Sources examine how classical commentators understood systems of political authority and rulership in the Book of Judges, including perspectives on the contrast between judicial and monarchical governance in ancient Israel.
בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם אֵין מֶלֶךְ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל
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What the sources say
The Abarbanel directly contrasts the era of the judges with that of the kings, and the Abarbanel (Devarim 17:14–20) concludes that the governance of the judges was good while the governance of the kings was harmful and extremely dangerous — whereas not a single judge turned his heart away from God, virtually every king led Israel astray, ultimately causing the exile.
This stands in pointed tension with the closing verse of the book itself, where Shoftim 21:25 records that 'there was no king in Israel; everyone did as they pleased,' suggesting that the period of the judges was marked by unchecked individualism rather than ordered self-governance.
A philosophical grounding for why any form of ordered communal leadership is necessary at all appears in Duties of the Heart, Second Treatise on Examination 5:59, which observes that human beings — despite their great diversity of character — naturally consent to appoint one from among themselves, accepting his authority and fearing him, so that he may govern for the benefit of all and prevent their affairs from collapsing.
שופטים כ״א:כ״ה
Judges 21:25
The closing refrain of Sefer Shoftim says that in those days there was no king in Israel; each person did what was right in his own eyes. This is often the biblical backdrop for later discussions about governance, order, and political authority.
בַּיָּמִ֣ים הָהֵ֔ם אֵ֥ין מֶ֖לֶךְ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֑ל אִ֛ישׁ הַיָּשָׁ֥ר בְּעֵינָ֖יו יַעֲשֶֽׂה׃
In those days there was no king in Israel; everyone did as they pleased.
Duties of the Heart, Second Treatise on Examination 5:59
The Abarbanel states that people with diverse temperaments consent to appoint one person from among themselves as a ruler whom they obey and fear, and he protects them, judges them justly, and guides them toward their collective welfare; were each person concerned only with himself, they could not cooperate to build structures or walls and their affairs would be lawless, yet when a ruler observes Torah's laws, leads them with righteous judgments and good paths, and maintains justice, his rule is established and his kingdom endures, as it is written in Mishlei and as the Sages say one must pray for the kingdom's peace, for without its authority people would devour one another.
וּמִמַּה שֶּׁרָאוּי לָתֵת אֶל לִבְּךָ וְלִבְחֹן בּוֹ הַסְכָּמַת בְּנֵי אָדָם וְהִתְחַבְּרוּת לִבּוֹתָם עִם רֹב הִתְחַלְּקוּת מִדּוֹתָם לְמַנּוֹת עֲלֵיהֶם אִישׁ מֵהֶם וּמְקַבְּלִים עֲבוֹדָתוֹ וְשׁוֹמְעִים בְּקוֹלוֹ כְּמָה שֶׁהוּא מְצַוֶּה וּמַזְהִיר אוֹתָם וִירֵאִים אוֹתוֹ וְהוּא שׁוֹמֵר אוֹתָם וְחוֹמֵל עֲלֵיהֶם וְדָן בְּצֶדֶק בֵּינֵיהֶם וּמַנְהִיגָם עַל מָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ תַּקָּנַת כֻּלָּם כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִתְקַלְקְלוּ עִנְיְנֵיהֶם וְלֹא יוּכַל הָאוֹיֵב לָהֶם. וְאִלּוּ הָיָה כָּל אֶחָד מִבְּנֵי אָדָם חוֹשֵׁשׁ לְעַצְמוֹ וְלִדְחוֹת מֵעָלָיו לֹא הָיוּ מַסְכִּימִים עַל בִּנְיַן מִגְדָּל וְלֹא חוֹמָה וְהָיוּ עִנְיְנֵיהֶם מֻפְקָרִים ועכ״ז שֶׁהַמּוֹשֵׁל בָּהֶם שׁוֹמֵר חֻקֵּי הַתּוֹרֹת וּמַנְהִיגָם בְּמִשְׁפָּטִים צַדִּיקִים וּבִדְרָכִים טוֹבִים וִישָׁרִים וְהוּא מְשָׁרֵת לַתּוֹרָה וְשׁוֹמֵר מִנְהַג הַצֶּדֶק וּבָהֶם תִּכּוֹן מֶמְשַׁלְתּוֹ וְתַתְמִיד מַמְלַכְתּוֹ כמ״ש (משלי כ) חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת יִצְּרוּ מֶלֶךְ וְגוֹ׳ וְאָמְרוּ רז״ל הֱוֵי מִתְפַּלֵּל בִּשְׁלוֹמָהּ שֶׁל מַלְכוּת שֶׁאִלְמָלֵא מוֹרָאָהּ אִישׁ אֶת רֵעֵהוּ חַיִּים בָּלָעוּ.
אברבנאל על תורה, דברים י״ז:י״ד-כ׳
Abarbanel on Torah, Deuteronomy 17:14-20
The Abarbanel contrasts the judges of Israel and their prophets—who were all men of strength, God-fearing, and truthful, with none turning their hearts away from God to serve other gods—with the kings of Israel and Judah, who led the people astray and brought about exile, thus demonstrating that the governance of judges was good while that of kings was evil and dangerous.
המה הסבו לבב בני ישראל אחורנית כמו שידעת מירבעם בן נבט ושאר מלכי ישראל כלם ורוב מלכי יהודה עד שבסבתם גלתה יהודה מעוני, לא כן אנחנו רואים בשופטי ישראל ונביאיהם כלם אנשים אנשי חיל יראי אלהים אנשי אמת, ולא היה אחד מהשופטים שנטה לבבו מאחרי ה' לעבוד אלהים אחרים בהפך המלכים שמי ומי מהם נצל, וכל זה ממה שיעיד שהנהגת השופטים טובה, והנהגת המלכים היתה רעה ומזקת ומסוכנת מאד
Abarbanel and other classical commentators argue that the Torah does not command or praise monarchy as an ideal institution, but rather permits it as a reluctant concession to the nation's misguided desire to imitate foreign kingdoms. The sources present the divinely sanctioned model of Israelite governance as a system of judges and elders, which represents the true vision for Israel's political order.
Sources identify and explain the commandments derived from Parashat Shoftim, including the establishment of judges and officers in every city, the appointment of a king, prohibitions against judicial partiality and bribery, and proper treatment of the executed.
Jewish law establishes two complementary systems of authority: courts administering Torah law and kings empowered to act for the common good beyond strict halakha. These sources explore how divine law guides both the judiciary and monarchy, and how political necessity integrates with religious obligation in establishing a just society.
These sources explore whether appointing a king is a Torah commandment or merely a reluctant permission granted to accommodate human weakness. The debate centers on Deuteronomy 17:14–20 and Samuel's warnings, with particular attention to Abarbanel's argument that heroic leadership without hereditary monarchy better reflects the Torah's true vision for Jewish governance.
Classical rabbinic and medieval Jewish sources explore whether monarchy is an essential institution or a concession to human weakness. These texts examine biblical models of leadership without a king, divine kingship over Israel, and the conditional nature of the institution of human monarchy.
These sources explore the halakhic concept of peshara (compromise settlement), examining how it functions as a legitimate and often preferred judicial approach in civil disputes. The sources address the relationship between peshara and strict Din Torah, the role of the dayan (judge) in facilitating compromise, and the formal requirements such as kinyan needed to establish its binding authority.