Talmudתלמוד

Sfas Emes on Temurah: Majority and Minority Rulings

These passages from the Sfas Emes's commentary on Temurah explore how the halakhah is determined when the Mishnah and Gemara present disputes between individual sages and the Sages (majority). The sources examine the relationship between tannaitic disagreements and the principles by which later authorities rule according to the majority position.

הלכה כמכריע. ותו דת״ק סתמא וחכמים הם לשון רבים

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What the sources say

On Temurah 20a, the Sfas Emes explicitly resolves the puzzle of why the halacha follows Rebbi's opinion over Rabbi Shimon's despite Rebbi being described as a lone dissenter deciding between them, by tracing the dispute back to the underlying machlokes in the mishnah between the tanna kamma and Rabbi Shimon over whether an animal may be sold without a blemish, and concluding that since that mishnah presents a plain dispute of an individual against the majority, the halacha follows the majority (Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 20a).

This is consistent with the Sfas Emes's broader approach elsewhere in Temurah, where he explains that the Rambam rules like the Chachamim rather than like Rabbi Shimon precisely because the Chachamim are described in plural language against a single tanna kamma, reinforcing the principle that an unqualified plurality outweighs an individual opinion (Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 18a).

The Sfas Emes's broader method of tracing a later halachic ruling back to its root in an earlier mishnah's dispute, rather than taking the later Gemara's stated reasoning at face value, appears again in his treatment of the deduction from Rava's statement about consecrating a male animal for its value (Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 19b).

Source 1 · Hasidic
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Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 20b

שפת אמת על הש"ס, Temurah כ׳:א׳ (Temurah כ׳ ע״א) — ד"ה בגמ' אמר רבי אין אני רואה

Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 20a

The continuation of the Sfas Emes's discussion of the Mishnah's rule concerning an animal sold without a blemish, including the relationship between the Mishnah's alternatives and the underlying tannaitic dispute.

בגמ' אמר רבי אין אני רואה דבריו של ר"ש כו'. לכאורה צריך להיות הלכה כרבי שהוא מכריע. אך הרמב"ם פסק כת"ק. ונראה הטעם דמשמעות הגמ' דהך פלוגתא דתמורה תלוי' בפלוגתא דת"ק ור"ש במשנה אי תמכר שלא במום. וכיון דבמתני' הוי סתם פלוגתא דיחידורבים ממילא הלכה כרבים.

Source 2 · Hasidic
Verified

Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 18b

שפת אמת על הש"ס, Temurah י״ח:א׳ (Temurah י״ח ע״א) — ד"ה בגמ' דאי עבר ומקריב קאי בעשה

Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 18a

Sfas Emes explains that the ruling follows the Sages, who hold that “it shall be offered” refers to the offspring but not the offspring’s offspring, because the halakhah follows the הכריע and the plural Sages, despite a later anonymous ruling appearing to adopt the stricter view.

ולמ"ש א"ש דודאי לא ס"ל כר"ש רק כתנא דידן דאיכא ג' מחלוקת ופוסק כחכמים דיקרב היינו הולד ולא ולד ולד. משום דהלכה כמכריע. ותו דת"ק סתמא וחכמים הם לשון רבים. ולהכי נהי דסתם דבתר הכי גבי ולד תודה סתם כת"ק דאפי' ולד ולד יקרב מ"מ פוסק הרמב"ם כחכמים דמשנה ראשונה כנ"ל:

Source 3 · Hasidic· doesn’t discuss this
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Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 19b

שפת אמת על הש"ס, Temurah י״ט:ב׳ (Temurah י״ט ע״ב) — ד"ה בגמ' היינו מומא כו' מיגו דנחתא

Sfas Emes al HaShas, Temurah 19b

Sfas Emes questions how Rava infers that an animal consecrated for its monetary value acquires sanctity of the body, and explains that although the intended asham sanctity does not take effect, sanctity of the body remains by means of a migo, similarly applying when a male animal is consecrated for its value.

והנה מה דאמר רבא זאת אומרת הקדיש זכר לדמיו קדוש קדושת הגוף. יש לעיין בזה דמה ראי' ממתניתין דהקדישו באמת לאשם ורצה שיהי' בו קדושת הגוף ואע"ג דאינו ראוי לכך מ"מ מנלן להוציא מזה דאפי' פי' בהדיא רק לדמיו יהי' קדוש קדושת הגוף. וצ"ל דסברת הגמ' דמ"מ הכא נמי קדושה דאשם לא חל עליו כמו שהי' רצון המקדיש רק דנשאר קדושת הגוף מכח מיגו. וה"ה בהקדיש זכר לדמיו.

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