The Gemara in Chullin 11a establishes the basic principle that halacha follows the majority (rov), deriving it from the pasuk "אחרי רבים להטות" (Chullin 11a), and distinguishes a quantifiable majority before us (like nine kosher shops against one non-kosher one) from a majority not physically before us, such as the presumption that most children are not tumtumim.
This is codified as a biblical commandment: Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 8:1 rules that when judges disagree, one follows the majority, deriving this from the same pasuk, and limits its force to monetary law and the general categories of forbidden/permitted and pure/impure; Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandments 174 frames the broader obligation to follow the rulings of the Great Court; and Sefer HaChinukh 78 likewise counts inclining after the majority as a mitzvah applying both to the Sanhedrin's disputes and to a private din between two litigants, citing the same drashah of "רובא דאורייתא" from Chullin 11a.
The sugya in Ketubot 15a-16a qualifies how rov operates geographically: one follows the majority of the city only when it is also the majority of the assembled group, and not a bare majority of either city or group alone, because of a concern that the group may not reflect the city's fixed population.
Pesachim 9b-10a applies rov to the classic case of nine piles of matza against one of chametz (or nine kosher shops against one non-kosher one), ruling that an item found detached is judged by the majority, while Bava Batra 23b-24a records Rabbi Chanina's ruling that even though both rov and proximity (karov) are biblically grounded considerations, rov is preferred when the two conflict, as tested against the eglah arufah case of the closest city.
The codifiers carry this into practical dietary law: Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 98 rules that in a mixture of the same type whose proportions cannot be measured, the result depends on whether it was known beforehand that the permitted food was the majority, while Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 110 introduces the important exception of "kavua" (a fixed, unmoving majority): meat taken directly from one of nine kosher shops against one non-kosher shop is forbidden because a kavua is treated as an even split, whereas meat found loose in the market or in a gentile's hand follows the majority, since what separates from the majority is treated as having come from it.
The Talmudic sugyot on bitul distinguish the operative basis of nullification: Zevachim 79a states that Chazal applied taste (ta'am) to a mixture of different types, majority (rov) to a mixture of the same type, and appearance (chazuta) where visible, and Steinsaltz on Zevachim 78b explains that when the forbidden and permitted substances are of the same type with identical taste, the mixture follows the majority; Chullin 97b, Chullin 108a, and Chullin 108b work through the details of how taste and majority interact once a forbidden substance has already imparted flavor, including the view that a piece itself rendered non-kosher cannot be nullified by majority because it is of the same type as the rest; Chullin 96b and Zevachim 79b likewise apply taste-based and majority-based rules to mixtures of sinews, meat, or blood in the Temple context.
Rov has real limits: Beitzah 3b and Rashi on Beitzah 3b teach that a "davar sheyesh lo matirin" (an item whose prohibition will lapse on its own) is not nullified even by a thousand permitted items, since there is no need to rely on bitul when the prohibition will pass naturally, and rabbinic law was stringent here even though Torah law would allow nullification of one against two.
Later authorities probe how far rov extends and what it actually accomplishes: Sefer HaIttur 27a holds that a majority concerning the very matter in question does not remove a doubt of prohibition, citing Pesachim and Niddah, and leaves the point for further study; Sfas Emes al HaShas, Bechorot 20a distinguishes a majority that is "before us" from a case where the underlying event itself is not before us; Avnei Miluim, Even HaEzer 45:2 and Sdei Chemed, Maarechet Alef 84 discuss whether rov is followed in monetary matters only when it is a rov that is not before us versus one that is, citing the Rishonim's dispute on this; and Shoel uMeshiv Mahadura III 2:95 and Darkhei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 109:23 explore further refinements, such as whether a majority of the whole differs from a majority drawn from within a fixed total, and whether an individual can act against an established rov and chazakah regarding himself.
On the mechanics of bitul berov in mixtures, Darkhei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 98:26 and Darkhei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 110:232 note that under Torah law a same-type mixture is nullified by the majority even in liquids mixed together, since the minority is Scripturally transformed into permitted status, though the Rabbis did not always accept this leniency; Shoel uMeshiv Mahadura I 2:192 questions whether bitul berov applies at all in a case of doubtful prohibition rather than certain permitted status; and Mishpetei Uziel, Volume IX, Yoreh De'ah 12:17 applies bitul berov to a modern case of powdered milk, ruling that an negligible admixture is nullified in the overwhelming majority, restoring the mixture to full permitted status, though he ultimately does not rely on this leniency alone given a separate rabbinic decree.
Noda BiYehudah II, Orach Chaim 78 applies bitul berov practically to a case of whiskey that became mixed with chametz after Pesach, invoking the principle that such a mixture is nullified in the majority.
Avnei Yashfeh 8:78 addresses the practical application of rov in determining the demographic composition of a locale, holding that once the law is established to depend on the majority, one still must determine as a factual matter what constitutes that majority in the present, since the proportions of non-Jews to Jews vary by place and region.
Among the modern poskim, Har Tzvi (Har Tzvi YD 100) holds that one follows the majority even in monetary matters because a majority overrides a chazakah, and he discusses whether the rule of rov functions as a clarification of the true facts or as an independent rabbinic enactment, while Igros Moshe (Igros Moshe YD 1:120) rules that when a forbidden and a permitted substance become combined into a single physical piece, the whole piece is judged together and permitted through bitul berov on the strength of "acharei rabbim lehatot," even absent a genuine doubt as to which substance predominates.