Halachaהלכה

Double Ring Ceremonies in Jewish Marriage

Sources address whether a bride may give a ring to the groom during the wedding ceremony and whether such an exchange affects the halakhic validity of kiddushin. The sources examine the requirements of betrothal, the effect of conditions contrary to Torah law, and the permissibility of ceremonies that might obscure or alter the bride's legal status.

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19 sources · 17 verified

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What the sources say

This question about double ring ceremonies actually folds together several distinct halachic issues: whether conditions can affect the validity of kiddushin, what role the bride can halachically play in the betrothal act, and whether a double ring ceremony risks misleading people about the real requirements of kiddushin.

Validity of kiddushin with conditions

The most direct source on this question is Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer 3:18, which rules that once the groom validly betroths the bride, the kiddushin is fully binding, and a subsequent ring-giving and declaration by the bride is halachically meaningless rather than a condition that could unravel the betrothal, even if all parties knew in advance she intended to do so — because a condition made explicitly contrary to Torah law is void from the outset.

The Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Ishut 6:1) and the Shulchan Arukh (Even HaEzer 38:1-2) establish the general law that a conditional kiddushin is valid only if the condition meets four specific formal requirements — doubled language, the affirmative clause preceding the negative, the condition preceding the act, and feasibility of fulfillment — and lacking any one of these the condition is void and the kiddushin or sale is treated as unconditional, as further detailed in Mishneh Torah 6:2, Mishneh Torah 6:15, and Mishneh Torah 6:16.

Kiddushin 19b teaches that any condition made contrary to what is written in the Torah is void, giving the example of a stipulation against the standard marital obligations, which demonstrates the same principle Rav Moshe applies: parties cannot contract out of fixed halachic structures by mutual intent.

The Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Mechira 11:1-4) confirms that conditions in any transfer of ownership, whether by seller or buyer, are binding only if fulfilled, paralleling the rule that governs conditional kiddushin.

Ketubot 72b shows a case where an explicit condition regarding the bride's vows does nullify betrothal if unmet, illustrating that conditions can be effective when properly formed and not contrary to Torah law, in contrast to the void condition Rav Moshe describes.

B'Mareh HaBazak Volume X 87 addresses a practical case of couples who already exchanged rings civilly, ruling that the bride may return her ring to the groom as an outright gift so that he can use it to perform the actual kiddushin, provided the officiating rabbi makes clear beforehand that this transfer is a plain gift and not itself an act of betrothal.

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Bride's role in betrothal

The Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Ishut 3:1-8) and Kiddushin 5b-6b both state that kiddushin must be effected by the man giving money or an item of value and making the betrothal declaration; if the woman is the one who gives the item and speaks the betrothal words, she is not betrothed, because the halachic structure requires the man's acquisition of her, not hers of him.

Kiddushin 2b-3b grounds this structure in the mishnaic language that "the woman is acquired," from which the Gemara derives that the process depends on her consent but proceeds through the man's act, not a reciprocal act by her.

The Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Ishut 4:1-2) and the Shulchan Arukh (Even HaEzer 42:1-2) reinforce that a woman can only be betrothed with her willing consent, but this consent operates within the man's act of consecration rather than through her own parallel act of giving.

Bava Batra 167b notes that documents of betrothal and marriage may be written only with the consent of both bride and groom, with the groom paying the scribe's fee, indicating a format where both parties participate but the formal acquisition remains the groom's act.

The Shulchan Arukh (Even HaEzer 27:7-9) discusses cases where the woman gives money and makes a declaration either before or alongside the man's own declaration, ruling that her independent declaration alone does not create betrothal, though the outcome can become a certain or doubtful kiddushin depending on exactly how the man's own words and actions align with hers.

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Risk of misleading about halachic requirements

Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer 3:18 prohibits the double ring ceremony primarily because it resembles non-Jewish custom and, independent of that concern, because performing it under the chuppah risks causing people to think a woman can also betroth a man, or that both the man's and the woman's giving are required for kiddushin — concerns he treats as prohibited even absent any actual confusion, since causing forgetfulness or distortion of halacha is itself an independent prohibition.

Igros Moshe EH 4:32 distinguishes the case where the bride's ring-giving after valid kiddushin is halachically inert from a Reform ceremony where the rings are purely symbolic and no halachic kiddushin occurs at all, and it also discusses the propriety of the groom later wearing the bride's ring as mere ornament or a sign of marriage, showing that labeling and clarity about what constitutes the actual kiddushin act remain central concerns.

Gray Matter I, Non Orthodox Marriages records that Rav Moshe's concern was that a double ring ceremony could make people think the groom's ring was merely a wedding gift rather than an act of kiddushin, but notes that Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg and Rav Hershel Schachter disagreed with this concern, holding that once the groom gives the bride a ring the couple is married regardless of what follows.

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Source 1 · Chazal
Verified

Kiddushin 5b-6b

קידושין ה׳ ב-ו׳ ב

Kiddushin 5b-6b

The sugya examines the language and circumstances that can effect kiddushin, including statements that clarify or undermine the act’s legal meaning. It is relevant to whether a declaration accompanying a ring creates, changes, or prevents kiddushin.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיצַד בְּכֶסֶף? נָתַן לָהּ כֶּסֶף אוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף, וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְאוֹרֶסֶת לִי״, ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ לִי לְאִינְתּוּ״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲבָל הִיא שֶׁנָּתְנָה, וְאָמְרָה הִיא: ״הֲרֵינִי מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לְךָ״, ״הֲרֵינִי מְאוֹרֶסֶת לְךָ״, ״הֲרֵינִי לְךָ לְאִינְתּוּ״ – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: נָתַן הוּא וְאָמַר הוּא – פְּשִׁיטָא דְּהָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין. נָתַן הוּא וְאָמְרָה הִיא – נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנָּתְנָה הִיא וְאָמְרָה הִיא, וְלָא הָווּ קִידּוּשִׁין. וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: נָתַן הוּא וְאָמַר הוּא – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. נָתְנָה הִיא וְאָמְרָה הִיא – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. נָתַן הוּא וְאָמְרָה הִיא – סְפֵיקָא הִיא וְחָיְישִׁינַן מִדְּרַבָּנַן. לִישָּׁנֵי בָּתְרָאֵי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: הָכָא כְּתִיב ״כִּי יִקַּח״ – וְלֹא שֶׁיַּקַּח אֶת עַצְמוֹ. וְהָכָא כְּתִיב ״וְשִׁלְּחָהּ״ – וְלֹא שֶׁיְּשַׁלַּח אֶת עַצְמוֹ.

§ After discussing the sources for the modes of acquisition listed in the mishna, the Gemara analyzes these halakhot in greater detail. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:1): How is betrothal performed through money? If a man gave a woman money or an item worth money, and he said to her: You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me, or: You are hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to me, or: You are to me as a wife, then she is betrothed. But if she is the one who gave the money to him, and she said: I am hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to you, or: I am hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to you, or: I am hereby to you as a wife, then she is not betrothed. Rather, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation in favor of the following. This is what the baraita is saying: If he gave the money and he said the formula, it is obvious that it is a valid betrothal. If he gave the money and she said the formula, it is considered as though she gave the money and she said the formula, and therefore it is not a valid betrothal. And if you wish, say a different explanation of the baraita: If he gave the money and he said the formula, she is betrothed. If she gave the money and she said the formula, she is not betrothed at all. If he gave the money and she said the formula, the ruling is uncertain, and by rabbinic law we are concerned that this might actually be a betrothal. last expressions are what he teaches us. The novelty of Shmuel’s statement is that with regard to the second set of pronouncements there is no concern at all that a valid betrothal or divorce might have been performed. The Gemara explains why according to Shmuel these pronouncements are not of concern. Here, in the case of betrothal, it is written: “When a man takes a woman” (Deuteronomy 24:1), which indicates that the man is acting to change the status of the woman, and it is not written that he takes himself or gives himself to her, as in the case of one who says: I am hereby your man. And likewise, it is written here, with regard to divorce: “And sends her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and it is not written that he sends himself from her, as in the case of one who says: I am not your man.

Edition: William Davidson Edition - Vocalized Aramaic · William Davidson Edition - English — License: CC-BY-NC ↗

See also

  • Kiddushin 5bunverifiedFiled under: Specific Forms of the Kiddushin [Marriage] Declaration
  • Nedarim 6bunverifiedFiled under: Specific Forms of the Kiddushin [Marriage] Declaration
  • Kiddushin 7aunverifiedFiled under: Specific Forms of the Kiddushin [Marriage] Declaration
Source 2 · Chazal
Verified

Kiddushin 19b

קידושין י״ט ב — ד"ה תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ

Kiddushin 19b:12-14

The sugya discusses the principle that a stipulation against what is written in the Torah is ineffective in relevant contractual contexts. It is a central Talmudic source for understanding why an attempted condition cannot redefine the Torah’s requirements.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: הַמּוֹכֵר אֶת בִּתּוֹ, וּפָסַק עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא לְיַיעֵד – נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִם רָצָה לְיַיעֵד – מְיַיעֵד, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִתְנָה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה, וְכׇל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. וּלְרַבִּי מֵאִיר תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים? וְהָתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לְךָ עָלַי שְׁאֵר כְּסוּת וְעוֹנָה״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּתְנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים. אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״לְאָמָה״ – פְּעָמִים שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוֹכְרָהּ אֶלָּא לְאָמָה בִּלְבָד.

§ It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who sells his daughter and stipulates with the buyer that the sale applies on the condition that he does not designate her, the condition stands. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: If the master wants to designate her he may designate her, because the father stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah, as the Torah permits the designation of a Hebrew maidservant. And with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, does his condition stand in that case? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you do not have against me any claims of food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed and his condition is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to monetary matters, e.g., food and clothing, his condition stands. This indicates that Rabbi Meir maintains that one cannot stipulate counter to that which is written in the Torah. Ḥizkiyya said: It is different here, as the verse states: “And if a man sells his daughter as a maidservant” (Exodus 21:7), from which it is derived: There are times when he sells her only as a maidservant, not for the sake of marriage. This indicates that the designation of a maidservant is not a Torah obligation but is optional. Therefore, one can issue a stipulation that runs counter to the master designating her.

Edition: William Davidson Edition - Vocalized Aramaic · William Davidson Edition - English — License: CC-BY-NC ↗

Source 3 · Chazal
Verified

Kiddushin 2b-3b

קידושין ב׳ ב-ג׳ ב

Kiddushin 2b-3b

Chachmei Bavel explain that the mishna’s wording implies a woman becomes betrothed only with her consent, and derive from Shemot 21:11 that betrothal through money is valid and that the payment belongs to her father.

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: אִי תְּנָא ״קוֹנֶה״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא אֲפִילּוּ בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ – תְּנָא ״הָאִשָּׁה נִקְנֵית״, דְּמִדַּעְתָּהּ – אִין, שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעְתָּהּ – לָא. בְּכֶסֶף. מְנָא לַן? וְתוּ, הָא דִּתְנַן: ״הָאָב זַכַּאי בְּבִתּוֹ בְּקִדּוּשֶׁיהָ, בְּכֶסֶף בִּשְׁטָר וּבְבִיאָה״, מְנָלַן דְּמִיקַּנְיָא בְּכֶסֶף, וְכֶסֶף דַּאֲבוּהּ הוּא? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״וְיָצְאָה חִנָּם אֵין כָּסֶף״ – אֵין כֶּסֶף לְאָדוֹן זֶה, אֲבָל יֵשׁ כֶּסֶף לְאָדוֹן אַחֵר. וּמַאן נִיהוּ – אָב.

And if you wish, say instead another explanation. If the mishna had taught: The man acquires the woman, I would say that he can acquire her even against her will, as indicated by the expression: He acquires. One might have assumed that the betrothal depends on the husband, without the need for the woman’s consent. Therefore the mishna taught: The woman is acquired, from which it may be inferred that with her consent, yes, he can acquire her as a wife, but when he acts without her consent, no, she is not betrothed to him. § The mishna teaches that a woman can be acquired with money. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a woman can be acquired through money? And furthermore, with regard to that which we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 46b): A father has authority over his daughter with regard to her betrothal, whether it is through money, through a document, or through sexual intercourse, from where do we derive that she is acquired by her husband with money, and that this money is her father’s? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The reason is that the verse states with regard to a Hebrew maidservant acquiring freedom from her master: “Then shall she go out for nothing, without money” (Exodus 21:11). The extraneous phrase: Without money, indicates that there is no money for this master, i.e., in this case the master she leaves loses the money he paid for her, but there is money for a different master, i.e., another master receives money for her when she leaves his authority. And who is the other master who can transfer her to someone else and receives money for her? This is her father.

Edition: William Davidson Edition - Vocalized Aramaic · William Davidson Edition - English — License: CC-BY-NC ↗

Source 4 · Chazal
Verified

Ketubot 72b

כתובות ע״ב ב — ד"ה מַתְנִי׳ הַמִּקְדָּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל מְנָת

Ketubot 72b:8-9

The passage states that a betrothal explicitly conditioned on the woman having no vows or blemishes is invalid if those conditions are unmet, whereas a marriage entered without such conditions remains valid but may end without payment of the ketubah; the blemishes include those that disqualify kohanim from service.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמִּקְדָּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים, וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים — אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם וְנִמְצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ נְדָרִים — תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה. עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ מוּמִין וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין — אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. כְּנָסָהּ סְתָם וְנִמְצְאוּ בָּהּ מוּמִין — תֵּצֵא שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְתוּבָּה. כֹּל הַמּוּמִין הַפּוֹסְלִין בַּכֹּהֲנִים — פּוֹסְלִין בְּנָשִׁים.

MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her, and it was subsequently discovered that there are vows incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. This is because if the condition is not fulfilled, the betrothal is nullified. If he married her without specification and it was subsequently discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract, since he discovered a deficiency about which she had not initially informed him. However, this does not invalidate the betrothal, since he did not make any explicit condition. If he betrothed her on condition that she has no blemishes, and it was subsequently discovered that she did have blemishes, she is not betrothed. But if he married her without specification, and it was subsequently discovered that she had blemishes, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. The mishna clarifies what qualifies as a blemish: All of the blemishes that are listed in tractate Bekhorot involving significant physical deformities that disqualify priests from service similarly disqualify betrothal of women, as a mistaken transaction.

Edition: William Davidson Edition - Vocalized Aramaic · William Davidson Edition - English — License: CC-BY-NC ↗

Source 5 · Chazal
Verified

Bava Batra 167b

בבא בתרא קס״ז ב — ד"ה אֵין כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָרֵי אֵירוּסִין וְנִשּׂוּאִין אֶלָּא

Bava Batra 167b:3

Chachmei Bavel state that documents of betrothal and marriage may be written only with the consent of both the groom and the bride, while the groom pays the scribe’s fee.

אֵין כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָרֵי אֵירוּסִין וְנִשּׂוּאִין אֶלָּא מִדַּעַת שְׁנֵיהֶם, וְהֶחָתָן נוֹתֵן שָׂכָר.

A scribe may not write documents of betrothal and documents of marriage except with the consent of both parties, the groom and the bride. And it is the groom who gives the scribe his wages.

Edition: William Davidson Edition - Vocalized Aramaic · William Davidson Edition - English — License: CC-BY-NC ↗

Source 6 · Rishonim
Verified

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 3:1-8

משנה תורה, הלכות אישות ג׳:א׳-ח׳

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 3:1-8

Rambam explains the modes and requirements of kiddushin, including acquisition through money or an object of value, the groom’s act of giving, the woman’s acceptance, and the role of intention and witnesses. The passage clarifies why the Torah-defined act cannot simply be redesigned by ceremony.

כֵּיצַד הָאִשָּׁה מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת. אִם בְּכֶסֶף הוּא מְקַדֵּשׁ אֵין פָּחוֹת מִפְּרוּטָה כֶּסֶף אוֹ שְׁוֵה פְּרוּטָה. אוֹמֵר לָהּ הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי. אוֹ הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְאֹרֶסֶת לִי. אוֹ הֲרֵי אַתְּ לִי לְאִשָּׁה בָּזֶה. וְנוֹתֵן לָהּ בִּפְנֵי עֵדִים. וְהָאִישׁ הוּא שֶׁאוֹמֵר דְּבָרִים שֶׁמַּשְׁמָעָן שֶׁקּוֹנֶה אוֹתָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה וְהוּא שֶׁיִּתֵּן לָהּ הַכֶּסֶף: נָתְנָה הִיא וְאָמְרָה לוֹ הֲרֵי אֲנִי מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לְךָ. הֲרֵינִי מְאֹרֶסֶת לְךָ. הֲרֵינִי לְךָ לְאִנְתּוּ אוֹ בְּכָל לְשׁוֹן הַקְנָאָה אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְכֵן אִם נָתְנָה הִיא לוֹ וְאָמַר הוּא אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְאִם נָתַן הוּא וְאָמְרָה הִיא הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִסָּפֵק:

How is the bond of kiddushin established with a woman? If the man [desires to establish] the kiddushin by [the transfer of] money, [he must give] a p'rutah, either in coin or its worth. [Before giving it], he tells her, "You are consecrated unto me...," "You are betrothed to me...," or "You become my wife through this." He must give her [the money or the item] in the presence of witnesses. It is the man who makes the statement that implies that he acquires the woman as his wife, and it is he who gives her the money. If she gave him [money] and told him: "Behold, I am consecrated to you," "Behold, I am betrothed to you," "I am your wife," or [she used] any other expression that implied acquisition, the marriage bond is not established. Similarly, if she gave [him money] and he made the statement, the marriage bond is not established. If he gave [her money] and she made the statement [the matter is unresolved,] and the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

Edition: Torat Emet 363 · Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007 — License: CC-BY-NC ↗

Source 7 · Rishonim
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Mishneh Torah, Sales 11:1-4

משנה תורה, הלכות מכירה י״א:א׳-ד׳

Mishneh Torah, Sales 11:1-4

Rambam discusses transactions made with conditions and the requirements for a valid conditional stipulation. This helps frame the worksheet’s question about when a condition affects a transaction and when a condition contradicting Torah law cannot control the result.

הַמַּקְנֶּה בֵּין קַרְקַע בִּין מִטַּלְטְלִין וְהִתְנָה תְּנָאִין שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לְקַיְּמָן. בֵּין שֶׁהִתְנָה הַמַּקְנֶה בֵּין שֶׁהִתְנָה הַקּוֹנֶה. אִם נִתְקַיְּמוּ הַתְּנָאִין נִקְנָה הַדָּבָר שֶׁהֻקְנָה. וְאִם לֹא נִתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי לֹא קָנָה. וּכְבָר בֵּאַרְנוּ מִשְׁפְּטֵי הַתְּנָאִים בְּהִלְכוֹת אִישׁוּת: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּשֶׁקָּנָה בְּדֶרֶךְ מִן הַדְּרָכִים שֶׁקּוֹנִין בָּהֶן וַהֲרֵי יֵשׁ עָלָיו לְקַיֵּם אֶת הַתְּנַאי. אֲבָל אִם לֹא קָנָה עַתָּה וְהִתְנָה עִמּוֹ שֶׁאִם נִתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי זֶה יִקְנֶה וְאִם לֹא נִתְקַיֵּם לֹא יִקְנֶה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי לֹא קָנָה. שֶׁזּוֹ אַסְמַכְתָּא הִיא. שֶׁהֲרֵי סָמַךְ קְנִיָּתוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹת כָּךְ וְכָךְ וְכָל אַסְמַכְתָּא אֵינָהּ קוֹנָה שֶׁהֲרֵי לֹא גָּמַר בְּלִבּוֹ לְהַקְנוֹתוֹ:

When a person transfers ownership of an article - whether landed property or movable property - and establishes conditions that can be fulfilled the conditions are binding - whether established by the seller or the purchaser. If the conditions are fulfilled, then the ownership of the object is transferred. If the conditions are not fulfilled, the ownership of the object is not transferred. We have already described the laws governing conditional agreements in Hilchot Ishut. When does the above apply? When a person stated a condition and then carried out a kinyan transferring ownership of the article through one of the accepted procedures. For then, he is obligated to fulfill the condition. If, however, the person did not perform a kinyan, but merely entered into a conditional agreement stating that if this condition is fulfilled he will transfer ownership, and if it is not fulfilled he will not transfer ownership, the transfer of ownership is not effected even if the condition is fulfilled. This is considered an asmachta - i.e., he made his transfer of ownership dependent on the performance of certain deeds. An asmachta is never binding, for the person transferring ownership did not make a firm decision in his heart to transfer ownership.

Edition: Torat Emet 363 · Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007 — License: CC-BY-NC ↗

Source 8 · Rishonim
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Mishneh Torah, Marriage 4:1-2

משנה תורה, הלכות אישות ד׳:א׳-ב׳

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 4:1-2

Rambam discusses the effect of intention and the legal status of doubtful or improperly structured kiddushin. The passage reinforces that formal marital status depends on the Torah’s defined act, not merely on ceremonial symbolism.

אֵין הָאִשָּׁה מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת אֶלָּא לִרְצוֹנָהּ וְהַמְקַדֵּשׁ אִשָּׁה בְּעַל כָּרְחָהּ אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. אֲבָל הָאִישׁ שֶׁאֲנָסוּהוּ עַד שֶׁקִּדֵּשׁ בְּעַל כָּרְחוֹ הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְיֵשׁ לָאִישׁ לְקַדֵּשׁ נָשִׁים רַבּוֹת כְּאַחַת וְהוּא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה בְּכֶסֶף אִם קִדֵּשׁ בְּכֶסֶף פְּרוּטָה לְכָל אַחַת וְאַחַת. וְיֵשׁ לְאַחַת מֵהֶן אוֹ לְאַחֵר לְקַבֵּל הַקִּדּוּשִׁין עַל יְדֵי כֻּלָּן מִדַּעְתָּן: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְנָתַן הַקִּדּוּשִׁין מִדַּעְתָּהּ בְּיַד חֲבֶרְתָּהּ וְאָמַר לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ כְּשֶׁנָּתַן הַקִּדּוּשִׁין בְּיָדָהּ וְאַתְּ נַמִּי. אוֹ וְכֵן גַּם אַתְּ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. הֲרֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן מְקֻדָּשׁוֹת. אֲבָל אִם נָתַן בְּיָדָהּ וְאָמַר לָהּ וְאַתְּ. הֲרֵי זוֹ שֶׁקִּבְּלָה הַקִּדּוּשִׁין מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת בְּסָפֵק. שֶׁמָּא לֹא נִתְכַּוִּן אֶלָּא לִרְאוֹת מַה בְּלִבָּהּ וּכְאִלּוּ אָמַר לָהּ וְאַתְּ מַה תֹּאמְרִי בְּדָבָר זֶה. וּלְפִיכָךְ קִבְּלָה הַקִּדּוּשִׁין הִיא שֶׁהֲרֵי זֶה עֲדַיִן שׁוֹאֲלָהּ לִרְאוֹת מַה בְּלִבָּהּ וּמִפְּנֵי זֶה הִיא סָפֵק מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת:

A woman may be consecrated only voluntarily. If one forces a woman to be consecrated, she is not consecrated. When a man, by contrast, is forced to consecrate [a woman], she is consecrated. A man may consecrate many women at one time, provided that he does so by [transferring] money, and there is enough money to give each one a p'rutah. One of these [women] or another person may accept the money on behalf of them all, [provided] they consent. When a person [desires to] consecrate a woman, and with her consent gives the kiddushin to another woman, and tells the latter "And you as well," or uses another similar expression, they are both consecrated. When, however, the man places [the kiddushin] in the hand [of the second woman] and says, "And you," there is doubt whether or not the kiddushin are valid. Perhaps his intent was only to clarify her feelings. It was as if he asked her, "What would you say about this?" Therefore, she accepted the kiddushin, for she thought he was still asking her about her intent. For this reason, [the question is unresolved,] and the status of the kiddushin is in doubt.

Edition: Torat Emet 363 · Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007 — License: CC-BY-NC ↗

Source 9 · Rishonim
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Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:1

משנה תורה, אישות פרק ו א והלאה

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:1

Rambam states that kiddushin performed on condition is valid if the condition is fulfilled and invalid if it is not, whether the condition is made by the man or the woman, and that conditions in kiddushin, divorce, transactions, and other monetary matters must meet four requirements.

הַמְקַדֵשׁ עַל תְּנַאי אִם נִתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת וְאִם לָאו אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת בֵּין שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַתְּנַאי מִן הָאִישׁ בֵּין שֶׁיִּהְיֶה מִן הָאִשָּׁה. וְכָל תְּנַאי שֶׁבָּעוֹלָם בֵּין בְּקִדּוּשִׁין בֵּין בְּגֵּרוּשִׁין בֵּין בְּמִקָּח בֵּין בְּמִמְכָּר בֵּין בִּשְׁאָר דִּינֵי מָמוֹן צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת בִּתְנָאֵי אַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים:

Source 10 · Rishonim
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Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:2

משנה תורה, אישות פרק ו א והלאה

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:2

Rambam lists four requirements for a valid condition—repetition, stating the affirmative before the negative, stating the condition before the act, and making it possible to fulfill—and says that if any one is missing, the condition is void and the kiddushin, divorce, transaction, or gift takes effect immediately as though no condition had been made.

וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הַד' דְּבָרִים שֶׁל כָּל תְּנַאי. שֶׁיִּהְיֶה כָּפוּל. וְשֶׁיִּהְיֶה הֵן שֶׁלּוֹ קוֹדֵם לַלָּאו. וְשֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַתְּנַאי קוֹדֵם לַמַּעֲשֶׂה. וְשֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַתְּנַאי דָּבָר שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לְקַיְּמוֹ. וְאִם חָסֵר הַתְּנַאי אֶחָד מֵהֶן הֲרֵי הַתְּנַאי בָּטֵל וּכְאִלּוּ אֵין שָׁם תְּנַאי כְּלָל אֶלָּא תִּהְיֶה זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת אוֹ מְגֹרֶשֶׁת מִיָּד וְיִתְקַיֵּם הַמִּקָּח אוֹ הַמַּתָּנָה מִיָּד וּכְאִלּוּ לֹא הִתְנָה כְּלָל הוֹאִיל וְחָסֵר הַתְּנַאי אֶחָד מִן הָאַרְבָּעָה:

Source 11 · Rishonim
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Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:15

משנה תורה, אישות פרק ו א והלאה

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:15

Rambam states that when kiddushin is made conditional, it takes effect only when the condition is fulfilled, not from the initial act; for example, a woman given a dinar in Nisan on condition that she receive two hundred zuz that year becomes betrothed from Elul, when the promised sum is given.

הַמְקַדֵּשׁ עַל תְּנַאי כְּשֶׁיִּתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי תִּהְיֶה מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁנִּתְקַיֵּם הַתְּנַאי לֹא מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה. כֵּיצַד. הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה אִם אֶתֵּן לִיךְ מָאתַיִם זוּז בְּשָׁנָה זוֹ הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי בְּדִינָר זֶה וְאִם לֹא אֶתֵּן לִיךְ לֹא תִּהְיִי מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת וְנָתַן הַדִּינָר לְיָדָהּ בְּנִיסָן וְנָתַן לָהּ הַמָּאתַיִם זוּז שֶׁהִתְנָה עִמָּהּ בֶּאֱלוּל הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת מֵאֱלוּל.

Source 12 · Rishonim
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Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:16

משנה תורה, אישות פרק ו א והלאה

Mishneh Torah, Marriage 6:16

Rambam explains that a kiddushin made conditional on a future payment takes effect retroactively once the payment is made, even after a long delay; therefore, another kiddushin performed before that condition is fulfilled does not take effect, and the same principle applies to gittin and monetary transactions.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּשֶׁהָיָה שָׁם תְּנַאי וְלֹא אָמַר מֵעַכְשָׁו. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר לָהּ הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לִי מֵעַכְשָׁו בְּדִינָר זֶה אִם אֶתֵּן לִיךְ מָאתַיִם זוּז וּלְאַחַר זְמַן נָתַן לָהּ מָאתַיִם זוּז הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת לְמַפְרֵעַ מִשְּׁעַת הַקִּדּוּשִׁין אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נַעֲשָׂה תְּנָאוֹ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר זְמַן מְרֻבֶּה. לְפִיכָךְ אִם קִדְּשָׁהּ הַשֵּׁנִי קֹדֶם שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה הַתְּנַאי אֵינָהּ מְקֻדֶּשֶׁת. וְכֵן הַדִּין בְּגִטִּין וּבְמָמוֹן:

Source 13 · Acharonim
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Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 42:1-2

שולחן ערוך, אבן העזר מ״ב:א׳-ב׳

Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 42:1-2

These laws address the effect of intention, witnesses, and circumstances on kiddushin. They are useful for analyzing whether the participants’ prior knowledge of a planned second ring changes the validity of the first, properly performed kiddushin.

אין מקדשין אלא לרצון האשה ובפני ב' עדים. ובו ה סעיפים: אין האשה מתקדשת אלא לרצונה והמקדש אשה בעל כרחה אינה מקודשת אבל האיש שאנסוהו עד שקידש בעל כרחו הרי זו מקודשת וי"א שאינה מקודשת הילכך הוה ליה ספק: הגה אמרה תחילה קדשני וזרק קידושין לתוך חיקה ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי וניערה בגדיה תוך כדי דיבור להשליך ממנה הקידושין ואומרת שלא כיוונה מתחילה רק לשחוק בעלמא אפ"ה הוי מקודשת (תשו' מוהר"ם סוף ספר נשים) ואין הולכין בענין קידושין אחר אומדנות והוכחות המוכיחות שלא כיוונה לשם קידושין (שם) לקח יד האשה בחזקה שלא ברצונה וקדשה והיא לא זרקה הקידושין הוי מקודשת אע"פ שמתחלה באונס היה ונתן לה סתם ולא אמר לה כלום הואיל ובתחלה דבר עמה מקידושין (הגהות מרדכי סוף גיטין) היה חייב לה מעות ואמרה לו תן לי מעותי וכאשר התחיל ליתן אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי וזרקה היא המעות מידה אינן קידושין (טור בשם תשובת הרא"ש):

A woman can only become engaged by her will. One who engages a woman against her will, she is not engaged. But a man who they forced until her engaged against his will she is engaged, but there are those who say she is not engaged and therefore it is in doubt. [Rema: If she originally said engage me and he threw engagement money into her arms and said to her: Behold you are betrothed to me, and she shook out her clothing while he was saying so to throw the money from her and said that she did not intend to get engaged and was only joking, even so she is engaged (Moharam, end of Sefer Nashim). They do not go after in the topic of engagement proofs that she did not intend to become engaged. If he took a woman's hand by force against her will and gave her engagement money and she does not throw the money away she is engaged, even though at the beginning it was by force and he gave it to her without saying anything, since at the beginning they were talking about engagement. If he owed her money and she told him, Give me my money: and when he gave them to her he said: Behold you are betrothed to me" and she threw the money away she is not engaged.

Source 14 · Acharonim
Verified

recovered from “Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 27:7”

Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer

שולחן ערוך, אבן העזר כ״ז:ז׳-ט׳ — ד"ה נתנה היא לו כסף ואמרה הריני

Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 27:7-9

Joseph Karo’s passage distinguishes cases where the woman gives money and declares betrothal: the act is invalid, doubtful, or certain depending on the man’s prior discussion, response, and status, with a gift to an important man potentially effecting betrothal through the benefit she receives.

נתנה היא לו כסף ואמרה הריני מקודשת לך אינה מקודשת: נתן הוא ואמרה היא אם היה מדבר עמה על עסקי קדושין הוי ודאי קדושין ואם לאו הוי ספק קדושין ואם ענה הבעל הן בשעת נתינה הוי ודאי קדושין אפילו אין עסוקין באותו ענין: נתנה היא ואמרה לו הילך דינר זה מתנה ואתקדש לך ולקחו ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאה זו שקבלתי ממך מתנה אם אדם חשוב הוא הרי זו מקודשת שהנא' יש לה בהיותו נהנה ממנה ובהנאה זו הקנתה עצמה לו וצריך חקירת חכם מי נקרא אדם שאינו חשוב להתירה בלא גט ויש מחמירין אפילו לא אמרה תחלה כשנתנה ואתקדש לך רק נתנה סתם ואמר לה התקדשי כו' ושתקה (תשו' הרשב"א סי' תרי"ג):

If she gives money to him and she says, "Hareini, I am betrothed to you," she is not betrothed. He gave her the money and she made the declaration (of betrothal); if he was already speaking about the business of betrothal beforehand, this is certainly a betrothal (since she declared her intent with words while he made it clear with his action), but if not (he did not speak about betrothal beforehand), this is a questionable betrothal (Saffek). However, if after her declaration, he answers "Yes," at the moment of his giving (and her declaration) then this is a certain betrothal, even if they were not discussing the business of betrothal beforehand. If she gives a Dinar (a significantly valued coin, much more than a pruta) and she says to him, "This Dinar is for you a present by which I will be betrothed to you," and he accepts it; and he says back to her, "Harei, you are betrothed to me with the pleasure you received from my accepting this gift from you," if he is an important man, they are betrothed since the enjoyment she received (is worth more than a sheva pruta) is directly from him, and with this pleasure, she is accepting it like money from him; however, this transaction needs to be studied by a Chacham as to his status (as an 'important man') if he were not important, (their betrothal would be invalid, and) they would not need a Get (for her to be free). [Rama: And there are strict opinions whereby even if she did not initially say, "that I gave you and I will be betrothed to you," only that she gave him this gift stam (without words) and he declared "You are betrothed to me etc." then they are betrothed.

Edition: Apei Ravrevei: Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer, Lemberg, 1886 · Wikisource Shulchan Aruch — License: CC-BY-SA ↗

Source 15 · Acharonim
Verified

recovered from “Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 38:3”

Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer

שולחן ערוך, אבן העזר ל״ח:א׳-ב׳ — ד"ה המקדש על תנאי וכל דיני תנאי

Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 38:1-2

Joseph Karo’s passage states that conditional kiddushin takes effect only if the condition is fulfilled, provided the condition meets four formal requirements; otherwise, the condition is void and the kiddushin takes effect immediately, while conditions negating Torah-based marital obligations are generally invalid.

המקדש על תנאי וכל דיני תנאי. ובו לט סעיפים: המקדש על תנאי אם נתקיים התנאי מקודשת ואם לאו אינה מקודשת בין שיהיה התנאי מן האיש בין שיהיה מן האשה: כל תנאי צריך להיות בו ד' דברים ואלו הן שיהיה כפול ושיהיה הן שלו קודם ללאו ושיהיה התנאי קודם למעשה ושיהי' התנאי דבר שאפשר לקיימו ואם חסר התנאי אחד מהם הרי התנאי בטל כאילו אין שם תנאי כלל אלא תהיה מקודשת מיד כאילו לא התנה כלל הזכיר לאו קודם להן וחזר והזכיר הלאו אחר הן הוי תנאי כאלו הזכיר הן קודם ללאו (הר"ן פרק מי שאחזו): התנה בשעת הקידושין שלא יהא לה שאר וכסות תנאו קיים ואינו מתחייב לה בהם אבל אם התנה שלא יתחייב בעונה תנאו בטל וחייב בה: הגה דכל המתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה ואינו ממון תנאו בטל (דעת עצמו) וי"א דכל מה דתיקון רבנן הוי כמ"ש בתורה (הגהות מיי' ריש הכותב):

One who Betroths Conditionally and All the Laws Concerning Conditions • 39 Paragraphs One who betroths conditionally--if the conditions are fulfilled she is betrothed, and if not she is not betrothed, whether the condition shall be from the man or from the woman. Every condition has to meet four requirements and they are: a) that it have a double formulation b) that the affirmative clause be before the negative clause c) that the conditional should be expressed before the actual action is expressed d) that the conditions be a thing possible to fulfill and if the condition is lacking one element, behold the condition is null and void, as if there had been no condition at all, rather she will become betrothed immediately as if he had not stipulated at all. (If he mentioned a negative before a positive, and then repeated the negative after the positive, there exists a condition, as if he had mentioned a positive before a negative.) (Rabbi Nissim B. Reuben Gerondi Chapter Mi Sheaḥzo) If he stipulated at the time of betrothal that she will not receive sustenance and clothing his condition stands; he does not owe them to her. However if he stipulated that he is not obligated to marital duties his stipulations are void and he is obligated to do this to her. [Note: Because anyone who makes a condition over and against what is written in the Torah and it does not involve money his condition is void (his opinion).] And there are those who say that all that which our Rabbis ordained is similar to that written in the Torah. (Hagahot Maimon, beginning of Hakotev).

Edition: Apei Ravrevei: Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer, Lemberg, 1886 · Hilchot Kidushin, trans. by Steven H. Garten. HUC, 1975 — License: CC-BY ↗

Source 16 · Modern
External

Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer 3:18

אגרות משה, אה"ע ג׳:י״ח

Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer 3:18

The passage states that the groom’s valid kiddushin remains fully effective even when the bride subsequently gives him a ring and makes a declaration, but it prohibits such a ceremony because it imitates non-Jewish practice and may cause people to misunderstand, forget, or alter the laws of kiddushin.

Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer 3:18 — page scan on HebrewBooks
Page 438

Igros Moshe is not freely available in text. This PDF surfaced in our research. Please use the feedback buttons below to help us improve.

Source 17 · Modern
External

Igros Moshe EH 4:32

אגרות משה, אה"ע ד׳:ל״ב

Igros Moshe EH 4:32

The passage explains that a woman’s giving a ring to the groom after valid kiddushin does not invalidate the marriage, though kiddushin-like words are meaningless; it distinguishes this from a Reform ceremony in which the rings are merely symbolic and no halakhic kiddushin is performed, and discusses when the groom may wear the woman’s ring afterward as ornament or a sign of marriage.

Igros Moshe EH 4:32 — page scan on HebrewBooks
Page 70

Igros Moshe is not freely available in text. This PDF surfaced in our research. Please use the feedback buttons below to help us improve.

See also

Source 18 · Modern
Verified

B'Mareh HaBazak Volume X 87

שו"ת במראה הבזק חלק עשירי פ״ז:ד׳-ו׳ — ד"ה שאלה

B'Mareh HaBazak Volume X 87:4-6

The passage permits a woman who was previously married in a civil ceremony to return her ring to her husband so he can use it for kiddushin, provided she clearly gives it to him as an unconditional gift beforehand; it also stresses explaining that civil marriage is not halakhic marriage, whereas kiddushin establishes full halakhic marital status and its consequences, including the need for a get.

שאלה: בגרמניה פעמים רבות שהזוגות הבאים להינשא בחופה וקידושין כבר נישאו בנישואין אזרחיים וכבר נתנו זה לזה טבעות. בעבר הוריתי להם לקנות טבעת נוספת, דבר שעורר התנגדות. האם ישנה אפשרות שהאישה תחזיר את הטבעת לבעל והוא ישתמש בה לקדש את האישה? תשובה: האישה יכולה להחזיר את הטבעת לבעל והוא יקדש אותה בה. יש להקפיד שהרב מסדר הקידושין יסביר לאישה לפני כן שהיא מקנה לבעל את הטבעת במתנה גמורה. יש להסביר לזוג שעל פי ההלכה לפני קידושין הם אינם מוגדרים כנשואים2ולדעת הגרנ"א רבינוביץ מטעם זה יש להורות להם לקנות טבעת חדשה, וזאת על מנת ללמדם שהנישואין האזרחיים אינם נישואין על פי ההלכה., ולאחר הקידושין הם ייחשבו כנשואים מבחינה הלכתית, על כל המשמעות של חומר איסור אשת איש והצורך בגט במקרה של גירושין, וזאת שלא יצא שכרנו בהפסדנו, שבכך שערכנו חופה וקידושין כדת משה וישראל נמצאנו מרבים ממזרים ח"ו3וכן הורה הגרז"נ גולדברג..

Source 19 · Modern
Verified

Gray Matter I, Non Orthodox Marriages, The Halachic Status of Reform Marriages

גריי מאטר א, נישואין לא אורתודוקסיים, המעמד ההלכתי של נישואין רפורמיים

Gray Matter I, Non Orthodox Marriages, The Halachic Status of Reform Marriages

The passage states that Rav Moshe viewed the bride’s reciprocal ring as potentially indicating that the groom’s ring was merely a wedding gift rather than an act of kiddushin, while Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg and Rav Hershel Schachter maintained that the couple is married once the groom gives the bride a ring.

The Double Ring Ceremony In the above responsum, Rav Moshe suggests that double ring ceremonies raise concern about how the couple understood the wedding procedures: Even though he gives her a ring, she also gives him a ring, which demonstrates that his giving her a ring was merely a present in honor of their marriage, and there is no act of kiddushin. Many great rabbis disagree with this assertion of Rav Moshe. Both Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg and Rav Hershel Schachter expressed their opinions to this author that once the groom gives the bride a ring, they are married.

Edition: Gray Matter, by Chaim Jachter. Teaneck, N.J, 2000-2012 — License: CC-BY ↗

Related sources· 8 found, not yet verifiedSign in to verify
  • נתנה היא ואמרה לו הילך דינר זה מתנה ואתקדש לך ולקחו ואמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי בהנאה זו שקבלתי ממך מתנה אם אדם חשוב הוא הרי זו מקודשת שהנא' יש לה בהיותו נהנה ממנה ובהנאה זו הקנתה עצמה לו וצריך חקירת חכם מי נקרא אדם שאינו חשוב להתירה בלא גט ויש מחמירין אפילו לא אמרה תחלה כשנתנה ואתקדש לך רק נתנה סתם ואמר לה התקדשי כו' ושתקה (תשו' הרשב"א סי' תרי"ג):

    Same passage as Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 27:7-9

  • טַעְמָא — דְּכָתְבָה לֵיהּ, אֲבָל עַל פֶּה — לָא. אַמַּאי? דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן הוּא, וְשָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן — תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים. דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לִיךְ עָלַי שְׁאֵר כְּסוּת וְעוֹנָה״ הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּתְנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן — תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים! קָסָבַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: כְּתוּבָּה דְּרַבָּנַן, וַחֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִיזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁל תּוֹרָה.

    Same passage as Kiddushin 19b:12-14

  • מזכה לו, ואפי׳ בשואל מאחרים טבעת לקדש בו את האשה והמשאיל יודע שהוא שואל לקדש בו את האעזה, כתב הרא׳׳ש בכלל ל״ה סי׳ ב׳ והביאה הטור באה׳׳ע סי׳ כ״ח שמקדש בכל ענין, דאנן סהדי שגמר בלבו א תנו לו באותו ענין שיועיל לענין

  • לשמח אותה, וכן המנהג. וגאון אחד שליט״א אמר שיש דעות אבל כך המנהג. ושו״ר שדיבר בזה בשו״ת מהרש״ם חלק ג׳ סי׳ ר״ו, וכתב שמצות התורה היא על החתן וגם בזה יש דעות שמועלת מחילה, וכתב עוד שבשו״ת חיים שאל ח״ב סי׳ ל״ה מביא שיטה

  • נוחה שיתחלק כטבעת לקדושין ולמתנה הויא כטבעת כלה לקדושין, ויש שהיו מוששין בחזרת כקדושין משום גזירת אמימר שמא יאמרו קדושין תופשין באחותה, והלכך אף במקום שנהגו כן יש לבטל המנהג ולא לדון על פיו,. וזה דעת מהרי״ו שהביאו הח׳׳מ

  • וכתב שאפשר דמ״ש הריטב״א החתן והכלה לאו דוקא, והעיקר שיהיה שם החתן. ע״ש. ופשט ד׳ הריטב״א מוכיחים דתרויהו בעינן לעיכובא. ואשינויי כה״ג לא סמכינן למעבד עובדא בברכות, דספק בר׳ להקל. ואף שראיתי להרב יד אהרן ובספר בירך את

  • סימן תרלא שאלה: העדים ראו נתינת הטבעת ושמעו כיצד אמר לה הרי את מקודשת לי אבל מסופקין אם אמר ״בטבעת זו״. הרמב״ם ריש פ״ג דאישות מביא בנוסח הקידושין שצריך לומר ״בזה״ בקדושי כסף וביאה ומשמע שמעכב, וכן בש״ע ר״ס כ״ז העתיק כן

  • חדש אדר פה ברוקליז יצ״ו. משה שטערן אח״ז רב — סכדיי במרומים — בא לידי תשו׳ חלקת יעקר) מ׳׳א( למחו׳ הגה״צ אב״ד ציריך שליט׳׳א, וראיתי שם )בסי׳ ע״א( שנשאל גם הוא בזה והביא בקיאות מספר אוצר ישראל )ערן שאן( מה שכ׳ בשם הפחד יצחק

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