall sell the ox that is alive and divide the money." [An animal] that performs a deed it is accustomed to performing by nature is called a mu'ad. [When an animal] deviates from its ordinary pattern and performs an act that its species does not usually perform - e.g., an ox gores or bites - it is called a tam. If the animal continues to follow the deviant pattern on several occasions, it is considered to be mu'ad with regard to the deviation to which it has become habituated, as [implied by Exodus 21:36]: "Or it is known that it is a goring ox."

Source 9 · Rishonim
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Tur, Choshen Mishpat 378

טור, חושן משפט שע״ח

Tur, Choshen Mishpat 378

The Tur lays out the laws of damage caused by one's property in the civil-law section of Choshen Mishpat. It serves as an important bridge between the Gemara and the Shulchan Arukh.

הלכות נזיקין כשם שאסור לגנוב ולגזול ממון חבירו כך אסור להזיק ממון שלו אפילו אם אינו נהנה כיון שמזיקו בין במזיד בין בשוגג חייב לשלם ובלבד שלא יהא אנוס כגון אם נפל מן הגג ברוח שאינה מצויה והזיק אבל אם נפל ברוח מצויה והזיק חייב דלאו אנוס הוא כתב הרמב"ם היה עולה בסולם ונשמטה השליבה מתחתיו ונפל והזיק אם לא היתה חזקה ומהודקת חייב ואם היתה חזקה ומהודקת והתליעה פטור שזו מכה בידי שמים היא וכל כיוצא בזה והראב"ד השיג עליו ואומר דאין זה אונס ליפטר טפי מרוח [שאינה] מצויה: ואפילו לגרום נזק לממון חבירו אסור אלא יש צד גורם שחייב לשלם ויש צד גורם שפטור כאשר יתבאר בע"ה:

Source 10 · Rishonim
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Sefer HaChinukh 11

ספר החינוך י״א — ד"ה שֶׁלֹּא יִמָּצֵא חָמֵץ בִּרְשׁוּתֵנוּ בְּפֶסַח –

Sefer HaChinukh 11:1

The passage discusses the prohibition against chamets being found in one's possession (reshuth) during Pesach, clarifying that "possession" encompasses not only one's home but anything under one's control, and outlines various legal scenarios—such as depositing chamets with others, receiving chamets from others with or without responsibility, chamets belonging to a gentile, and mixtures containing chamets—whose detailed rulings are found in Pesachim.

שֶׁלֹּא יִמָּצֵא חָמֵץ בִּרְשׁוּתֵנוּ בְּפֶסַח – שֶׁלֹּא יִמָּצֵא חָמֵץ בִּרְשׁוּתֵנוּ כָּל יְמֵי הַפֶּסַח, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות יב יט) שִׁבְעַת יָמִים שְׂאֹר לֹא יִמָּצֵא בְּבָתֵּיכֶם. וּבֵאֲרוּ חֲכָמֵינוּ זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה (פסחים ה, ב) לָאו דַּוְקָא בֵּיתוֹ, אֶלָּא כָּל שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּתוֹ. וְלָאו דַּוְקָא שְׂאוֹר שֶׁהוּא מְחַמֵּץ, דְּהוּא הַדִּין לְחָמֵץ. דִּשְׂאוֹר וְחָמֵץ חַד הוּא לְעִנְיַן אִסּוּרוֹ. (ביצה ז, ב) דִּינֵי הַמִּצְוָה, כְּגוֹן אִם הִפְקִיד חֲמֵצוֹ בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים מָה דִּינוֹ אוֹ אֲחֵרִים בְּיָדוֹ, וְכֵן חָמֵץ הֶקְדֵּשׁ בְּיָדוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי בְּאַחְרָיוּת וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּאַחְרָיוּת, וְדִין עַכּוּ"ם אַלָּם שֶׁהִפְקִיד לוֹ חָמֵץ, וְדִין תַּעֲרֹבֶת חָמֵץ אִם עוֹבְרִים עָלָיו. וְהַפַּת שֶׁעִפְּשָׁה מָה דִּינָהּ, (שם מה, ב) וְיֶתֶר פְּרָטֶיהָ, מְבֹאָרִים בְּפֶסַח רִאשׁוֹן (אורח חיים ת"מ תמ"א תמ"ב).

That chamets not be found in our possession on Pesach: That chamets not be found in our possession on all the days of Pesach, as it is stated (Exodus 12:19), “Seven days leaven is not to be found in your homes.” And our Sages, may their memory be blessed, elucidated (Pesachim 5b) that it is not specifically one’s home, but rather anything that is in his possession; and not specifically leaven which makes rise, but the same is true of [any grain product] that has risen — as leaven and leavened grain products are one [and the same] concerning the matter of its prohibition (Beitzah 7b). The laws of this commandment — for example if he deposits his chamets in the hand of others or [that of] others [is deposited] into his hand, and also chamets that is sacred property that is in his hand or that of a gentile, with responsibility or without responsibility, and the law of a violent [gentile] that deposited chamets with him; the law of whether one transgresses for a mixture that includes chamets; what is the law of bread that has rotted (Pesachim 45b); and the rest of its details — are elucidated in [the] first [section of] Pesach[im]. (See Tur, Orach Chaim 440-442.)

Source 11 · Rishonim
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Sefer HaChinukh 52

ספר החינוך נ״ב — ד"ה מִשָּׁרְשֵׁי הַמִּצְוָה

Sefer HaChinukh 52:2

This mitzvah-oriented discussion addresses damages and responsibility in a way that links legal ownership with accountability for consequences. It adds a moral-theoretical dimension to civil liability.

מִשָּׁרְשֵׁי הַמִּצְוָה, כְּדֵי לְהַסְכִּים בְּדַעְתֵּנוּ שֶׁכָּל מִי שֶׁבָּאָה תַּקָּלָה עַל יָדוֹ, מְרֻחָק וְנִמְאָס עִם אֱלֹהִים וְעִם אֲנָשִׁים, וַאֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹגֵג, כְּמוֹ הַבְּהֵמָה שֶׁאֵין לָהּ דַּעַת, וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן מֵזִיד. וּבְתִתֵּנוּ דַּעְתֵּנוּ עַל דָּבָר זֶה יְבִיאֵנוּ לְהִזָּהֵר הַרְבֵּה בְּכָל מַעֲשֵׂינוּ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֵּצֵא תַּקָּלָה מִתַּחַת יָדֵינוּ לְעוֹלָם. מִדִּינֵי הַמִּצְוָה, מָה שֶׁבֵּאֲרוּ זִכְרוֹנָם לִבְרָכָה (ב"ק מא א) שֶׁבֵּין תָּם בֵּין מוּעָד נִסְקָל עַל כָּל בְּרִיָּה שֶׁמֵּמִית, בֵּין אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה אוֹ קָטָן אוֹ עֶבֶד, וְשֶׁאֵין גּוֹמְרִין דִּינוֹ (סנהדרין עט ב) אֶלָּא בִּפְנֵי בְּעָלָיו אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ בְּעָלִים, וְכֵן אָמְרוּ (שם מד א) שֶׁיֵּשׁ צְדָדִין הַרְבֵּה שֶׁהַשּׁוֹר מֵמִית וְאֵינוֹ נִסְקָל, וְיֶתֶר פְּרָטֶיהָ מְבֹאָרִים בְּקַמָּא (הלכות מאכלות אסורות פ"ד).

It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] in order to establish in our mind that anyone that has a mishap happen through him is distanced and disgusting for God and for people; even if it is inadvertent — like with an animal that has no intelligence — and all the more so, if it is volitional. And when we put our minds to this thing, it will cause us to be very careful in all of our actions, so that a mishap never come from our hands. From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Bava Kamma 41a) that whether it is a muad (known as likely to cause damage) or a tam (tame), it is stoned for any [person] that it kills, be it a man or a woman or a child or a slave; that we only finish its judgment in front of it owners, if it has owners (Sanhedrin 99b); and [that which] they also said (Sanhedrin 44a) that there are many angles through which the ox kills but is not stoned. And the rest of its details are elucidated in [Bava] Kamma. (See Mishneh Torah, Laws of Forbidden Foods 4.)

Source 12 · Acharonim
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Derekh Chayyim 6:10

Derekh Chayyim 6:10

Acquisition (kinyan) occurs when an object is transferred to someone's possession from another person and becomes separated from others and reaches their domain; similarly, items like money and gold are called someone's "acquisition" even if not purchased from another, because they are separated and have reached their domain, and this applies the same way as when something reaches someone through transfer from another.

כדי* שתבין עוד המאמר הזה יש לך לדעת, כי הקנין הוא כאשר קונה דבר לרשותו מאחֵר, אשר נמסר אליו הדבר, ונבדל מן הזולת, ומגיע לרשותו. ונקרא כסף וזהב וכל אשר לאדם 'קנינו', אף שלא קנה אותו מאחר, נקרא זה 'קנינו' מפני שהוא נבדל והגיע לרשותו, ולכך נקרא זה 'קנינו'*, כמו שנקרא 'קנין' דבר שהגיע לו מאחר.

Source 13 · Acharonim
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Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 378

שולחן ערוך, חושן משפט שע״ח

Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 378

This siman addresses liability for damage caused by one's property and the legal standards of supervision and prevention. It is a practical code source for the owner's responsibility to prevent harm from owned objects.

אסור להזיק ממון חבירו ואם הזיקו אע"פ שאינו נהנה חייב לשלם נזק שלם בין שהי' שוגג בין שהיה אנוס (ודווקא שאינו אנוס גמור כמו שיתבאר) כיצד נפל מהגג ושבר את הכלי או שנתקל כשהוא מהלך ונפל על הכלי ושברו חייב נזק שלם: כל אלו הדברי' ברשו' הניזק אבל ברשות המזיק פטור עד שיתכוין להזיק כמו שיתבאר :

Source 14 · Acharonim
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Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 378

ערוך השולחן, חושן משפט שע״ח

Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 378

Arukh HaShulchan expands and explains the halakhic principles governing damage caused by property and the owner's obligation to guard it. It is useful for conceptualizing ownership as a bundle of rights and responsibilities.

כל מה שנתבאר דחייב בין בשוגג בין במזיד ובין באונס זהו דוקא כשהזיק ברשותו של ניזק שנכנס אצלו שלא ברשיונו והזיקו אבל ברשותו של מזיק או ברשות שניהם או ברשות שאינו של שניהם יש בזה דינים אחרים וכך אמרו חז"ל [ב"ק מח:] שניהם ברשות או שניהם שלא ברשות הזיקו זא"ז חייבין הוזקו זה בזה פטורין אבל אחד ברשות ואחד שלא ברשות זה שברשות פטור וזה שלא ברשות חייב ולדעת הרמב"ם אינו חייב המזיק ברשותו אלא כשהיה מתכוין להזיקו אבל בשגגה וכ"ש באונס פטור ו

Source 15 · Acharonim
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Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 378

בית יוסף, חושן משפט שע״ח — ד"ה כשם שאסור לגנוב ולגזול ממון חבירו

Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 378:1

Beit Yosef gathers the classical sources and opinions underlying the laws of liability for damage caused by owned property. It is useful for seeing how the halakhic tradition frames the owner's legal exposure.

כשם שאסור לגנוב ולגזול ממון חבירו כך אסור להזיק ממון שלו אפילו שאינו נהנה כיון שמזיקו בין בשוגג בין במזיד חייב לשלם משנה בפרק ב' דב"ק: (ה) כל שמזיק חייב לשלם בין בר"ה בין ברשות הניזק ואפילו ברשות המזיק אם הכניס בו הניזק ממונו שלא ברשות והזיקו לא שנא בגופו לא שנא בממונו חייב לשלם דנהי דיש לו רשות וכו' ומיהו דוקא במזיקו במזיד אבל אם בשוגג הזיק בו פטור ב"ה וכו' בפרק הפרה (מח.) אמר רבא הכניס שורו לחצר בע"ה שלא ברשות והזיק את בע"ה או בע"ה הזזק בו חייב ואמר רבא נכנס כחצר ב"ה שלא ברשות והזיק את ב"ה או ב"ה הוזק בו חייב הזיקו ב"ה פטור אמר רב פפא לא אמרן אלא דלא הוה ידע ביה אבל הוה ידע ביה הזיקו ב"ה חייב מ"ט משום דא"ל נהי דאית לך רשות לאפוקי לאזוקי לית לך רשותא.