Halachaהלכה

Refrigerator Use and Shabbat Electricity

Sources examine the Shabbat prohibitions surrounding actions that produce unintended secondary effects, including the principles of pesik reisha (inevitable consequence) and davar she'ein mitkavin (unintended result). These frameworks apply to modern appliances where opening a door triggers a change in mechanical operation.

דבר שאין מתכוין מותר

19 sources · 15 verified

Opens as a working sheet — explore, annotate, and export.

What the sources say

The question of using an inverter-motor refrigerator on Shabbat, where opening the door alters the motor's operation, touches several distinct halachic issues that must be analyzed separately.

Use of electricity on Shabbat

The Rambam rules that one who kindles even the smallest fire is liable provided he needs what the fire produces, and that lighting a candle for warmth or light constitutes a Torah violation (the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 12:1-4)), establishing the foundational framework within which later authorities debated whether activating an electrical circuit carries the same prohibition.

The Minchas Shlomo (Minchas Shlomo 1:11) cites the Chazon Ish's position that completing an electrical circuit constitutes the Torah prohibition of Boneh — building or fixing a vessel — because it establishes the functional state of the electrical path, a stringency directly relevant to any change in the refrigerator motor's operation caused by opening the door.

Rav Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 4:127) explains that using electricity for a refrigerator on Shabbat may be permitted on the grounds that the prohibition of benefiting from a Jew's forbidden labor is only rabbinic in nature, and one may rely on leniencies — such as the need to operate power plants for hospitals — particularly where food spoilage is at stake.

Explore this topic

Melacha she-eino tzerikha legufah

The Rambam establishes that one who kindles a fire destructively is exempt because he is causing ruin rather than performing a constructive act, and that liability requires the act to be tzricha legufah — needed for its own constructive purpose (the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 12:1-4)), a principle that bears on whether altering a motor's speed, which the user neither desires nor needs, constitutes a prohibited labor.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:68) rules that opening a refrigerator door when a light inside will inevitably turn on is forbidden as a pesik reishei that is beneficial to the user, implying that where the consequence is unwanted or destructive in character the analysis of whether the melacha serves the person's body would differ.

Explore this topic

Grama and indirect causation

The Gemara in Shabbat 120b records that opening a door opposite a fire on Shabbat was disputed — with Abaye cursing those who did so — and concludes that the prohibition of melacha applies to direct action while grama, indirect causation, is permitted, though Poskim debated whether to extend this leniency even where a typical wind is expected (Shabbat 120b).

The Shulchan Aruch rules that it is forbidden to open a door next to a candle lest the wind extinguish it, and that where the candle is fixed to the door itself such that opening directly moves the oil closer or farther from the flame it is forbidden entirely, illustrating how the degree of directness of causation determines the prohibition (the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 277:1)).

The Mishnah Berurah clarifies that the prohibition applies specifically when the candle is directly opposite the door opening and close enough that wind from outside could extinguish it, and notes that in a pressing situation one may open the door slowly so as not to cause a draft from the door itself, a nuanced treatment of indirect versus direct causation (the Mishnah Berurah (277)).

The Gemara establishes that even Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an unintentional act is permitted, concedes that where a forbidden consequence is an inevitable result — pesik reishei, 'cut off its head and will it not die' — the act is prohibited, and both Abaye and Rava agree on this point (Shabbat 133a).

The Rambam rules that an act whose forbidden consequence is merely possible but not certain is permitted when the person did not intend the forbidden outcome, but where the forbidden consequence is inevitable no such leniency applies (the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 1:5-7)), and the Shulchan Aruch and Mishnah Berurah codify this distinction by defining pesik reishei as a case where the forbidden melacha will certainly result (the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 337:1); the Mishnah Berurah (337)).

The Rambam further rules that melacha begun before Shabbat that completes itself automatically on Shabbat is permitted, since the Torah forbids only labor performed by a person on Shabbat itself (the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 3:1)), a principle that informs whether a refrigerator motor's autonomous response to a door-opening constitutes the owner's direct act or a form of grama.

Explore this topic
Source 1 · Chazal
Verified

Shabbat 133a

שבת קל״ג א — ד"ה אָמַר אַבָּיֵי

Shabbat 133a:3

This daf contains a central discussion of pesik reisha and whether an inevitable result may be disregarded when it is not desired, a key principle in evaluating door-opening effects.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין — אָסוּר. רָבָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בִּ״פְסִיק רֵישֵׁיהּ וְלָא יְמוּת״. וְאַבָּיֵי לֵית לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא? וְהָא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בִּ״פְסִיק רֵישֵׁיהּ וְלָא יְמוּת״! בָּתַר דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרָבָא סַבְרַהּ. וְהָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא, דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין הוּא, וְדָבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין — מוּתָּר! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין — אָסוּר. וְרָבָא אָמַר אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בִּ״פְסִיק רֵישֵׁיהּ וְלָא יְמוּת״. וְאַבָּיֵי לֵית לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא? וְהָא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַויְיהוּ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בִּ״פְסִיק רֵישֵׁיהּ וְלָא יְמוּת״! לְבָתַר דְּשַׁמְעֵיהּ מֵרָבָא סַבְרַהּ.

Abaye said: This derivation is only necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional act is prohibited. Rava said: Even if you say that it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an unintentional act is permitted, as Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of: Cut off its head and will it not die, i.e., an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor ensued as an inevitable consequence. In that case, the one who performs the action cannot claim that the outcome was unintended. In the case of circumcising a leprous foreskin, the removal of leprosy is an inevitable consequence of the circumcision. The Gemara asks: And does Abaye not accept this reasoning? Wasn’t it Abaye and Rava who both say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that in the case of: If you cut off its head will it not die? The Gemara answers: After Abaye heard this principle from Rava, he accepted it. The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to address this? It is an unintentional act, and an unintentional act is permitted. Abaye said: This derivation is only necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional act is prohibited. Rava said: Even if you say that it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an unintentional act is permitted, as Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of: If you cut off its head will it not die? The Gemara asks: And does Abaye not accept this reasoning? Wasn’t it Abaye and Rava who both say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that in the case of: Cut off its head and will it not die? The Gemara answers: After Abaye heard this principle from Rava, he accepted it.

Source 2 · Chazal
Verified

Shabbat 120b

שבת ק״כ ב — ד"ה אֲמַר לֵיהּ

Shabbat 120b:5

The sugya discusses unintended consequences and cases where a permitted action produces a prohibited result, supplying the Talmudic background for melakhah caused indirectly or without intent.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּהָא אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מוֹדֶה. דְּהָא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בִּ״פְסִיק רֵישֵׁיהּ וְלָא יְמוּת״. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: פּוֹתֵחַ אָדָם דֶּלֶת כְּנֶגֶד מְדוּרָה בְּשַׁבָּת. לָיֵיט עֲלַהּ אַבָּיֵי. בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּרוּחַ מְצוּיָה — מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְמַאן דְּאָסַר?! אִי בְּרוּחַ שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְצוּיָה — מַאי טַעְמָא דְמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי?! לְעוֹלָם בְּרוּחַ מְצוּיָה: מָר סָבַר גָּזְרִינַן, וּמָר סָבַר לָא גָּזְרִינַן. אִי הָכִי, הָכָא נָמֵי, כְּתִיב: ״לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה [כׇל] מְלָאכָה״ — עֲשִׂיָּיה הוּא דְּאָסוּר, גְּרָמָא שְׁרֵי! מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאָדָם בָּהוּל עַל מָמוֹנוֹ, אִי שָׁרֵית לֵיהּ — אָתֵי לְכַבּוֹיֵי.

He said to him: In this case, even Rabbi Shimon concedes that it is prohibited, as it was Abaye and Rava who both said that Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of: Cut off its head, will it not die? In an instance where the unintentional act leads to an inevitable prohibited consequence, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that the person who performs the unintentional act is liable. Rav Yehuda said: A person opens a door opposite a fire on Shabbat. The Gemara relates that Abaye would curse anyone who did so. The Gemara clarifies: With what are we dealing? If you say this is referring to a case where a typical wind is blowing outside, what is the reason of the one who prohibits opening the door? A typical wind will neither fan nor extinguish the fire. And if it is referring to a case where an atypical wind is blowing outside, what is the reason of the one who permits opening the door? The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to the case of a typical wind. However, one Sage, Abaye, holds that we issue a decree prohibiting to open the door in the case of a typical wind due to a case of an atypical wind, and the other Sage, Rav Yehuda, holds that we do not issue that decree. The Gemara asks: If so, here too, with regard to Shabbat, it is written: “And the seventh day is Shabbat for the Lord your God, you shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:9). And here, too, one could derive: Performance is that which is prohibited; indirectly causing a prohibited action is permitted. The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yosei maintains there is no prohibition in indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished; however, since a person is agitated about his property, if you permit him to indirectly extinguish the fire, he will come to extinguish it directly.

Source 3 · Chazal
Verified

Shabbat 17

שבת י״ז — ד"ה טָבִי רִישְׁבָּא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל

Shabbat 17:2

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute whether one may initiate an action before Shabbat that will continue into Shabbat itself: Beit Shammai permit only if there is sufficient time for the action's essential purpose to be substantially accomplished before Shabbat begins, while Beit Hillel permit even when this condition is not met, across multiple scenarios including soaking items, heating materials, spreading traps, and entrusting items to gentiles.

מַתְנִי׳ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין שׁוֹרִין דְּיוֹ וְסַמָּנִים וְכַרְשִׁינִין אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּשּׁוֹרוּ מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין נוֹתְנִין אוּנִּין שֶׁל פִּשְׁתָּן לְתוֹךְ הַתַּנּוּר אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּהְבִּילוּ מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, וְלֹא אֶת הַצֶּמֶר לַיּוֹרָה אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּקְלוֹט הָעַיִן, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין פּוֹרְסִין מְצוּדוֹת חַיָּה וְעוֹפוֹת וְדָגִים אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּצּוֹדוּ מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מוֹכְרִין לְגוֹי וְאֵין טוֹעֲנִין עִמּוֹ וְאֵין מַגְבִּיהִין עָלָיו אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ לְמָקוֹם קָרוֹב, וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין נוֹתְנִין עוֹרוֹת לְעַבְּדָן, וְלֹא כֵּלִים לְכוֹבֵס גּוֹי אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיֵּעָשׂוּ מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם. וּבְכוּלָּן בֵּית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין עִם

MISHNA: In this mishna there is a fundamental dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai: Must one begin refraining from actions prohibited on Shabbat on Shabbat eve? Or, may one initiate an action prior to Shabbat, even if he knows that it will continue on its own on Shabbat itself? These are the details of that dispute: Beit Shammai say: One may only soak dry ink in water and dry plants, which produce dyes, in water and vetch for animal food to soften them in water on Shabbat eve, adjacent to Shabbat, if there is clearly sufficient time for them to soak for their designated purpose while it is still day, before Shabbat begins, and their continued soaking on Shabbat will have no effect. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may only place bundles of combed flax inside the oven on Shabbat eve if there is sufficient time so that they will be heated while it is still day. And one may only place wool into the dyer’s kettle if there is sufficient time for the wool to absorb the dye while it is still day. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may spread traps for an animal and birds and fish only if there is sufficient time remaining in the day for them to be trapped in them while it is still day, and Beit Hillel permit doing so even if there is not sufficient time remaining in the day. Beit Shammai say: One may only sell an item to a gentile on Shabbat eve, and one may only load a burden on his donkey with him, and one may only lift a burden on him if there remains sufficient time for the gentile to arrive to a near place prior to Shabbat, and the Jew will play no role in the performance of a prohibited labor by the gentile on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may not give skins to a gentile tanner, nor clothes to a gentile launderer, unless there is sufficient time for work on them to be completed while it is still day, before Shabbat begins. And in all of them Beit Hillel permit doing so with

Source 4 · Chazal
Verified

Shabbat 51

שבת נ״א — ד"ה לֹא מִשּׁוּם כִּלְאַיִם

Shabbat 51:1

Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel permits insulating a cooler on Shabbat, and Abaye explains that this ruling teaches that one may insulate an object whose typical use is insulation, whereas one may not insulate an object whose typical use is not insulation.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מוּתָּר לְהַטְמִין אֶת הַצּוֹנֵן. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: מְמַלֵּא אָדָם קִיתוֹן וְנוֹתֵן תַּחַת הַכַּר אוֹ תַּחַת הַכֶּסֶת! אָמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: טוּבָא קָמַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאִי מִמַּתְנִי׳ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי — דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַטְמִין, אֲבָל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַטְמִין לָא — קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.

Source 5 · Chazal
Verified

Tosefta Shabbat 15

תוספתא שבת ט״ו

Tosefta Shabbat 15

A door that was installed on a cupboard to open and close it may be used on Shabbat if it is tied and hanging, but if not it may not be used; Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel holds that it is considered fixed even without being tied or hanging, while a stick fashioned with a nail at its head to remove bread is like a spit and thus a carried object in the courtyard.

קנה שהתקינו בעה"ב להיות פותח ונועל בו אם היה קשור ותלוי פותחין ונועלין בו [ואם לאו אין פותחין ונועלין בו] רשב"ג אומר מתוקן אע"פ שאינו קשור ואע"פ שאינו תלוי מקל שעשה בראשו מסמר להיות נוטל בו את הפת [מאיפופירות] הרי היא כדוקרן ומטלטלת בחצר.

Source 6 · Rishonim
Verified

Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 1:5-7

משנה תורה, הלכות שבת א׳:ה׳-ז׳

Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 1:5-7

Maimonides discusses liability for unintended and inevitable outcomes, providing a primary framework for evaluating whether an appliance change is an unavoidable result of opening its door.

דְּבָרִים הַמֻּתָּרִים לַעֲשׂוֹתָן בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִשְׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּתָן אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה בִּגְלָלָן מְלָאכָה וְאֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה. אִם לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לְאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. כֵּיצַד. גּוֹרֵר אָדָם מִטָּה וְכִסֵּא וְסַפְסָל וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לַחְפֹּר חָרִיץ בַּקַּרְקַע בִּשְׁעַת גְּרִירָתָן. וּלְפִיכָךְ אִם חָפְרוּ הַקַּרְקַע אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּכָךְ לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן. וְכֵן מְהַלֵּךְ אָדָם עַל גַּבֵּי עֲשָׂבִים בְּשַׁבָּת וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לַעֲקֹר אוֹתָן. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נֶעֶקְרוּ אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וְרוֹחֵץ יָדָיו בַּעֲפַר הַפֵּרוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַשִּׁיר הַשֵּׂעָר. לְפִיכָךְ אִם נָשַׁר אֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. וְכֵן פִּרְצָה דְּחוּקָה מֻתָּר לְהִכָּנֵס בָּהּ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּשִּׁיר צְרוֹרוֹת. וְכֵן כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּן כְּגוֹן זֶה הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר: אֲבָל עָשָׂה מַעֲשֶׂה וְנַעֲשֵׂית בִּגְלָלוֹ מְלָאכָה שֶׁוַּדַּאי תֵּעָשֶׂה בִּשְׁבִיל אוֹתוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְכַּוֵּן לָהּ חַיָּב. שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָשֶׂה אוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה. כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְרֹאשׁ עוֹף לְצַחֵק בּוֹ הַקָּטָן וְחָתַךְ רֹאשׁוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין סוֹף מְגַמָּתוֹ לַהֲרִיגַת הָעוֹף בִּלְבַד חַיָּב שֶׁהַדָּבָר יָדוּעַ שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיַּחְתֹּךְ רֹאשׁ הַחַי וְיִחְיֶה אֶלָּא הַמָּוֶת בָּא בִּשְׁבִילוֹ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

It is permissible to perform an act that is permitted on the Sabbath, despite the fact that it is possible - but it is not an absolute certainty - that, [as a result of one's actions], a forbidden labor will be performed, provided one does not have the intent to perform that labor. What is implied? A person may drag a bed, a chair, a bench and the like [on the ground] on the Sabbath, provided he does not intend to gouge out a groove in the earth while dragging them. Therefore, even if he did gouge out [a groove] in the ground [while dragging them], it is of no consequence, for he did not have this intent in mind. Similarly, a person may tread on grass on the Sabbath, as long as his intent is not to uproot it. Thus, should it be uprooted, that is of no consequence. Also, a person may rub powdered herbs and the like over his hands, provided he does not intend to remove his hair. Therefore, if the hair is removed, it is of no consequence. Based on the same rationale, one may enter a narrow opening on the Sabbath even though, [while doing so,] one causes pieces of the wall to fall. Similarly, it is permissible to perform any act with similar repercussions, provided that one does not have the intent of doing so. [In contrast,] when one performs a deed that results in the performance of a forbidden labor, and it is a certainty that this deed will cause [that labor] to be performed, one is liable even though one did not intend [to perform the forbidden labor]. What is implied? A person needs a fowl's head to serve as a toy for a child, and therefore cuts off the [fowl's] head on the Sabbath; although his ultimate purpose is not merely to slaughter the chicken, he is liable. It is obvious that it is impossible for the head of a living being to be cut off and for that being to survive. Instead, the [fowl's] death came about because of [this activity]. [Therefore, he is liable.] The same applies in other similar situations.

Source 7 · Rishonim
Verified

Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 12:1-4

משנה תורה, הלכות שבת י״ב:א׳-ד׳

Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 12:1-4

Maimonides defines core categories of Shabbat labor, including constructive activity and effects generated through a person's action; these principles form part of the conceptual foundation for electrical-appliance analysis.

הַמַּבְעִיר כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב. וְהוּא שֶׁיְּהֵא צָרִיךְ לָאֵפֶר. אֲבָל אִם הִבְעִיר דֶּרֶךְ הַשְׁחָתָה פָּטוּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מְקַלְקֵל. וְהַמַּבְעִיר גְּדִישׁוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ הַשּׂוֹרֵף דִּירָתוֹ חַיָּב אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מַשְׁחִית. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכַּוָּנָתוֹ לְהִנָּקֵם מִשּׂוֹנְאוֹ וַהֲרֵי נִתְקָרְרָה דַּעְתּוֹ וְשָׁכְכָה חֲמָתוֹ וְנַעֲשָׂה כְּקוֹרֵעַ עַל מֵתוֹ אוֹ בַּחֲמָתוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב וּבְחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ בִּשְׁעַת מְרִיבָה שֶׁכָּל אֵלּוּ מְתַקְּנִים הֵן אֵצֶל יִצְרָן הָרַע. וְכֵן הַמַּדְלִיק אֶת הַנֵּר אוֹ אֶת הָעֵצִים בֵּין לְהִתְחַמֵּם בֵּין לְהָאִיר הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב. הַמְחַמֵּם אֶת הַבַּרְזֶל כְּדֵי לְצָרְפוֹ בְּמַיִם הֲרֵי זֶה תּוֹלֶדֶת מַבְעִיר וְחַיָּב: הַמְכַבֶּה כָּל שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב. אֶחָד הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַנֵּר וְאֶחָד הַמְכַבֶּה אֶת הַגַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל עֵץ. אֲבָל הַמְכַבֶּה גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת פָּטוּר. וְאִם נִתְכַּוֵּן לְצָרֵף חַיָּב. שֶׁכֵּן לוֹטְשֵׁי הַבַּרְזֶל עוֹשִׂים מְחִמִּים אֶת הַבַּרְזֶל עַד שֶׁיֵּעָשֶׂה גַּחֶלֶת וּמְכַבִּין אוֹתוֹ בְּמַיִם כְּדֵי לְחַסְּמוֹ. וְזֶהוּ לְצָרֵף שֶׁהָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ חַיָּב וְהוּא תּוֹלֶדֶת מְכַבֶּה. וּמֻתָּר לְכַבּוֹת גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִזּוֹקוּ בָּהּ רַבִּים. הַנּוֹתֵן שֶׁמֶן לְתוֹךְ הַנֵּר הַדּוֹלֵק חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם מַבְעִיר. וְהַמִּסְתַּפֵּק מִן הַשֶּׁמֶן שֶׁבַּנֵּר חַיָּב מִשּׁוּם מְכַבֶּה:

A person who kindles even the smallest fire is liable, provided he needs the ash that it creates. However, should a person kindle a fire with a destructive intent, he is not liable, for he is causing ruin. Nevertheless, a person who sets fire to a heap of produce or a dwelling belonging to a colleague is liable, because his intent is to take revenge on his enemies. [Through this act,] he calms his feelings and vents his rage. He is comparable to a person who rends his garments over a deceased person or in rage [on the Sabbath], or a person who injures a colleague in an argument. These individuals are all considered to be performing a constructive activity, because of their evil inclinations. Similarly, a person who lights a candle or wood, whether to generate warmth or light, is liable. A person who heats iron in order to strengthen it by submerging it in water is liable for [performing] a derivative [of the forbidden labor] of kindling. A person who extinguishes [a fire] of even the smallest size is liable. [This includes both] one who extinguishes a candle and one who extinguishes a coal that comes from wood. In contrast, a person who extinguishes a glowing piece of metal is not liable. If, however, the person's intent is to purify the metal, he is liable. This indeed is the practice of blacksmiths; they heat the iron until it glows like a coal, and extinguish it in water to seal it. This is the process of purification for which one is liable. It is a derivative [of the category of forbidden labor] of extinguishing. It is permissible to extinguish a glowing piece of metal in the public domain so that many people will not be injured by it. A person who pours oil into a burning lamp is liable for kindling. [Similarly,] a person who takes oil from a lamp is liable for extinguishing.

Source 8 · Rishonim
Verified

Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 3:1

משנה תורה, שבת פרק א א והלאה ג א והלאה, וראה שם עוד ופרק ד

Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 3:1

One may begin a melacha on erev Shabbat even though it completes itself on Shabbat, since the prohibition applies only to performing melacha on Shabbat itself; however, when a melacha happens on its own on Shabbat, one is permitted to benefit from what was made automatically on Shabbat.

מֻתָּר לְהַתְחִיל מְלָאכָה מֵעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהִיא נִגְמֶרֶת מֵאֵלֶיהָ בְּשַׁבָּת. שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֱסַר עָלֵינוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה אֶלָּא בְּעַצְמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹם. אֲבָל כְּשֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה הַמְּלָאכָה מֵעַצְמָהּ בְּשַׁבָּת מֻתָּר לָנוּ לֵהָנוֹת בְּמַה שֶּׁנַּעֲשָׂה בְּשַׁבָּת מֵאֵלָיו:

Source 9 · Acharonim
Verified

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 277

שולחן ערוך, אורח חיים ער״ז — ד"ה שלא לגרום כיבוי הנר

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 277:1

The laws of extinguishing and related unintended consequences establish classic parameters for an action that may produce an additional effect without the person's direct intent.

שלא לגרום כיבוי הנר. ובו ה סעיפים: נר שמונח אחורי הדלת אסור לפתוח הדלת (כדרכו) (רמב"ם פ"ה ומרדכי פרק כ"ב וב"י בשם סמ"ג) שמא יכבנו הרוח (אבל) לנעול הדלת כנגדו מותר (ת"ה סי' נ"ט) (וה"ה בחלון שכנגד הנר שעל השלחן) (מרדכי פכ"ב וב"י בשם תוס' וטור) ואם הוא קבוע בכותל באחורי הדלת אסור לפתוח הדלת ולנעלו כדרכו שמא תהא הדלת נוקשת עליו ותכבנו אלא פותח ונועל בנחת ואם הוא קבוע בדלת עצמו שפתיחתו ונעילתו מקרב השמן לנר או מרחיקו ממנו אסור לפותחו ולנעלו: הגה ובנר של שעוה מותר לפתוח ולנעול אע"פ שהוא קבוע בדלת (ב"י): אסור לפתוח הדלת כנגד המדורה שהיא קרובה קצת אל הדלת ואפי' אין שם אלא רוח מצויה אבל אם היה פתוח כנגדה מותר לסגרו ואין בו משום מכבה:

[Safeguards] to prevent the [Shabbos] lights from being extinguished. Contianing 5 paragraph: If a candle is placed behind a door, it is forbidden to open the door (in the regular manner) (Rambam, Perek 5; Mordechai Perek 22; Beis Yosef in the name of the Smag) lest the wind will blow it out, (however) it is permitted to shut the door. (This is the law regarding a window that is next to a candle on a table)(Mordechai and Beit Yosef in the name of Tosfos and Tur). If it is fixed to the wall behind the door, it is forbidden to open and shut the door in the regular manner, lest the door will knock it and extinguish it, rather one should open and shut the door gently. If it is fixed to the door itself, and by opening and shutting the door the oil is moved nearer or farther from the wick, it is forbidden to open and shut the door. Rema: As for a wax candle, it is permitted to open and shut the door, even though it is fixed to the door. (Beis Yosef) It is forbidden to open a door opposite a fire that it is near the door; even if only a calm wind is blowing. However, it is permitted to shut it if it was open opposite the fire, and is not considered Mechabeh (Extinguishing).

See also

Source 10 · Acharonim
Verified

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 337

שולחן ערוך, אורח חיים של״ז — ד"ה דין כיבוד הבית ודבר שאינו מתכוין

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 337:1

This siman treats actions that cause a secondary result on Shabbat and supplies background for distinguishing direct action, indirect causation, and an inevitable outcome.

דין כיבוד הבית ודבר שאינו מתכוין. ובו ד סעיפים: דבר שאין מתכוין מותר והוא שלא יהא פסיק רישיה הילכך גורר אדם מטה כסא וספסל בין גדולים בין קטנים ובלבד שלא יתכוין לעשות חריץ מותר לרבץ הבית כיון שאינו מתכוין להשוות גומות אלא שלא יעלה האבק:

The Laws of Sweeping the House and Something Done Unintentionally, 4 Seifim: Something that one didn't intend to happen is allowed as long as it is not a definite consequence of the specific action (psik reisha). Therefore, a person may drag a bed, chair, or bench, whether it is big or small, provided that he doesn't intend to make a rut. One is permitted to sprinkle the floor because he does not intend to level the depressions [of the earth floor], rather he just doesn't want the dust to rise.

See also

Source 11 · Acharonim
External

Igros Moshe OC 4:127

אגרות משה, או"ח ד׳:קכ״ז

Igros Moshe OC 4:127

Rav Feinstein permits using electricity to operate a refrigerator on Shabbat because food often spoils, and since the prohibition against benefiting from Melachet Yisrael on Shabbat is only Rabbinic, one may rely on the leniency that power plants must run on Shabbat for hospitals.

אבל מה שמשתמשין בהחשמל להמקרר הוא אולי מצד שהרבה פעמים מתקלקלים האוכלין ולכן כיון שכל האיסור ליהנות אף ממלאכת ישראל במזיד הוא רק מדרבנן הקילו בהפ"מ כזה לסמוך על ההיתר דבשביל בתי החולים

On this pageIn Siman 127, Rav Feinstein discusses the permissibility of using electricity on Shabbat, specifically regarding refrigerators where food might spoil, explaining that one may rely on leniencies since power plants must operate on Shabbat for hospitals. He also rules on whether Levites in Israel are obligated to wash the Kohanim's hands daily before the Priestly Blessing even on weekdays.

Igros Moshe OC 4:127 — page scan on HebrewBooks
Page 219

Igros Moshe is not freely available in text. This PDF surfaced in our research. Please use the feedback buttons below to help us improve.

See also

Source 12 · Acharonim
Verified

Mishnah Berurah 337

משנה ברורה של״ז

Mishnah Berurah 337

The commentary develops the practical distinctions surrounding secondary effects and unintended results, concepts frequently invoked in contemporary electrical applications.

(א) דבר שאין מתכוין - זה לשון הרמב"ם דברים המותרין לעשותן בשבת ובשעת עשייתן אפשר שתעשה בגללן מלאכה אחרת ואפשר שלא תעשה אם לא נתכוין לאותה מלאכה מותר וכן כונת המחבר: (ב) פסיק רישא - פי' שבודאי תעשה מלאכה האחרת:

See also

Source 13 · Acharonim
Verified

Mishnah Berurah 277

משנה ברורה ער״ז

Mishnah Berurah 277

The passage discusses whether wind from outside can extinguish a flame when a door is opened on Shabbat, citing sources that prohibit this even when the door is opened gently because external wind blows in regardless, though some are lenient in cases of need when the door is opened slowly and carefully.

ודוקא כשהוא נגד פתיחת הדלת ממש וקרוב אל הדלת בענין שכשיפתח הדלת יוכל להכבות ע"י הרוח המנשב מבחוץ ומש"כ כדרכו עיין במ"א שכתב דט"ס הוא דאפילו אם הוא פותח הדלת בנחת מ"מ הרוח מבחוץ מנשב ואסור וכן סתמו כמה אחרונים ועיין בבה"ל: (ג) הרוח - עיין במ"א סי' תקי"ד סק"ט דאפילו אם אין הרוח מנשב עתה ג"כ יש לאסור דבכל רגע ורגע הרוח מנשב וא"א להבחין בזה ויש מקילין בזה ונ"ל דבמקום הדחק יש להקל בזה כשפותח הדלת בנחת לאט לאט שלא יגרום הדלת גופא לרוח שיבא:

Source 14 · Acharonim
Verified

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 320

שולחן ערוך, אורח חיים ש״כ — ד"ה השלג והברד אין מרסקין אותם דהיינו

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 320:9

The laws of actions that cause liquid to flow or change on Shabbat provide foundational principles for evaluating indirect and unintended physical effects, though this siman does not address refrigerators specifically.

השלג והברד אין מרסקין אותם דהיינו לשברם לחתיכות דקות כדי שיזובו מימיו אבל נותן הוא לתוך כוס של יין או מים והוא נימח מאיליו ואינו חושש וכן אם הניחם בחמה או כנגד המדורה ונפשרו מותרים: מותר לשבר הקרח כדי ליטול מים מתחתיו:

It is prohibited to crush snow and ice into small pieces in order to produce water but one may place them into a cup of wine or water and let them melt by themselves, without trepidation. They are also permitted if one places them in the sun or opposite a fire and they melted. It is permissible to break ice in order to access the water beneath it.

See also

Source 15 · Acharonim
Verified

Shulchan Arukh HaRav, Orach Chayim 318:25

שולחן ערוך הרב, אורח חיים שי״ח:כ״ה

Shulchan Arukh HaRav, Orach Chayim 318:25

The Alter Rebbe's treatment of inevitable and indirect effects in the laws of cooking provides an important Chabad formulation of principles used in later appliance discussions.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים שֶׁמֻּתָּר לְחַמֵּם הָאָפוּי? כְּשֶׁאֵין בּוֹ שֻׁמָּן, אֲבָל פַּת כְּפוּלָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּתוֹכָהּ חֲתִיכוֹת שֻׁמָּן שֶׁנִּקְרַשׁ (שֶׁקּוֹרִין אינפאנד"ה) — אָסוּר לְהָחֵם אוֹתָהּ אֲפִילוּ רָחוֹק מִן הָאֵשׁ מָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין הַיָּד סוֹלֶדֶת בּוֹ, וַאֲפִלּוּ לְהַנִּיחָהּ בַּחַמָּה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַשֻּׁמָּן שֶׁבָּהּ שֶׁנִּקְרַשׁ חוֹזֵר וְנִמּוֹחַ וַהֲרֵי זֶה דוֹמֶה לִמְרַסֵּק חֲתִיכַת בָּרָד בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיָּזוּבוּ מֵימָיו, שֶׁאָסְרוּ חֲכָמִים מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמּוֹלִיד בְּשַׁבָּת, וְדוֹמֶה לִמְלָאכָה שֶׁבּוֹרֵא מַיִם הַלָּלוּ, כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בְּסִימָן ש"כ.

Source 16 · Acharonim
Verified

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 252:5

שולחן ערוך, אורח חיים רנ״ב

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 252:5

Laws of preparing for Shabbat and related activities, including using items that may produce sound or be associated with weekday labor. This is the practical halakhic baseline for Shabbat-related device use.

הגה ולא חיישי' להשמעת קול שיאמרו רחיים של פלוני טוחנות בשבת ויש אוסרים ברחיים ובכל מקום שיש לחוש להשמעת קול (טור ותוס' והרא"ש פ"ג דשבת וסמ"ג וסה"ת והגהות מיי' פ"ז ותשובת מהרי"ו סימן ק"ל ואגור) והכי נהוג לכתחלה מיהו במקום פסידא יש להקל כמו שנתבאר לעיל ס"ס רמ"ד.

See also

Source 17 · Modern
External

Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:68

אגרות משה, או"ח ב׳:ס״ח

Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:68

Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that if a light bulb in a refrigerator was not disconnected before Shabbat, it is forbidden to open the refrigerator on Shabbat because opening the door inevitably turns on the light, constituting a pesik reishei.

הנה כשיש בהמקרר שנקרא פרעזערירער אור עלעקטרי שנדלק בפתיחת דלת המקרר ונכבה בסגירת הדלת ושכחו מליקח את האור משם בערב שבת. ודאי אסור לפתחו שהרי פסיק רישיה הוא שודאי נדלק

On this pageRav Moshe Feinstein rules that if one forgot to disconnect or unscrew the light bulb in a refrigerator before Shabbat, it is forbidden to open the refrigerator because doing so will inevitably turn the light on (constituting a 'pesik reishei' that is beneficial to the user). However, in cases of great need for Shabbat meals, one may ask a non-Jew to open the door, and ideally, one should open the refrigerator while the motor is already running.

Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim 2:68 — page scan on HebrewBooks
Page 262

Igros Moshe is not freely available in text. This PDF surfaced in our research. Please use the feedback buttons below to help us improve.

Source 18 · Modern
External

Tzitz Eliezer 8:12

ציץ אליעזר, ח״ח סי׳ י״ב

Tzitz Eliezer 8:12

The passage discusses the permissibility of freezing water in an electric refrigerator on Shabbat, examining opinions of Rashi, Ran, and Rashba regarding whether freezing violates prohibitions such as merasek, nolad, or Rabbinic restrictions on labor-like activities.

על ספרי שו״ת ציץ אליעזר ח״ו סי׳ ל״ד ע״ד הקפאת מים במקרר חשמלי בשבת

On this pageThis siman discusses the halachic permissibility of placing water in an electric freezer on Shabbat to make ice, and the general use of electric refrigerators on Shabbat. The author responds to critiques on his previous lenient ruling, analyzing the opinions of Rashi, the Ran, and the Rashba regarding the prohibition of crushing ice (merasek) and whether freezing water violates Shabbat laws such as 'nolad' or Rabbinic prohibitions resembling labor.

Tzitz Eliezer 8:12 — page scan on HebrewBooks
Page 56

Tzitz Eliezer is not freely available in text. This PDF surfaced in our research. Please use the feedback buttons below to help us improve.

Source 19 · Modern
External

Minchas Shlomo 1:11

מנחת שלמה סי׳ י״א

Minchas Shlomo 1:11

The Chazon Ish holds that closing an electrical circuit on Shabbat violates the prohibition of Boneh (building a vessel), since it establishes the wiring in its functional state to conduct current continuously, even when no current is actively flowing at the moment of connection.

בספר חזו"א (חלק או"ח סי' נ' אות ט') לאחר שמבאר ענין מלאכת מבעיר ומבשל שיש בהדלקת חשמל בשבת כתב אח"כ: "עוד יש בזה משום תיקון מנא כיון שמעמידו על תכונתו לזרום את זרם החשמל בתמידות וקרוב הדבר דזה בונה מה"ת, כעושה כלי, וכש"כ כאן שכל החוטים מחוברים לבית

On this pageThe author begins a discussion on the halachic status of completing an electrical circuit on Shabbat, presenting the novel stringency of the Chazon Ish. According to this view, completing a circuit constitutes the Torah prohibition of 'Boneh' (building/fixing a vessel) because it establishes the functional state of the electrical path, even if no current is actively flowing at the moment of connection.

Minchas Shlomo 1:11 — page scan on HebrewBooks
Page 131

Minchas Shlomo is not freely available in text. This PDF surfaced in our research. Please use the feedback buttons below to help us improve.

Related sources· 9 found, not yet verifiedSign in to verify

Related sheets

Shabbatשבת

Opening a Refrigerator on Shabbat

Sources address whether one may perform an otherwise permitted action on Shabbat when it will foreseeably trigger a prohibited result. The discussion centers on the distinction between intentional acts and unintended consequences, and whether inevitable side effects render an action forbidden.

View Sources21 sources
Shabbatשבת

Automatic Timers and Air Conditioning on Shabbat

These sources address the permissibility of setting devices before Shabbat to operate automatically during Shabbat itself. They establish the foundational principles governing pre-programmed mechanisms, including weight-driven clocks and flowing water systems, and examine when such arrangements comply with Shabbat law.

View Sources18 sources
Shabbatשבת

Setting Timers Before Shabbat

Sources address the permissibility of initiating processes before Shabbat that continue operating automatically on Shabbat itself. Classical rabbinic sources establish principles for such pre-Shabbat setup, while later halakhic authorities apply these principles to weight-based timers and mechanical devices.

View Sources11 sources
Shabbatשבת

Automatic Timers and Shabbat Appliances

Sources examine the halakhic principles governing work that begins before Shabbat and continues automatically on Shabbat itself. The discussion addresses which types of pre-Shabbat arrangements are permitted, the distinction between direct human action and mechanical continuation, and the practical considerations that apply to modern timer-controlled devices.

View Sources18 sources
Shabbatשבת

Setting Appliance Timers Before Shabbat

Sources explore the halakhic principles governing actions initiated before Shabbat that continue or complete themselves automatically during Shabbat. These texts examine whether setting a device in motion erev Shabbat—such that it performs labor on Shabbat itself—violates the prohibition against melacha.

View Sources13 sources
Shabbatשבת

Operating Appliances on Shabbat With Timers

These sources address whether work that is set in motion before Shabbat and completes automatically during Shabbat is permitted, establishing the foundational rules for timer-operated devices and the conditions under which such arrangements are halakhically acceptable.

View Sources21 sources

Explore more