Acquisition by Sight Versus Possession

וְלִיתְנֵי ״אֲנִי מְצָאתִיהָ״, וַאֲנָא יָדַעְנָא דְּכוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי! אִי תְּנָא ״אֲנִי מְצָאתִיהָ״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מַאי ״מְצָאתִיהָ״ – רְאִיתִיהָ. אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אֲתַאי לִידֵיהּ – בִּרְאִיָּה בְּעָלְמָא קָנֵי, תְּנָא: ״כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי״ – דְּבִרְאִיָּה לָא קָנֵי. וְלִיתְנֵי ״כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי״ וְלָא בָּעֵי ״אֲנִי מְצָאתִיהָ״! אִי תָּנֵי ״כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: בְּעָלְמָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״מְצָאתִיהָ״ בִּרְאִיָּה בְּעָלְמָא קָנֵי, תְּנָא ״אֲנִי מְצָאתִיהָ״ וַהֲדַר תְּנָא ״כּוּלָּהּ שֶׁלִּי״ דְּמִמִּשְׁנָה יַתִּירָה אַשְׁמְעִינַן דִּרְאִיָּה לָא קָנֵי.

The Gemara asks: But let the tanna teach a case where each one merely claims: I found it, and I would know that the intention of each litigant is to claim: All of it is mine. The Gemara answers: If the tanna would teach only that each one claimed: I found it, I would say that what is the meaning of the claim: I found it? It means: I saw it. In other words, he is claiming that he saw the item first, and he believes that even though it did not reach his possession, he acquired it through mere sight. Since it would have been possible to think that this is an effective claim, the tanna teaches that the litigant states definitively: All of it is mine, to teach that one does not acquire a lost item through sight alone. The Gemara asks: But if that was the objective of the tanna, let him teach that each party need only state: All of it is mine, and the litigant would not need to say: I found it. The Gemara answers: If the tanna had taught that it is sufficient for each party to claim only: All of it is mine, I would say that in general, when the tanna teaches that one claims: I found it, he means that the finder acquires the item through mere sight. Therefore, he taught that the litigants claimed: I found it, and he then taught that the litigants claimed: All of it is mine, to teach that only when the litigants each make both of these claims does the court divide the item, as from the superfluous expression in the mishna he teaches us that one does not acquire the item through sight alone.

מַתְנִי׳ נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת – נִקְנִין בְּכֶסֶף וּבִשְׁטָר וּבַחֲזָקָה. שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת – אֵין נִקְנִין אֶלָּא בִּמְשִׁיכָה. נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת נִקְנִין עִם נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת בְּכֶסֶף וּבִשְׁטָר וּבַחֲזָקָה, וְשֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אַחְרָיוּת אֵין נִקְנִין אֶלָּא בִּמְשִׁיכָה. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכִי תִמְכְּרוּ מִמְכָּר לַעֲמִיתֶךָ אוֹ קָנֹה מִיַּד עֲמִיתֶךָ״ – דָּבָר הַנִּקְנֶה מִיָּד לְיָד.

MISHNA: Property that serves as a guarantee, i.e., land or other items that are fixed in the earth, can be acquired by means of giving money, by means of giving a document, or by means of taking possession of it. Property that does not serve as a guarantee, i.e., movable property, can be acquired only by pulling. Property that does not serve as a guarantee can be acquired along with property that serves as a guarantee by means of giving money, by means of giving a document, or by means of taking possession of them. The movable property is transferred to the buyer’s possession when it is purchased together with the land, by means of an act of acquisition performed on the land. § The mishna teaches that property that does not serve as a guarantee can be acquired only by pulling. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As it is written: “And if you sell any item to your neighbor or buy from your neighbor’s hand” (Leviticus 25:14). This verse speaks of an item that is acquired from hand to hand, i.e., by pulling.

מַתְנִי׳ רָאָה אֶת הַמְּצִיאָה וְנָפַל עָלֶיהָ, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ – זֶה שֶׁהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בָּהּ. גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם אַבָּא כֹּהֵן בַּרְדְּלָא: אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם קוֹנוֹת לוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם. [מַאי טַעְמָא] תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן, דְּלָא (אָתֵי) [לֵיתוֹ] לְאִנְּצוֹיֵי. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף פֵּיאָה. אָמַר רָבָא: מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי נְזִיקִין. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף פֵּיאָה: נָטַל מִקְצָת פֵּיאָה וְזָרַק עַל הַשְּׁאָר – אֵין לוֹ בָּהּ כְּלוּם. נָפַל לוֹ עָלֶיהָ, פֵּרַס טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ – מַעֲבִירִין אוֹתוֹ הֵימֶנָּה. וְכֵן בְּעוֹמֶר שִׁכְחָה.

MISHNA: If one saw a found item and fell upon it, intending to thereby acquire it, but did not employ one of the formal modes of acquisition, and then another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it because he employed one of the formal modes of acquisition. GEMARA: Reish Lakish says in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: The area of four square cubits surrounding a person has the legal status of his courtyard, and it effects acquisition of every ownerless item located there for him, everywhere. What is the reason for this? The Sages instituted this ordinance so that people would not come to quarrel over an item. Abaye said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raises an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Pe’a. Rava said that Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi raises an objection to this from a mishna in Nezikin. The Gemara elaborates: Abaye said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raises an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Pe’a (4:3), which states: If a poor person took some of the pe’a in the field and threw it on the rest of the pe’a in order to acquire it, he has nothing of it. The same is true if he fell upon the pe’a, or if he spread his garment over it; others may remove him or his garment from the pe’a in order to take it for themselves, as he did not acquire it. And the same is true in the case of a forgotten sheaf left for the poor; a poor person cannot acquire it in any of these manners.

בְּמִדָּה זֹאת קָנוּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם לֹא קָנָה עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא מְשִׁיכָה בְּגָמָל וְהַנְהָגָה בַּחֲמוֹר. קָתָנֵי מִיהַת: אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אֶחָד מוֹשֵׁךְ וְאֶחָד מַנְהִיג, מוֹשֵׁךְ וּמַנְהִיג – אִין. אֲבָל רָכוּב לָא!

they have both acquired the animal in that manner. Rabbi Yehuda says: Actually, one acquires an animal only through pulling in the case of a camel or driving in the case of a donkey, as that is the manner in which they are normally directed. In any event, it is taught in the baraita: Or one who was pulling and one who was driving, which indicates that pulling and driving are indeed effective modes of acquisition, but sitting in a riding position on an animal is not.

כָּל מְצִיאָה שֶׁאָמַרְנוּ בָּהּ שֶׁהִיא שֶׁל מוֹצְאָהּ אֵינוֹ זוֹכֶה בָּהּ עַד שֶׁתַּגִּיעַ לְיָדוֹ אוֹ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ. אֲבָל אִם רָאָה אֶת הַמְּצִיאָה אֲפִלּוּ נָפַל עָלֶיהָ וּבָא אַחֵר וְהֶחֱזִיק בָּהּ הֲרֵי זֶה שֶׁהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בָּהּ:

בראיה בעלמא קנה - אע"ג דקתני במתני' (לקמן בבא מציעא דף ט:) ראה את המציאה ואמר לחבירו תנה לי דלא קנה בראיה וכן ראה את המציאה ונפל עליה (לקמן בבא מציעא דף י.) קתני נמי דלא קני מצי למדחי כיון דאמר תנה לי או שנפל עליה גלי דעתיה דלא ניחא ליה למקני עד שיגיע לידו: דבראיה בעלמא לא קני - והא דאמרי' בפרק הבית והעלייה (לקמן בבא מציעא דף קיח. ושם) הבטה בהפקר קני היינו שעשה מעשה כל דהו כגון שגדר גדר קטן:

He acquired [it] through sight. The Gemara is suggesting that if the Mishna had only written - אני מצאתיה - I found it - one might think that the litigant is claiming that I saw it first and that by seeing it, he acquires the garment. The second phrase of the Mishna - כולה שלי - it is all mine - indicates that seeing is insufficient for acquiring a lost object. One must actually lift up the garment to acquire it. Tosfos will quote two Mishnayos where it is evident that one cannot acquire a lost object by seeing it. If so, why was it necessary for our Mishna to repeat the same ruling? The Mishna on 9b: Even though the Mishna teaches (below 9b): [Ruvain] who saw a lost object and said to [Shimon] “give it to me”. The Mishna rules that Shimon who was asked to pick it up may acquire it for himself. We see that [Ruvain] did not acquire it by seeing it, since Ruvain who asked Shimon to pick it up, obviously was the first to see it and even so Shimon may lift it up for himself. It is evident that Ruvain did not acquire it by seeing it. The Mishna on 10a: So too, we learned in another Mishna: [Ruvain] saw a lost object and fell on it, but did not lift it up and Shimon comes and lifts it up, the Mishna teaches us that [Ruvain] did not acquire it since he did not make a proper act of acquisition. But Ruvain did see it first? Once again we see that seeing the lost object is not a way of acquiring it. Why does our Mishna need to stress this lesson? [The Gemara] could have deflected the proof from those Mishnayos, that seeing is not an act of acquisition, by saying, since [Ruvain] said to Shimon in the Mishna on 9b “give it to me”, or in the Mishna on 10a he fell on it, he is showing his mindset, that he is not satisfied to acquire it by any method of acquisition until it actually reaches his hand. It is only then that those Mishnayos rule that seeing the lost object is not a valid method of acquiring it. However, when one did not in any way indicate that he does not want to acquire the lost object by seeing it, it may very well be that seeing is a proper way of acquiring it. Our Mishna must therefore teach us that even when there is no indication that he is dissatisfied to acquire it by seeing, he cannot acquire it. [H]e does not acquire [it] through sight. The Mishna teaches us that by merely seeing a lost object, one does not acquire it. There seems to be a contradiction to this ruling from a Gemara later on 118a. The Gemara there quotes a Mishna in Shekalim which cites a dispute about whether those who guard the growing barley in the Shemittah year must be paid for their labor or not. The first Tanna holds that they must be paid. Otherwise, the barley they are guarding would belong to them and the barley for the Omer offering must belong to the public, not to an individual. R’ Yose holds that the guards can work for free if they so desire. The Gemara explains that the first Tanna holds that “guarding” the ownerless barley is a way of acquiring it. If the guards are not paid from public funds, they become the legal owners and the Omer offering must be owned by the public. R’ Yose holds that “guarding” the ownerless barley is not an acceptable method of acquiring it. Thus, even if the guards are not paid, the barley does not become their property and may be used for the Omer offering. The Gemara continues to suggest other ways of explaining the dispute, but they all focus around whether “guarding” the growing barley is an acceptable method of acquisition. The Gemara uses the expression הבטה which literally means looking or watching. Tosfos understands that this is the same as ראיה - seeing, of our Gemara. Thus, we have what appears to be a contradiction. That which [the Gemara] says in Perek Habayis Vehaliyah (below 118a): “watching” an ownerless item is an effective act of acquisition, that is when he did some minimal action, such as constructing a small fence around the barley. Even though he did nothing at all to the barley, “watching” or “guarding” it is an effective act of acquisition, but by merely seeing a lost object and taking no action whatsoever, one does not acquire the object.

בראיה קני - מדקתני יחלוקו: תנא לישנא דעלמא נקט - אי לא הדר תנא כולה שלי הוה אמינא מאי מצאתיה דקתני תנא לשון בני אדם אחז במשנתנו ולא לשון מקרא והרבה בני אדם קורין לה מציאה משעת ראיה: בעלמא דקתני מצאתיה - בכ"מ ששנינו שהמוצא מציאה קנאה הוה אמינא דמציאה קני לה משעת ראיה דלא אשמעינן שום תנא דלא קני לה אלא בהגבהה להכי אשמעינן הכא ממשנה יתירה:

He acquired it through sight: From that which it taught, "They divide it." The teacher employed colloquial language: Had the teacher not also said, "It is all mine," I would have said, "What is, 'I found it,' that the teacher taught? It is the language of people that the mishnah employed, and not the language of Scripture - and many people call it a found object from the time of seeing [it]. In general, when he teaches, "I found it": In every place that we taught that one who finds a lost object, acquires it - I would have said that he acquires it from the time of seeing [it]. For no teacher made us understand that one only acquires it by picking it up. That is why we are made to understand this here from the extra [words in the] mishnah.

אין הרשות קונה ולא הכלי ולא משיכה ולא הגבהה אא"כ פסק תחלה המדה בכך וכך אבל כ"ז שלא פסק אין לו שום צד שיקנה בו דכל זמן שלא פסק לא סמכה דעת שניהם שמא לא יסכימו על הסכום ואם המקח דבר שדמיו קצובים אע"פ שלא פסק קנה וכן אם א"ל הריני מוכר לך כפי מה שישמוהו ג' קנה אפי' אין דמיו קצובים היו הפירות בסימטא או בחצר של שניהם ואפי' היו ברשות לוקח והיו בתוך כליו של מוכר קבל עליו המוכר למכור והתחיל המוכר למדוד בתוך כליו של מוכר אם א"ל כור בשלשים סלע אני מוכר לך יכול לחזור בו אפי' בסאה אחרונה הואיל ועדיין הפירות בכליו ולא גמר כל המדה וכליו של מוכר אינן קונים ללוקח אע"פ שהוא ברשות לוקח: