Rov as Birrur or Hanhaga

לֹֽא־תִהְיֶ֥ה אַחֲרֵֽי־רַבִּ֖ים לְרָעֹ֑ת וְלֹא־תַעֲנֶ֣ה עַל־רִ֗ב לִנְטֹ֛ת אַחֲרֵ֥י רַבִּ֖ים לְהַטֹּֽת׃

You shall neither side with the mighty to do wrong—you shall not give perverse testimony in a dispute so as to pervert it in favor of the mighty—

וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? קָסָבַר: רוֹב תִּינוֹקוֹת מְטַפְּחִין, וּמִיעוּט אֵין מְטַפְּחִין, וְעִיסָּה בְּחֶזְקַת טׇהֳרָה עוֹמֶדֶת, וּסְמוֹךְ מִיעוּטָא לַחֲזָקָה אִיתְּרַע לֵיהּ רוּבָּא. וְרַבָּנַן: מִיעוּטָא כְּמַאן דְּלֵיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי, רוּבָּא וַחֲזָקָה – רוּבָּא עֲדִיף. אֶלָּא אֵיזוֹ חֲזָקָה לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן שֶׁשּׂוֹרְפִין עָלֶיהָ אֶת הַתְּרוּמָה? כְּדִתְנַן: עִיסָּה בְּתוֹךְ הַבַּיִת, וּשְׁרָצִים וּצְפַרְדְּעִים מִטַּפְּלִין שָׁם, וְנִמְצְאוּ חֲתִיכוֹת בָּעִיסָּה. אִם רוֹב שְׁרָצִים – טְמֵאָה. אִם רוֹב צְפַרְדְּעִים – טְהוֹרָה.

And we discussed that case: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items, in this case the dough, that are within reach, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and the dough itself retains a presumptive status of purity, since its impurity has not been definitively determined. And if one appends the minority of children who do not handle items within reach to the presumptive status of purity of the dough, the force of the majority of children who handle items within reach is weakened. Therefore, the dough is considered pure. And the Rabbis contend that in a case where the majority is followed, the minority is considered like it does not exist. Consequently, there is a conflict between the determining factors of the majority of impure children who handle items within reach and the presumptive status of purity of the dough. In that case, the majority takes precedence. The Gemara asks: But if so, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the presumption that one burns teruma based on it? The Gemara answers: As we learned in a baraita: In a case where started dough is in the house, and creeping animals, which impart impurity when dead, and frogs, which do not impart impurity, are also present there, and pieces of an unidentified creature were found in the started dough, if the majority of creatures in the house are creeping animals, the dough is impure, since the presumption is that the pieces are from a creeping animal. If the majority are frogs, it is pure.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: רוֹב וְקָרוֹב – הוֹלְכִין אַחַר הָרוֹב; וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּרוּבָּא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא וְקוּרְבָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, רוּבָּא עֲדִיף. מֵתִיב רַבִּי זֵירָא: ״וְהָיָה הָעִיר הַקְּרֹבָה אֶל הֶחָלָל״ – וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיכָּא אַחֲרִיתִי דִּנְפִישָׁא מִינַּהּ! בִּדְלֵיכָּא. וְלֵיזִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא דְעָלְמָא! בְּיוֹשֶׁבֶת בֵּין הֶהָרִים.

GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥanina says: When resolving an uncertainty with regard to the halakhic status of an item, e.g., a found item, if the status of the majority of like items indicates that it has one status but the item in question is proximate to a source that indicates otherwise, one follows the majority. And even though the halakha of majority applies by Torah law and the halakha of proximity also applies by Torah law, even so the majority is preferable. Rabbi Zeira raises an objection from the Torah’s statement with regard to a murder victim where the identity of the murderer is unknown. In a case of this kind, the court measures the distances between the corpse and the nearby towns, in order to determine which town is closest and must consequently perform the rite of the heifer whose neck is broken. The verse states: “And it shall be, that the city that is nearest to the slain man, the Elders of that city shall take a heifer of the herd…and shall break the heifer’s neck” (Deuteronomy 21:3–4). And this town is chosen even though there might be another town that is larger in population than it. According to Rabbi Ḥanina, in a case of this kind one should follow the majority. The Gemara answers: This verse is referring to a situation where there is no other town that is larger than that one. The Gemara asks: And still, if one follows the majority, why should the court follow the closest city? Let us follow the majority of the world, as most people are found elsewhere. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where the city sits in isolation between mountains, and therefore it is unlikely that the murderer arrived from elsewhere.

פֶּסַח וְקָדָשִׁים מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר. הָכָא נָמֵי, הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר. וְאֶלָּא, דְּלָא יְדַע אִי גְּמִיר אִי לָא גְּמִיר, לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן. אַלְמָא אָמְרִינַן: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן. הָכָא נָמֵי לֵימָא: רוֹב מְצוּיִין אֵצֶל שְׁחִיטָה מוּמְחִין הֵן!

then with regard to the Paschal offering and sacrificial meat that one is obligated to eat, what is there to say? Rather, according to Rabbi Meir, there is no alternative to saying: Where it is possible to examine the situation it is possible, and the majority is not followed; where it is not possible to examine the situation it is not possible, and the majority is followed. If so, here too, according to the Rabbis, it cannot be proven from the above sources that one follows a non-quantifiable majority ab initio, as perhaps where it is possible to examine the situation it is possible, and where it is not possible to examine the situation it is not possible, and the majority is followed. Rather, perhaps it is a case where the onlooker does not know whether he is knowledgeable or whether he is not knowledgeable. But if that is the case, let us say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts in the halakhot of slaughter, and one may rely on his slaughter. Apparently, we say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts. Here too, in a case where it is unknown whether he is knowledgeable, let us say: The majority of those associated with slaughter are experts.

מְנַָא הָא מִילְּתָא דַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן: זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא? מְנָלַן?! דִּכְתִיב: ״אַחֲרֵי רַבִּים לְהַטֹּת״. רוּבָּא דְּאִיתָא קַמַּן, כְּגוֹן תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת, וְסַנְהֶדְרִין – לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לַן. כִּי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לַן, רוּבָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן, כְּגוֹן קָטָן וּקְטַנָּה, מְנָלַן?

§ After discussing the role of presumptive status in determining halakha, the Gemara discusses the role of the majority. From where is this matter that the Sages stated: Follow the majority, derived? The Gemara is surprised at the question: From where do we derive it? Obviously, it is derived from a verse, as it is written explicitly: “After the majority to incline” (Exodus 23:2). The Gemara explains: With regard to a majority that is quantifiable before us, for example, in the case of a piece of meat that was found on the street before ten shops, nine shops selling kosher meat and one shop selling non-kosher meat, one follows the majority and deems that piece kosher. Or when the Sanhedrin adjudicates a case, one follows a majority of the judges in determining the ruling. In these cases, we do not raise the dilemma. When the dilemma is raised to us it is in the case of a majority that is not quantifiable before us, for example, the case of a minor boy and a minor girl. If the boy entered into levirate marriage with the girl, it is permitted for them to remain married, and there is no concern that when they grow older it will be discovered that the boy or the girl never develop sexually. Rather, one follows the majority, that minors develop sexually at puberty. It is with regard to that non-quantifiable majority that the Gemara asks: From where do we derive it?

אַמְרוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. אָמַר לֵיהּ: וּבְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מִי אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא? הַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: ״וְשָׁפְטוּ הָעֵדָה וְהִצִּילוּ הָעֵדָה״, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא?! אַהְדְּרוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבִינָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וּבְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת לָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא? וְהָתְנַן: אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״בִּשְׁנַיִם בַּחֹדֶשׁ״ וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה״, עֵדוּתָן קַיֶּימֶת, שֶׁזֶּה יוֹדֵעַ בְּעִיבּוּרוֹ שֶׁל חֹדֶשׁ וְזֶה אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ לָא אָמְרִינַן זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא, נֵימָא: הָנֵי דַּוְקָא קָא מַסְהֲדִי, וְאַכְחוֹשֵׁי הוּא דְּקָא מַכְחֲשִׁי אַהֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן זִיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא, וְרוּבָּא דְאִינָשֵׁי עֲבִדִי דְּטָעוּ בְּעִיבּוּרָא דְּיַרְחָא!

The Sages stated this answer before Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, whereupon he said to them: But do we blindly follow the majority in cases of capital law and not judge each case on its own merits? Doesn’t the Torah state: “And the congregation shall judge…and the congregation shall deliver” (Numbers 35:24–25), from which it is derived that the court must make every effort to find exculpatory arguments in support of the accused; and yet you say that one follows the majority? If it is possible that already after two and one-third months the stubborn and rebellious son will be fit to be called a father, from that time on he should be exempt from punishment. The Sages then brought Rav Huna’s analysis back to Ravina and presented it before him. Ravina said to them: And do we not follow the majority in cases of capital law? But didn’t we learn in the mishna (Sanhedrin 40a): If one witness says that the event occurred on the second of the month, and one witness says that the event occurred on the third of the month, this is not regarded as a contradiction and their testimony stands, since it is possible to say that this witness knows of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event occurred on the second of the month, and that witness does not know of the addition of a day to the previous month, and according to his tally the event occurred on the third of the month. And if it enters your mind that we do not say that one follows the majority in cases of capital law, let us then say that these witnesses are testifying with precision, and that they contradict each other, and therefore the accused should be acquitted. Rather, is it not because we say that one follows the majority, and the majority of people are apt to err with regard to the addition of an extra day to the month?

הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב נָשִׁים, וְרוֹב נָשִׁים — וָלָד מְעַלְּיָא יָלְדָן.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains the reasoning behind this ruling: One must follow the majority of pregnant women, and most pregnant women give birth to full-fledged offspring. If so, this is another case involving an uncertainty where the Sages established the halakha as a certainty based on the majority. Furthermore, this case involves the ritual impurity of a woman. Why then did Rabbi Yoḥanan list only three cases of this kind?

ומ"מ בעיקר הוראת ר"מ שהורה להתאבל על גוסס משום דרוב גוססין למיתה אע"ג דאיכא מיעוט גוססין דחיים אזלינן בתר רובא להחמיר שדיתי בה נרגא בתשובה אחת דאין הולכין באבילות בתר רובא להחמיר כמ"ש שם מ"מ אין זה ענין לנידן שלפנינו דאע"פ דסבירא לי' לר"מ דלענין אבילות אזלינן בתר רובא דרוב גוססין למיתה ומתאבלין עליו מ"מ בגוסס אין משיאין את אשתו דמשום חומרא דא"א לא אזלינן בתר רובא דרוב גוססין למיתה וחיישינן למיעוטא דחיים והרי הרא"ש גופא שמביא ההוא עובדא דר"מ דהורה להתאבל בא"ל הנחנו את אישך גוסס מטעמא דרוב גוססין למיתה ומשמע דס"ל כוותייהו. ואפ"ה כתב ברפ"ג דבכורות דגוסס אין מעידין עליו להשיא את אשתו דמשום חומרא דא"א חיישינן למיעוט גוססין דחיים.