Source 1 · Chazal
VerifiedMishnah Yevamot 15:1-3
משנה יבמות ט״ו:א׳-ג׳
Mishnah Yevamot 15:1-3
The Mishnah permits reliance on one witness regarding a husband’s death in order to release a woman from agunah status, while defining important limits concerning conflicting testimony and later developments.
הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלְכָה הִיא וּבַעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, שָׁלוֹם בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ וְשָׁלוֹם בָּעוֹלָם, וּבָאתָה וְאָמְרָה, מֵת בַּעְלִי, תִּנָּשֵׂא. מֵת בַּעְלִי, תִּתְיַבֵּם. שָׁלוֹם בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ וּמִלְחָמָה בָעוֹלָם, קְטָטָה בֵינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ וְשָׁלוֹם בָּעוֹלָם, וּבָאתָה וְאָמְרָה, מֵת בַּעְלִי, אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, לְעוֹלָם אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן בָּאתָה בוֹכָה וּבְגָדֶיהָ קְרוּעִין. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, אַחַת זוֹ וְאַחַת זוֹ, תִּנָּשֵׂא: בֵּית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים, לֹא שָׁמַעְנוּ אֶלָּא בְּבָאָה מִן הַקָּצִיר, וּבְאוֹתָהּ מְדִינָה, וּכְמַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה. אָמְרוּ לָהֶן בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, אַחַת הַבָּאָה מִן הַקָּצִיר, וְאַחַת הַבָּאָה מִן הַזֵּיתִים, וְאַחַת הַבָּאָה מִן הַבָּצִיר, וְאַחַת הַבָּאָה מִמְּדִינָה לִמְדִינָה. לֹא דִבְּרוּ חֲכָמִים בַּקָּצִיר אֶלָּא בַהֹוֶה. חָזְרוּ בֵית הִלֵּל לְהוֹרוֹת כְּבֵית שַׁמָּאי:
With regard to a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, if there was peace between him and her, i.e., the couple were not fighting at the time, and there was also peace in the world, i.e., there was no war at that time, and the woman came back by herself and said: My husband died, she may marry on the basis of her own testimony. Likewise, if she said: My husband died, and they did not have children, but her husband had a brother, she may enter into levirate marriage. If there was peace between him and her when they left but there was war in the world, or if there was a quarrel between him and her and peace in the world, and she came and said: My husband died, she is not deemed credible, as she may be mistaken or lying. Rabbi Yehuda says: She is never deemed credible when she testifies that her husband died, unless she came crying and her clothing was torn, in which case it is apparent that she is speaking the truth. They said to him: This is an incorrect distinction. Rather, both this woman who cries and this woman who does not cry may marry on the basis of their own testimony. Beit Hillel say: We heard that one may accept the testimony of a woman concerning the death of her husband only when she comes from the grain harvest, and when she testified in the same country where he died, and in circumstances similar to the incident that occurred, in which a lenient ruling was issued, as will be explained. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: The same halakha applies to a wife who comes from the grain harvest, and one who comes from the olive harvest, and also one who comes from the grape harvest, and even one who comes from one country to another country. Although the incident in question took place during the grain harvest, the Sages spoke of the grain harvest only because it was the present occurrence, i.e., that is what happened in practice, but this is no proof that she is deemed credible only when she arrived specifically from the grain harvest. The mishna comments: Beit Hillel retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai on this issue.
Source 2 · Chazal
VerifiedYevamot 121a-122b
יבמות קכ״א א:א׳
Yevamot 121a:1
The classic agunah sugya analyzes testimony that a husband died, including identification of a body, recognition after a disaster, and the circumstances under which one witness may suffice. These principles directly frame wartime missing-person cases.
קֵירַב מִיתָתוֹ. מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ?
Source 3 · Chazal
VerifiedTosefta Yevamot 14:5-8
תוספתא יבמות (ליברמן) י״ד:ה׳-ח׳
Tosefta Yevamot (Lieberman) 14:5-8
The Tosefta expands the evidentiary framework for testimony concerning a missing husband and the circumstances in which testimony is accepted despite the ordinary rules of evidence.
אפי' שמע קול מקוננת שמזכרתו בין המתים, אין עדות גדולה מזו. שמע בית דין של ישראל שהיו אומ' פלני בן פלני מת, או נהרג, תנשא אשתו, שמע בקונטרוסון של מלכים שהיו או' פלוני בן פלוני מת, או נהרג, לא תנשא אשתו. ומשיאין על בת קול. מעש' שעמד אחד על ראש ההר, ואמ' איש פלני בן איש פלני נשכו נחש ומת. הלכו ומצאוהו שתפחו פניו, והשיאו את אשתו. ובגוי אם היה מתכוין להעד אין עדותו עדות. אבא יודן איש צידן אומ' מעשה בגוי וישראל אחד שהיו מהלכין בדרך, אמ' אותו הגוי, הוי והבל על ישראל אחד שמת כאן וספדתיו וקברתיו, ובא מעשה לפני חכמים והשיאו את אשתו. אמ' רבן שמעון בן גמליאל מעשה בקולר של בני אדם שהלכו לאנטוכיא, בחזירתן אמרו, לא נהרג ממנו אלא פל' יהודי, ובא מעשה לפני חכמים והשיאו את אשתו. שוב מעשה בששים בני אדם שירדו לכרקום ביתר ולא עלה אחד מהם, ובא מעשה לפני חכמים והשיאו את נשיהם. אין מעידין עליו עד שיהו מזכירין שמו ושם אביו, שמו ושם עירו, אבל אמ' אחד יצא מעיר פלני, מפשפשין באותה העיר, אם לא יצא משם אלא הוא, תנשא אשתו.
Source 4 · Chazal
VerifiedKetubot 27b-28b
כתובות כ״ז ב-כ״ח ב
Ketubot 27b-28b
The sugya discusses testimony about a husband’s death, including testimony arising from wartime circumstances and the reliability of ordinary witnesses in matters of agunah. It is a central Talmudic foundation for the later lenient evidentiary framework.
אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים, אֲפִילּוּ עֶבֶד וַאֲפִילּוּ שִׁפְחָה נֶאֱמָנִין. וַאֲפִילּוּ שִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ מְהֵימְנָא? וּרְמִינְהִי: לֹא תִּתְיַיחֵד עִמּוֹ אֶלָּא עַל פִּי עֵדִים. וַאֲפִילּוּ עַל פִּי עֶבֶד וְעַל פִּי שִׁפְחָה. חוּץ מִשִּׁפְחָתָהּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלִּבָּהּ גַּס בְּשִׁפְחָתָהּ! אָמַר רַב פַּפֵּי: בִּשְׁבוּיָה הֵקֵילּוּ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָא וְהָא בְּשִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ, וְשִׁפְחָה מִיחְזָא חָזְיָא וְשָׁתְקָה. הָתָם דִּשְׁתִיקָתָהּ מַתִּירָתָהּ — לָא מְהֵימְנָא. הָכָא דִּשְׁתִיקָתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ — מְהֵימְנָא.
Source 5 · Chazal
VerifiedYevamot 122a
יבמות קכ״ב א — ד"ה אַבָּא יוּדָן אִישׁ צַיְידָן אָמַר
Yevamot 122a:3-4
Chachmei Bavel recounts cases in which Sages permitted widows to remarry based on a gentile’s report that their husbands had died and records the subsequent practice of accepting hearsay, slave, woman, or maidservant testimony, alongside dissenting restrictions by Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Akiva.
אַבָּא יוּדָן אִישׁ צַיְידָן אָמַר: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וְגוֹי שֶׁהָלְכוּ בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וּבָא גּוֹי וְאָמַר: ״חֲבָל עַל יְהוּדִי שֶׁהָיָה עִמִּי בַּדֶּרֶךְ שֶׁמֵּת בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וּקְבַרְתִּיו״, וְהִשִּׂיאוּ אִשְׁתּוֹ. וְשׁוּב מַעֲשֶׂה בְּקוֹלָר שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם, שֶׁהָיוּ מְהַלְּכִין לְאַנְטוֹכְיָא, וּבָא גּוֹי אֶחָד וְאָמַר: ״חֲבָל עַל קוֹלָר שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁמֵּתוּ, וּקְבַרְתִּים״, וְהִשִּׂיאוּ אֶת נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶם. וְשׁוּב מַעֲשֶׂה בְּשִׁשִּׁים בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁהָיוּ מְהַלְּכִין לְכַרְכּוֹם בֵּיתֵּר, וּבָא גּוֹי וְאָמַר: ״חֲבָל עַל שִׁשִּׁים בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁהָיוּ מְהַלְּכִין בְּדֶרֶךְ בֵּיתֵּר שֶׁמֵּתוּ, וּקְבַרְתִּים״ וְהִשִּׂיאוּ אֶת נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶם. מִתּוֹךְ הַדָּבָר, נִזְכַּר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל שֶׁנֶּהֶרְגוּ הֲרוּגִים בְּתֵל אַרְזָא, וְהִשִּׂיא רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶן עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד. וְהוּחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִין עֵד מִפִּי עֵד, מִפִּי עֶבֶד, מִפִּי אִשָּׁה, מִפִּי שִׁפְחָה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מַשִּׂיאִין אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: לֹא עַל פִּי אִשָּׁה, וְלֹא עַל פִּי עֶבֶד, וְלֹא עַל פִּי שִׁפְחָה, וְלֹא עַל פִּי קְרוֹבִים.
Abba Yudan of Sidon said: An incident occurred involving a Jew and a gentile who traveled on the road, and later the gentile came and said: Alas for the Jew who was with me on the road, for he died, and I buried him. And the Sages relied upon this statement and allowed his wife to marry. And there was another incident involving a group of people who had been taken prisoner, each of whom was shackled with a collar [kolar] around his neck, and they were walking to Antokhya. And some time later a certain gentile came and said: Alas for the group of collared people, for they died, and I buried them. And the Sages allowed their wives to marry. And there was yet another incident involving sixty people who were walking to the siege [karkom] of Beitar, and later a gentile came and said: Alas for those sixty people who were walking on the road to Beitar, for they died, and I buried them. And the Sages allowed their wives to marry. As a result of this event, Rabban Gamliel remembered that people were murdered in Tel Arza, and Rabban Gamliel then allowed their wives to remarry based on only one witness. And from then onward they established as protocol to allow a woman to remarry based on hearsay testimony, a slave’s testimony, a woman’s testimony, or a maidservant’s testimony. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua say: The court may not allow a woman to remarry based on only one witness. Rabbi Akiva says: The court may not allow a woman to marry based on the testimony of a woman, nor based on the testimony of a slave, nor based on the testimony of a maidservant, nor based on the testimony of close relatives.
Source 6 · Chazal
VerifiedYevamot 117b
יבמות קי״ז ב — ד"ה מַתְנִי׳ עֵד אוֹמֵר ״מֵת״
Yevamot 117b:4-6
Chachmei Bavel’s passage states that when one witness testifies that a husband died and the woman is permitted to remarry, a later contradictory single witness does not revoke that permission; however, two witnesses denying the death override one witness, while two witnesses affirming it permit her to marry even before doing so.
מַתְנִי׳ עֵד אוֹמֵר ״מֵת״, וְנִשֵּׂאת, וּבָא אֶחָד וְאָמַר ״לֹא מֵת״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תֵּצֵא. עֵד אוֹמֵר ״מֵת״, וּשְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים ״לֹא מֵת״ — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת, תֵּצֵא. שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים ״מֵת״, וְעֵד אוֹמֵר ״לֹא מֵת״ — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִשֵּׂאת, תִּנָּשֵׂא. גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּנִשֵּׂאת, הָא לֹא נִשֵּׂאת — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא. וְהָאָמַר עוּלָּא: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁהֶאֱמִינָה תּוֹרָה עֵד אֶחָד — הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם, וְאֵין דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל אֶחָד בִּמְקוֹם שְׁנַיִם. הָכִי קָאָמַר: עֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״מֵת״, וְהִתִּירוּהָ לְהִנָּשֵׂא, וּבָא אֶחָד וְאָמַר ״לֹא מֵת״ — לֹא תֵּצֵא מֵהֶיתֵּירָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן.
MISHNA: If one witness says: The man died, and the wife married based on this testimony, and one other witness came and said: He did not die, she need not leave her new husband due to this testimony. However, if one witness comes and says: The husband died, and two witnesses say: He did not die, then even though she married based on the first witness she must leave her new husband. If two witnesses say: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, the testimony of the two witnesses is accepted, and even though she did not yet marry, she may marry. GEMARA: The Gemara infers: The reason in the case of one witness contradicted by another witness is that she already married; however, if she did not yet marry and a second witness comes in the meantime and contradicts the statement of the first one, she may not marry. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Ulla say: Wherever you find that the Torah relies on one witness, his testimony is considered complete proof, as though there are two witnesses present here? If so, the witness who comes and testifies to the opposite is only one witness, and the statement of one witness has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses. Why, then, may she not remarry, even ab initio? The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna said: If one witness says: He died, and they permitted her to marry based on his testimony, and one other witness later came and said: He did not die, she does not leave her initial, permitted state, i.e., the permission she was granted to remarry is still in force, and she may marry ab initio.
Source 7 · Chazal
VerifiedYevamot 121b
יבמות קכ״א ב — ד"ה מַתְנִי׳ אֲפִילּוּ שָׁמַע מִן הַנָּשִׁים אוֹמְרוֹת
Yevamot 121b:9
Chachmei Bavel discuss accepting reports of death from women, children, or a gentile speaking casually, including cases where Rav Yosef—or possibly Rava—permitted the deceased man’s wife to remarry based on such a report.
מַתְנִי׳ אֲפִילּוּ שָׁמַע מִן הַנָּשִׁים אוֹמְרוֹת ״מֵת אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי״ — דַּיּוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ שָׁמַע מִן הַתִּינוֹקוֹת אוֹמְרִים ״הֲרֵי אָנוּ הוֹלְכִין לִסְפּוֹד וְלִקְבּוֹר אֶת אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי״. בֵּין שֶׁהוּא מִתְכַּוֵּין, וּבֵין שֶׁאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּין. גְּמָ׳ וְדִלְמָא לָא אָזְלִי? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, דְּקָאָמְרִי: ״הָרֵינוּ בָּאִין מִלִּסְפּוֹד וּמִלִּקְבּוֹר אֶת אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי״. אֶלָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי: וּבְגוֹי, אִם הָיָה מִתְכַּוֵּין — אֵין עֵדוּתוֹ עֵדוּת, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? בְּמֵסִיחַ לְפִי תּוּמּוֹ. כִּי הָהוּא דַּהֲוָה קָאָמַר וְאָזֵיל: ״מַאן אִיכָּא בֵּי חִיוַּאי, מַאן אִיכָּא בֵּי חִיוַּאי, שְׁכֵיב חִיוַּאי״, וְאַנְסְבַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף לִדְבֵיתְהוּ. הָהוּא דַּהֲוָה קָאָמַר וְאָזֵיל: ״וַוי לֵיהּ לְפָרָשָׁא זְרִיזָא דַּהֲוָה בְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא דִּשְׁכֵיב״, וְאַנְסְבַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף, וְאִיתֵּימָא רָבָא, לִדְבֵיתְהוּ.
MISHNA: Even if one heard from the women, who were saying: So-and-so died, this is sufficient in order to testify to his death. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if one heard from the children, who were saying: We are going to eulogize and bury so-and-so, that is also sufficient. Furthermore, one may rely upon someone mentioning that a man died, regardless of whether the speaker intends to testify and thereby allow the man’s wife to remarry or whether he does not intend to offer formal testimony. GEMARA: With regard to relying on what children said, that they are going to eulogize and bury so-and-so, the Gemara asks: Perhaps they will not go; perhaps they only assumed that the individual would die, but in the end he didn’t. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is referring to a situation where the children say: We are coming from eulogizing and burying so-and-so. The Gemara asks: But, if that is so, what about that which is taught in the mishna: With regard to a gentile, if he intended to testify, his testimony is not considered valid testimony, which implies that if the gentile does not intend to testify, his statement may be relied upon? How can you find a case where one would rely on his statement? The Gemara answers: One may rely on a gentile’s statement when he speaks offhandedly, without any intention to testify. Like that gentile who was going around saying: Who is from the house of Ḥivvai; who is from the house of Ḥivvai? Ḥivvai has died. And based upon this report, Rav Yosef allowed Ḥivvai’s wife to marry. There was also a certain gentile who was going around saying: Alas for the brave horseman who was in Pumbedita, for he is dead. And Rav Yosef, and some say Rava, allowed his wife to marry.
Source 8 · Chazal
VerifiedYevamot 117a
יבמות קי״ז א — ד"ה אָמְרוּ לָהֶם בֵּית שַׁמַּאי
Yevamot 117a:2-3
Chachmei Bavel report that Beit Shammai derived from the marriage contract that a woman believed when she testifies that her husband died is entitled to her ketubah, and that Beit Hillel ultimately adopted this ruling; Rav Ḥisda adds that if she entered levirate marriage based on her testimony, her yavam inherits his deceased brother’s property.
אָמְרוּ לָהֶם בֵּית שַׁמַּאי: וַהֲלֹא מִסֵּפֶר כְּתוּבָּה נִלְמוֹד, שֶׁהוּא כּוֹתֵב לָהּ: שֶׁאִם תִּנָּשְׂאִי לְאַחֵר תִּטְּלִי מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב לִיכִי. וְחָזְרוּ בֵּית הִלֵּל לְהוֹרוֹת כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי. גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: נִתְיַיבְּמָה — יְבָמָהּ נִכְנָס לַנַּחֲלָה עַל פִּיהָ. הֵם דָּרְשׁוּ מִדְרַשׁ כְּתוּבָּה — אָנוּ לֹא נִדְרוֹשׁ מִדְרַשׁ תּוֹרָה?!
Beit Shammai said to them: But we can learn this halakha from the scroll of the marriage contract, as every husband writes for her that: If you marry another man, take what is written for you in this contract. This shows that her right to receive the money of her marriage contract is dependent upon her eligibility to remarry. In this case, as she is deemed credible when she says her husband died and she may marry again, she is likewise entitled to the money of the marriage contract. And Beit Hillel again retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda said: If the woman entered into levirate marriage based upon her own testimony, her yavam comes into the inheritance of the property of his dead brother based on her testimony. He adds: If Beit Shammai taught their halakha that she is entitled to her money, by interpreting homiletically the language of a marriage contract, will we not teach by interpreting homiletically the Torah itself?
Source 9 · Chazal
VerifiedYevamot 119a:1
תלמוד בבלי, יבמות קיט א, וראה שם עוד
Yevamot 119a:1
The passage states that when a woman’s husband and co-wife traveled overseas and witnesses reported that her husband had died, she may neither remarry nor enter levirate marriage until determining whether her co-wife might be pregnant.
הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ וְצָרָתָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וּבָאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ: ״מֵת בַּעְלִיךְ״ — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא, וְלֹא תִּתְיַיבֵּם עַד שֶׁתֵּדַע שֶׁמָּא מְעוּבֶּרֶת הִיא צָרָתָהּ.
Source 10 · Chazal
VerifiedKetubot 22a
כתובות כ״ב א — ד"ה מַתְנִי׳ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה
Ketubot 22a:5-6
Chachmei Bavel present the rule that a woman’s own statement can both establish a restrictive status and permit her by clarifying it, but that this does not suffice against witnesses; Rav Asi derives the principle from Devarim 22:16, where “to a man” restricts her and “this man” permits her to her husband.
מַתְנִי׳ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ הָיִיתִי וּגְרוּשָׁה אֲנִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר, הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהָיְתָה אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: ״גְּרוּשָׁה אֲנִי״, אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. אָמְרָה: ״נִשְׁבֵּיתִי, וּטְהוֹרָה אֲנִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר, הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁנִּשְׁבֵּית, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת: ״טְהוֹרָה אֲנִי״ — אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. וְאִם מִשֶּׁנִּשֵּׂאת בָּאוּ עֵדִים — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תֵּצֵא. גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: מִנַּיִן לְהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר מִן הַתּוֹרָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אֶת בִּתִּי נָתַתִּי לָאִישׁ הַזֶּה לְאִשָּׁה״. ״לָאִישׁ״ — אָסְרָה, ״הַזֶּה״ — הִתִּירָה.
MISHNA: With regard to a woman who said: I was a married woman and now I am a divorcée, she is deemed credible and permitted to remarry, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was married is the mouth that permitted, and established that she is divorced. However, if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am a divorcée, she is not deemed credible. Similarly, with regard to a woman who said: I was taken captive but I am pure, as I was not raped in captivity, she is deemed credible and permitted to marry a priest, as the mouth that prohibited and established that she was taken captive is the mouth that permitted and established that she was not defiled. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not deemed credible. And if witnesses came after she married, this woman need not leave her husband. GEMARA: Rav Asi said: From where in the Torah is the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, derived? It is derived as it is stated: “I gave my daughter to this man [la’ish hazeh] as a wife” (Deuteronomy 22:16). When the father said that he married her off “to the man [la’ish]” without revealing his identity, he rendered her forbidden to all men. When he then says “this [hazeh],” thereby identifying the man to whom he married her off, he renders her permitted to her husband.
Source 11 · Chazal
VerifiedYevamot 25a
יבמות כ״ה א — ד"ה מַתְנִי׳ הַמֵּבִיא גֵּט מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם
Yevamot 25a:8
Chachmei Bavel present a mishna in which an agent who validates a get or a witness who reports a husband’s death may not marry the wife, while the Gemara examines whether others may rely on such testimony in light of Rav Yosef’s ruling about a witness who admits to willingly committing a sexual transgression.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמֵּבִיא גֵּט מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם, וְאָמַר: ״בְּפָנַי נִכְתַּב וּבְפָנַי נֶחְתַּם״ — לֹא יִשָּׂא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ. ״מֵת״, ״הֲרַגְתִּיו״, ״הֲרַגְנוּהוּ״ — לֹא יִשָּׂא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״הֲרַגְתִּיו״ — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא אִשְׁתּוֹ, ״הֲרַגְנוּהוּ״ — תִּנָּשֵׂא אִשְׁתּוֹ. ״מֵת״, ״הֲרַגְתִּיו״, ״הֲרַגְנוּהוּ״ — לֹא יִשָּׂא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ. הוּא נִיהוּ דְּלֹא יִשָּׂא אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, הָא לְאַחֵר תִּנָּשֵׂא. וְהָאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: ״פְּלוֹנִי רְבָעַנִי לְאוֹנְסִי״ — הוּא וְאַחֵר מִצְטָרְפִין לְהׇרְגוֹ. ״לִרְצוֹנִי״ — רָשָׁע הוּא, וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: ״אַל תָּשֶׁת יָדְךָ עִם רָשָׁע לִהְיוֹת עֵד חָמָס״?
MISHNA: An agent who brought a bill of divorce from a country overseas and said: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, as required in order to establish the bill of divorce as valid, may not marry the wife, i.e., the divorcée. Since the validity of the bill of divorce is based upon his testimony, marrying the divorcée creates the impression that he had an ulterior motive for his testimony. Similarly, a witness who testified that a certain man died, or testified: I killed him, or: We killed him, may not marry that man’s wife. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he testified: I killed him, his wife may not be married at all based on that evidence, as his testimony is unreliable, but if he said: We killed him, his wife may be married to anyone other than those witnesses. The mishna stated that if the witness said with regard to the husband that he died, or: I killed him, or: We killed him, then he may not marry the wife of the deceased. The Gemara infers that he, the witness himself, may not marry the wife; this implies that to another she may be married on the basis of his testimony. The Gemara challenges this: Didn’t Rav Yosef say: With regard to one who testified that so-and-so sodomized me against my will, then he who testified to being the victim of the sexual assault and another bystander witness can combine as a pair of witnesses in order to put the assailant to death for homosexual intercourse. But if he testified: I was willingly sodomized by so-and-so, then he is wicked by his own admission, since he willingly transgressed. And the Torah said: “Put not your hand with the wicked to be a corrupt witness” (Exodus 23:1). If one renders himself unfit as a witness by admitting to murder, how can his testimony be accepted to permit the wife to remarry?
Source 12 · Chazal
VerifiedGittin 89b
גיטין פ״ט ב — ד"ה אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא לְרַב פָּפָּא
Gittin 89b:5-7
Chachmei Bavel explain that when a woman was betrothed after her husband was presumed dead and he later returned, she may return to him because his objection reveals that the betrothal was mistaken; if she had married the second man, however, the Sages penalized her for the prohibited intercourse, while no penalty applies when she was only betrothed.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא לְרַב פָּפָּא: וְאַתְּ לָא תִּסְבְּרַאּ?! וְהָתְנַן: נִתְקַדְּשָׁה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא בַּעְלָהּ – מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר. לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן עַל תְּנַאי קַדֵּישׁ? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָתֵי בַּעַל וְקָא מְעַרְעֵר. אִי הָכִי, נִישֵּׂאת נָמֵי! נִישֵּׂאת, דַּעֲבַדָה אִיסּוּרָא – קַנְסוּהָ רַבָּנַן; נִתְקַדְּשָׁה, דְּלָא עֲבַדָה אִיסּוּרָא – לָא קַנְסוּהָ רַבָּנַן.
Rav Kahana said to Rav Pappa: And you, do you not hold Rav Zevid’s statement to be true? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that if a woman was betrothed after her husband was taken for dead, and then her husband came back, she is permitted to return to him (Yevamot 92a), which would not have been the case if she had been married and not merely betrothed? Isn’t this because we say that the second man betrothed her conditionally, stipulating that if her husband is found to be alive the betrothal is null, even though this explanation did not circulate explicitly? The Gemara answers: It is different there because the husband comes and contests the betrothal, which shows clearly that he never divorced her and that her betrothal was mistaken. Therefore, there is no need for an additional explanation. The Gemara asks: If so, in a case where she married the second man, it should also be permitted for her to return to her first husband. Why do the Sages render it prohibited for her to do so? The Gemara answers: In a case where she married him, since she performed a prohibited action, albeit unintentionally, by engaging in sexual intercourse with a man who is not her husband while she was married, the Sages penalized her. By contrast, in a case where she was merely betrothed, since she did not perform a prohibited action, the Sages did not penalize her.
Source 13 · Chazal
VerifiedShabbat 56a:8
שבת נ״ו א
Shabbat 56a:8-9
Rav's defense of David regarding Uriah, based on the practice that David's soldiers gave their wives a get before battle, so Bathsheba was not a married woman.
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: כׇּל הַיּוֹצֵא לְמִלְחֶמֶת בֵּית דָּוִד, כּוֹתֵב גֵּט כְּרִיתוּת לְאִשְׁתּוֹ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאֵת עֲשֶׂרֶת חֲרִיצֵי הֶחָלָב הָאֵלֶּה תָּבִיא לְשַׂר הָאָלֶף וְאֶת אַחֶיךָ תִּפְקֹד לְשָׁלוֹם וְאֶת עֲרֻבָּתָם תִּקָּח״.
מַאי ״עֲרֻבָּתָם״? — תָּנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: דְּבָרִים הַמְעוֹרָבִים בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ.
Source 14 · Chazal
VerifiedSifrei Devarim 190:5
ספרי, שופטים קצ
Sifrei Devarim 190:5
The passage expounds the repeated phrase “ היטב” in Devarim as teaching that judges must investigate testimony through seven formal inquiries and additional examinations to establish that the matter is true and substantiated.
לִפְנֵי ה׳ – הֵם סְבוּרִים לִפְנֵי בָּשָׂר וָדָם הֵם עוֹמְדִים, וְאֵינָם אֶלָּא לִפְנֵי הַמָּקוֹם! (דברים יט יח) וְדָרְשׁוּ הַשֹּׁפְטִים הֵיטֵב, וּלְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר (דברים יז ד): ״וְהֻגַּד לְךָ וְשָׁמַעְתָּ וְדָרַשְׁתָּ הֵיטֵב״ – הֵיטֵב הֵיטֵב לִגְזֵרָה שָׁוָה, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁבּוֹדְקִים אוֹתוֹ בְּשֶׁבַע חֲקִירוֹת. אֵין לִי אֶלָּא חֲקִירוֹת, בְּדִיקוֹת מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר (דברים יג טו): ״וְהִנֵּה אֱמֶת נָכוֹן הַדָּבָר״.
Source 15 · Chazal
attestedMidrash Tehillim (Shocher Tov)
שוחר טוב, מדרש שמואל פרשה פרשה כב
Midrash Tehillim (Shocher Tov)
The passage records a dispute over whether the exemption of a newly married man from military service applies in a מלחמת מצוה or a מלחמת חובה, citing the principle that in one of these wars everyone goes forth, even a groom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy.
כיון ששמעו פלשתים שנשא דוד אשה, אמרו כתיב בתורה (דברים כ"ד) כי יקח איש אשה חדשה וגו', הרי שעה שנקפוץ על דוד ונאבדנו מן העולם. והן אינן יודעין שדוד חכם ודורש במה דברים אמורים במלחמת הרשות, אבל במלחמת מצוה הכל יוצא אפילו חתן מחדרו וכלה מחופתה, רבי יהודה אומר לא כי, אלא במה דברים אמורים במלחמת מצוה, אבל במלחמת חובה הכל יוצא אפילו חתן מחדרו וכלה מחופתה...