The core sugya establishes that a change wrought in a stolen object causes the thief to acquire it, derived from the phrase "that he took by robbery" in the pasuk, which teaches that only if the item is returned in the same state as when stolen must it be returned, but otherwise only payment is required (Bava Kamma 67a:9-11), and the Gemara further explains that a change even in name—such as a hide that becomes known as a table top—functions like a physical change wrought by an action, since the underlying entity has become something new (Bava Kamma 66b:14-15).
The Mishnah and Gemara on Bava Kamma 93b-94a illustrate this principle through concrete cases: one who robs wood and fashions it into vessels, or wool into garments, pays only the value at the time of the robbery and keeps the finished item, because the change is significant—mere sanding or whitening alone does not suffice (Bava Kamma 93b-94a). The Rambam codifies this, listing burning, cutting, carving, dyeing, spinning, whitening, weaving, pulverizing a brick, smoothing stones, and melting coins as effecting such a change, while renewing old coins by polishing them does not count since they can revert to their original state (Mishneh Torah, Robbery and Lost Property 2:12-15).
The Shulchan Arukh rules in accordance with this: an unchanged stolen item must be returned itself, whether before or after the owner's despair of recovery, but once it is changed in the thief's possession, the thief acquires it and its increase in value, paying only its monetary worth (Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 354:2-7), and elsewhere clarifies that the change must not be reversible—gluing boards into a box is not a change since it can be undone, whereas cutting and carving boards into vessels, or dyeing wool, or melting metal into coins, are genuine, irreversible changes (Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 360:5-6).
The Arukh HaShulchan addresses the specific case of a stolen animal that gives birth or is shorn while in the thief's possession, noting a dispute among the Rishonim as to whether this constitutes a true change acquiring the body of the animal itself, or only the offspring and wool as a rabbinic penalty for the sake of encouraging repentance (Arukh HaShulchan, Choshen Mishpat 354:4-8), a dispute also addressed by the Ketzot HaChoshen, who lays out the positions of the Rambam, Raavad, Ramban, and Baal HaMaor on whether birth and shearing change the body of the cow itself (Ketzot HaChoshen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 354:1-2), and by the Netivot HaMishpat, who questions whether such a change acquires even without the owner's despair (Netivot HaMishpat, Beurim on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 354:1-2).
Bava Kamma 95a records a further Talmudic inquiry into Rabbi Meir's position—whether he holds that a change leaves the item in its place (so that increase in value belongs to the original owner) or that a change generally does effect acquisition, with Rabbi Meir's ruling in that case understood instead as a penalty (Bava Kamma 95a:4).
Bava Kamma 66a frames the dispute between the Amoraim as one solely about whether a change effects acquisition, noting that all opinions agree that for purposes of the double and fourfold/fivefold payments, the thief still pays based on the item's state at the time of the theft (Bava Kamma 66a:2), and the Ketzot HaChoshen, discussing despair of recovery (yeush) together with change, notes the Gemara's proof that one may consecrate a stolen item once the owner has despaired, and that the combination of despair with a change in name (from chullin to hekdesh) achieves acquisition even for the opinion that despair alone does not (Ketzot HaChoshen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 353:1-3, Ketzot HaChoshen on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 360:2-4).
Bava Kamma 67b addresses a related consequence of change and despair together, ruling that if a second thief steals from a first thief after the owner's despair, the first thief has already acquired the item through that despair and the second thief must pay the double payment to the first thief as the item's legal owner (Bava Kamma 67b:17).
The Reshimot Shiurim raises a conceptual question underlying all these sources: whether a change constitutes an independent act of acquisition in its own right, or whether it merely exempts the thief from the obligation of returning the actual item because it is no longer "like what he stole," with the acquisitions already inherent in the robbery then simply taking effect (Reshimot Shiurim on Bava Kamma 66a:1).