The foundational dispute appears already in the Gemara: Sotah 20a records Ben Azzai's view that a father is obligated to teach his daughter Torah so she understands that merit may suspend punishment, while Rabbi Eliezer counters that anyone who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he taught her promiscuity — and this tension between the two positions drives every subsequent discussion.
The derivation from the pasuk itself, however, formally excludes daughters from the father's positive obligation: Kiddushin 30a draws from the verse "and you shall teach them to your sons" (Devarim 6:7) that the obligation extends to sons and to sons' sons — "your sons, but not your daughters" — and Kiddushin 29b confirms that since a woman is not commanded to study Torah she is correspondingly not commanded to teach it.
The Shulchan Arukh codifies the practical ruling in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 246:6: though a woman who studies Torah receives reward, the rabbis commanded that one should not teach his daughter Torah, because most women's minds are not suited for it and they bring words of Torah to frivolity — this prohibition applies fully to the Oral Torah, while for Written Torah it is preferable not to teach her but if one did so it is not comparable to frivolity, and the Rema adds that a woman is nonetheless obligated to learn the laws that pertain to her; the Tur (Yoreh De'ah 246) conveys the same ruling from the Rambam in nearly identical language.
The Sefer Chasidim draws a sharp internal distinction: Sefer Chasidim 313 rules that a father is obligated to teach his daughters the mitzvot — meaning the practical halachic conclusions of what to do and what not to do — since without knowing the laws of Shabbat, for example, how can she observe Shabbat? What the rabbis prohibited, the Sefer Chasidim explains, is specifically the depth of Talmud, the reasons behind the mitzvot, and the esoteric dimensions of Torah.
The Mishnah in Nedarim 35b likewise distinguishes Written Torah from Oral Torah in this context, permitting a father to teach his sons and daughters Mikra even under circumstances where he may not teach the person under the vow.
רש"ר הירש, דברים יא יט and רש"ר הירש, דברים יא יט, וראה עוד אב-בת both read the drashah "your sons and not your daughters" as freeing the father only from the obligation to impart scholarly Torah learning as a formal discipline — but not from transmitting knowledge of Tanach and the mitzvot required for fear of God and observance, as demonstrated by the mitzva of Hakhel which gathered men, women, and children alike; the father's exemption, on this reading, concerns academic Torah scholarship, not religious education broadly.
The Arukh HaShulchan notes in Arukh HaShulchan, Yoreh De'ah 246:8–15 that in the generations before his, the practice of taking a Torah scholar as a son-in-law was considered meritorious — reflecting a broader cultural context in which daughters' Torah exposure was expected even if not formally mandated.
The Sdei Chemed in Sdei Chemed, Maarechet Bet 110 engages the linguistic question of whether the word "banim" in relevant contexts includes daughters as well as sons, citing the Tosefot Yom Tov and others who hold that daughters are in fact included within the term, which has bearing on how broadly the obligation of Torah education extends.
Magen Avraham (Orach Chayim 47:14) notes that women are obligated to learn the laws that apply to them, as stated in Yoreh De'ah 246, and that this obligation supports their recitation of and blessing over related material.
B'tzel HaChochma (B'tzel HaChochma 5:4) addresses directly the halachic scope of a father's obligation in the chinuch of his daughter, analyzing Talmudic precedents including Nazir 29 and later authorities such as the Magen Avraham to determine the extent of these educational duties toward female children.
