Otherכללי

Is Kneeling Permitted When Proposing Marriage?

The sources found do not address whether kneeling is permitted during a marriage proposal. The passages discuss forms of bowing in rabbinic law, permitted and forbidden conduct related to marriage, and wedding procedures, but none directly engage with the specific halakhic status of kneeling as a gesture in a proposal context.

כְּרִיעָה — עַל בִּרְכַּיִם

7 sources · 6 verified

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What the sources say

None of the gathered sources directly discuss the practice of kneeling (כריעה) specifically as part of a marriage proposal. The Gemara in Megillah 22b defines keria as bowing upon one's knees, distinguishing it from kidda (bowing on the face) and hishtachava'a (full prostration), but this is a general discussion of forms of bowing in prayer and submission, not a discussion of proposal customs.

The sources that do bear on the marriage process address different questions entirely: Rav Mordechai Eliyahu (Darchei Tahara 26:14) discusses whether a man may look at a woman he intends to marry, ruling that he may see her to determine if she is to his liking but may not gaze at her in a licentious manner. Levush, Even HaEzer 2:10 addresses the propriety of marrying with intent to divorce, and permits it only if disclosed in advance.

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 339:4 and Mishnah Berurah 339:15-17 discuss the prohibition against performing betrothal (kiddushin) on Shabbat, with exceptions for a man who has no wife and children, but this concerns the timing of the halachic act of kiddushin, not any gesture of kneeling during a proposal.

Ketubot 57b:1-3 discusses the twelve-month period given to a virgin bride to prepare before her wedding, derived from the verse about Rebecca (Ketubot 57b:1-3), which likewise has no bearing on kneeling.

Nitei Gavriel, Nisuin vol 2, perek 71 does address the question of kneeling directly in a marriage context, citing sources that state the custom is not to kneel, and noting that the Shulchan Aruch HaRav and the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch make no mention of kneeling at all as part of the marriage process.

Taken together, the sources do not establish a scope of what is permitted or forbidden regarding kneeling specifically within a marriage proposal; the Talmudic and halachic sources here address bowing in general (Megillah 22b), viewing a prospective bride (Rav Mordechai Eliyahu (Darchei Tahara 26:14)), intent in marriage (Levush, Even HaEzer 2:10), and the timing of kiddushin (Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 339:4, Mishnah Berurah 339:15-17), none of which reach the question of kneeling during a proposal as such.

Source 1 · Chazal
Verified

Megillah 22b

מגילה כ״ב ב — ד"ה תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן

Megillah 22b:16

Chachmei Bavel distinguish three forms of bowing: kidda, falling face-down; keria, kneeling; and hishtaḥava’a, spreading out the hands and legs in complete prostration.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: קִידָּה — עַל אַפַּיִם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַתִּקֹּד בַּת שֶׁבַע אַפַּיִם אֶרֶץ״. כְּרִיעָה — עַל בִּרְכַּיִם, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״מִכְּרוֹעַ עַל בִּרְכָּיו״. הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה — זוֹ פִּישּׁוּט יָדַיִם וְרַגְלַיִם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הֲבוֹא נָבוֹא אֲנִי וְאִמְּךָ וְאַחֶיךָ לְהִשְׁתַּחֲוֹת לְךָ אָרְצָה״.

Apropos Rav’s practice of prostrating himself, the Gemara continues with a discussion of different forms of bowing. The Sages taught in a baraita: The term kidda indicates falling upon one’s face, with one’s face toward the ground, as it is stated: “Then Bathsheba bowed [vatikod] with her face to the ground” (I Kings 1:31). Keria means bowing upon one’s knees, as it is stated with regard to Solomon: He finished praying and “he rose from before the altar of the Lord, from kneeling [mikkeroa] upon his knees” (I Kings 8:54). Finally, hishtaḥava’a, that is bowing with one’s arms and legs spread in total submission, as it is stated that Jacob asked, in response to Joseph’s dream: “Shall I and your mother and your brothers indeed come to bow down [lehishtaḥavot] to you to the ground?” (Genesis 37:10).

Source 2 · Chazal
Verified

Ketubot 57b

כתובות נ״ז ב — ד"ה אֵין הָאִשָּׁה אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס

Ketubot 57b:1-3

Chachmei Bavel state that a woman may not eat teruma until she enters the wedding canopy, and derive from the account of Rebecca that a virgin is allotted time to prepare for marriage, with “days” meaning a year and “ten” meaning ten months.

אֵין הָאִשָּׁה אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לַחוּפָּה. גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וַיֹּאמֶר אָחִיהָ וְאִמָּהּ תֵּשֵׁב הַנַּעֲרָה אִתָּנוּ יָמִים אוֹ עָשׂוֹר״. מַאי ״יָמִים״? אִילֵּימָא תְּרֵי יוֹמֵי, מִשְׁתַּעֵי אִינִישׁ הָכִי? אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: תְּרֵי יוֹמֵי, אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ עַשְׂרָה יוֹמֵי?! אֶלָּא מַאי ״יָמִים״ — שָׁנָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״יָמִים תִּהְיֶה גְּאוּלָּתוֹ״.

A woman may not partake of teruma until she has actually entered the wedding canopy. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, that a virgin is given twelve months to prepare for her wedding? Rav Ḥisda said it is based on the fact that the verse states with regard to Rebecca: “And her brother and mother said: Let the damsel abide with us for days, or ten” (Genesis 24:55). The Gemara first analyzes the language of the verse: What is the meaning of “days”? If we say two days, the minimum number justifying the use of the plural, does a person really speak like this? Rebecca’s relatives said to Abraham’s servant that they wanted her to stay for two days, after which he said to them no, as he did not want to wait even that long. If so, is it possible that after that they said to him that they wanted her to stay for ten days? Consequently, it is impossible to explain the word “days” as two days and “ten” as ten days. Rather, what is the meaning of “days”? It means: A year, as it is written: “For days he shall have redemption” (Leviticus 25:29), and there it is explained that “days” is referring to a year. Consequently, in the verse “And her brother and mother said: Let the damsel abide with us for days, or ten” (Genesis 24:55), “days” refers to a year, and “ten” refers to a shorter period of similar magnitude, i.e. ten months, in order to prepare for her wedding.

Source 3 · Acharonim
Verified

Levush, Even HaEzer 2:10

לבוש מלכות, Even HaEzer ב׳:י׳ — ד"ה לא ישא אדם אשה ודעתו לגרשה

Levush, Even HaEzer 2:10

Mordechai Jaffe states that a man should not marry a woman intending to divorce her, citing Mishlei 3:29; however, it is permitted if he informs her beforehand that he is marrying her for a specified period.

לא ישא אדם אשה ודעתו לגרשה, ועל זה הזהיר שלמה עליו השלום: "אל תחרש על רעיך רעה והוא יושב לבטח אתך" משלי ג כט. ואם הודיעה תחילה שהוא נושא אותה לימים ידועים, מותר:

Source 4 · Acharonim
Verified

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim

שולחן ערוך, אורח חיים של״ט:ד׳ — ד"ה אין דנין

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 339:4

Joseph Karo’s passage states that betrothal and weddings are generally not performed at that time, though some permit them in pressing circumstances when the man has no wife or children, relying on human dignity; it also lists other actions that are not performed and says that if any of these were done inadvertently, deliberately, or mistakenly, they remain effective.

אין דנין: הגה ולכן אסור לתפוס ולהכניס לבית הסוהר מי שנתחייב איזה עונש כדי שלא יברח וכל שכן שאסור להלקותו דהוה בכלל דין ואם יברח אין עלינו כלום (ב"י סוף סימן רס"ג בשם שבולי הלקט) ולא מקדשין: הגה ויש מתירין לקדש היכא דאין לו אשה ובנים (ר"ת) ואפשר דה"ה הכניסה לחופה שרי (סמ"ג) ואע"ג דלא קי"ל הכי מ"מ סומכין על זה בשעת הדחק כי גדול כבוד הבריות כמו שרגילין שלפעמים שלא היו יכולים להשוות עם הנדוניא יום ו' עד הלילה דעושין החופה והקידושין בליל שבת הואיל וכבר הוכנו לסעודה ולנשואין והוי ביוש לכלה ולחתן אם לא יכנוס אז ומ"מ לכתחלה יש ליזהר שלא יבא לידי כך (ועיין בטור אבן העזר סימן ס"ג): ולא חולצין ולא מיבמין ואין כונסין ולא מקדישין ולא מעריכין ולא מחרימין ולא מפרישין תרומות ומעשרות ואין פודין הבן ואין מגרשין אלא אם כן הוא גט שכיב מרע (דתקיף ליה עלמא) וכולם אם נעשו שוגגין או מזידין או מוטעין מה שעשוי עשוי:

We do not hold court. Rem"a: Therefore, it was forbidden to arrest and imprison someone who deserved a punishment in order that he not escape. All the more so is it forbidden to give him lashings, because this is a legal matter. If he escapes, we are not liable (Beit Yosef Chapter 253 in the name of the Shibbolei haLeket). We do not betroth women. Rem"a: There are some who allow betrothing when the man has no wife and children (Rabbeinu Tam), and it is possible that this also the rule with regards to a wedding (Sma"g). Even though our established practice is not like this opinion, we can rely on it in a pressing situation, for the additional reason that human dignity is important. It often happens that they do not work out the dowry on Friday until nightfall, and in that case they do the betrothing and wedding on Friday night, because they already have the wedding meal ready and it would be embarrassing for the bridge and groom to not marry then. In any event, a priori one should be careful that it not come to this (and see Tur Even HaEzer Chapter 63). And we do not do chalitza nor we do yibum [levirate marriage], nor do we have a wedding, nor do we dedicate objects to the temple, nor do we dedicate the value of a person or an animal to the Temple, nor do we renounce private use of an object, nor do we separate trumot or maasrot, nor do we redeem a firstborn son [[[wikipedia:pidyon haben|pidyon haben]]], nor do we divorce unless he is very ill (the world is weighing heavily on him). For all of these things, if they were done, whether by mistake, on purpose, or erroneously, what was done is regarded has having been [legally] done.

See also

Source 5 · Acharonim
Verified

recovered from “Mishnah Berurah 339:19”

Mishnah Berurah

משנה ברורה של״ט:ט״ו-י״ז — ד"ה (טו) ולא מקדשין - גם זה

Mishnah Berurah 339:15-17

Israel Meir Kagan (Chafetz Chaim) explains that betrothal alone does not effect the full legal acquisition of a woman, whereas bringing her under the chuppah does and is therefore treated as a forbidden transaction on Shabbat; nevertheless, he notes a view permitting the wedding on Shabbat when this fulfills the mitzvah of procreation for someone without a wife and children.

(טו) ולא מקדשין - גם זה מחמת גזירה שמא יכתוב אבל לא מטעם דהוא כקונה קנין בשבת דהא בקידושין לבד בלא חופה לא קנאה עדיין ליורשה ולמציאתה ולמעשה ידיה וכן אם אפילו היו הקידושין מבעוד יום מבואר בהמחבר לקמיה דאסור להכניסה לחופה בשבת והיינו מטעם דע"י החופה קונה אותה לכל הדברים האלו הנ"ל והוי כמקח וממכר דאסור בשבת: (טז) היכא דאין לו אשה ובנים - וה"ה ביש לו בנים ואין לו אשה ג"כ מותר לדעה זו דמצוה קעביד כדאמרינן ביבמות [ס"ב] מקרא בבקר זרע את זרעך ולערב אל תנח ידך וגו': (יז) ואפשר דה"ה וכו' - ר"ל אף דע"י החופה קונה אותה לכמה דברים וכנ"ל אפ"ה כיון דלית ליה אשה ובנים ויש בזה מצות פו"ר סבירא ליה דיש להקל בזה:

Source 6 · Modern
External

Rav Gavriel Zinner (Nitei Gavriel, Nisuin vol 2, perek 71)

נטעי גבריאל, נשואין ב פרק ע״א

Nitei Gavriel, Nisuin vol 2, perek 71

ה passage cites sources stating that the custom is not to kneel, noting that the Shulchan Aruch HaRav and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch do not mention kneeling.

On this pageה passage cites sources stating that the custom is not to kneel, noting that the Shulchan Aruch HaRav and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch do not mention kneeling.

Nitei Gavriel, Nisuin vol 2, perek 71 — page scan on HebrewBooks
Page 113

Nitei Gavriel is not freely available in text. This PDF surfaced in our research. Please use the feedback buttons below to help us improve.

Source 7 · Modern
Verified

Rav Mordechai Eliyahu (Darchei Tahara 26:14)

דרכי טהרה, כ״ו:י״ד — ד"ה אשה שהוא רוצה לישא אותה –

Darchei Tahara 26:14

Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu states that a man may and should look at a woman he wishes to marry to determine whether she is suitable for him, but he may not gaze at her in a lustful manner, as expressed in the verse, “I have made a covenant with my eyes; how then could I gaze at a virgin?

אשה שהוא רוצה לישא אותה – מותר לו וראוי לו לראותה אם היא לרצונו, אבל לא יסתכל בה דרך זנות, ועל זה נאמר: "ברית כרתי לעיני ומה אתבונן על בתולה".

Related sources· 1 found, not yet verifiedSign in to verify
  • ולפי האמור יש לפרש ענין שהשתחואה שהיא פישוט ידים ורגלים רומז שהוא מסלק התפשטות הידים למעלה והרגלים למטה, ומבטל הכל לרצון השי"ת... אך בענין כריעה שהיא על ברכים, אין כאן ביטול התפשטות הידים אלא ביטול התפשטות הרגלים לבד, ועל כן כריעה אינה ביטול השכל, אלא ביטול כחות הנפש, דהיינו מדותיה ותשוקותיה...

    from our library copy — not yet checked against the original

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