Ketubot
Ketubot 22a:5
The passage discusses whether a woman's statement about her marital status is believed based on the principle that "the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted," and derives this principle from a biblical verse about a father giving his daughter to a husband.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ הָיִיתִי וּגְרוּשָׁה אֲנִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר, הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהָיְתָה אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: ״גְּרוּשָׁה אֲנִי״, אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. אָמְרָה: ״נִשְׁבֵּיתִי, וּטְהוֹרָה אֲנִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר, הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁנִּשְׁבֵּית, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: ״טְהוֹרָה אֲנִי״ — אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. וְאִם מִשֶּׁנִּשֵּׂאת בָּאוּ עֵדִים — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תֵּצֵא. גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: מִנַּיִן לְהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר מִן הַתּוֹרָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֶת בִּתִּי נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לְאִשָּׁה״. ״לָאִישׁ״ — אָסְרָה, ״הַזֶּה״ — הִתִּירָה. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה ״אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ אֲנִי״, וְחָזְרָה וְאָמְרָה ״פְּנוּיָה אֲנִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. וְהָא שַׁוְּויַהּ לְנַפְשַׁהּ חֲתִיכָה דְּאִיסּוּרָא? אָמַר רָבָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּתְנָה אַמַּתְלָא לִדְבָרֶיהָ. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: אָמְרָה אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ אֲנִי, וְחָזְרָה וְאָמְרָה: פְּנוּיָה אֲנִי — אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. וְאִם נָתְנָה אַמַּתְלָא לִדְבָרֶיהָ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת.
MISHNA: With regard to a woman who said: I was a married woman and now I am a divorcée, she is deemed credible and permitted to remarry, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was married is the mouth that permitted, and established that she is divorced. However, if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am a divorcée, she is not deemed credible. Similarly, with regard to a woman who said: I was taken captive but I am pure, as I was not raped in captivity, she is deemed credible and permitted to marry a priest, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was taken captive is the mouth that permitted and established that she was not defiled. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not deemed credible. And if witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband. GEMARA: Rav Asi said: From where in the Torah is the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, derived? It is derived as it is stated: “I gave my daughter to this man [la’ish hazeh] as a wife” (Deuteronomy 22:16). When the father said that he married her off “to the man [la’ish]” without revealing his identity, he rendered her forbidden to all men. When he then says “this [hazeh],” thereby identifying the man to whom he married her off, he renders her permitted to her husband. § The Sages taught with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is deemed credible. The Gemara asks: But didn’t she render herself an entity of prohibition? When she said that she was married she rendered herself forbidden to all men. How then can she abrogate the prohibition? The Gemara answers that Rava bar Rav Huna said: It is referring to a case where she provided a rationale [amatla] for her initial statement and explained why she said that she was a married woman. That was also taught in a baraita with regard to the woman who said: I am a married woman, and then said: I am unmarried, that she is not deemed credible. And if she provided a rationale for her initial statement, she is deemed credible.