The foundational category is the cheresh who neither hears nor speaks, whom the Gemara treats as lacking sound mind on a par with an imbecile and a minor, exempting him from mitzvot, while one who speaks but does not hear or hears but does not speak is obligated like anyone else (Chagigah 2b:3-4, Chagigah 2a:1, Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 1:1, Turei Even, Chagigah 2a). This same distinction governs disqualification from serving as an agent to deliver a bill of divorce and from valid testimony, where a complete deaf-mute is invalid but one who speaks though he cannot hear, or hears though he cannot speak, may testify or serve as an agent (Gittin 23:13-15, Mishneh Torah, Testimony 9:11).
In marriage and divorce law the same binary controls: a cheresh's own kiddushin are only rabbinic, not scriptural, and a fully deaf person who divorces by gesture is treated differently from one who merely cannot speak but can hear (Mishneh Torah, Marriage 4:9, Mishneh Torah, Divorce 2:16, Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 121:5-6). Teshuvot HaRosh clarifies that the label cheresh applies only to one born unable to hear or speak at all, whereas one who can hear when spoken to loudly, though his hearing is impaired, is not a cheresh but comparable to a mute (Teshuvot HaRosh 85:13), and the Chiddushei HaRim Responsa and Noda BiYehudah likewise wrestle with how to classify partial deafness for purposes of kiddushin and the blemishes disqualifying a kohen (Chiddushei HaRim Responsa, Even HaEzer 26:1-3, Noda BiYehudah I, Even HaEzer 53:2-3).
Niddah extends the rule to a deaf woman's self-examination for nidda purposes, distinguishing one who speaks but cannot hear, who may examine herself, from one who can do neither, who requires competent friends to assist her (Niddah 13b:12-14). The Mekhilta and Midrash Tanchuma apply the cheresh-shoteh-katan grouping to liability for murder and to the invalidity of an eruv sent through such a messenger, extending the same incapacity principle beyond ritual law (Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael, Tractate Nezikin 4:19, Midrash Tanchuma, Ki Tisa 25), while Shabbat 153a discusses handing over an object on Shabbat to a cheresh, shoteh, or katan in the same framework (Shabbat 153a:16-17).
A separate and halachically significant question is whether hearing via a device changes this status. Rav Mordechai Eliyahu brings the position that a deaf person who hears only through an ear-trumpet-like device is nonetheless obligated in shofar, since true exemption requires total loss of hearing, and that hearing through an instrument still counts as hearing (Shut HaRav HaRashi 27:56, Shut HaRav HaRashi 27:57), and Kitzur Shulchan Arukh Yalkut Yosef rules that one who hears via a hearing aid or trumpet-like device is not called a cheresh for this purpose and can fulfill the obligation of others (Kitzur Shulchan Arukh Yalkut Yosef, Orach Chaim 689:15). The Avnei Nezer disagrees in substance, holding that merely perceiving undifferentiated sound through a trumpet-like device, without distinguishing speech, does not make one a pikeach, since speech itself is what defines the human form (Avnei Nezer, Choshen Mishpat 150).
For practical communal participation, Kitzur Shulchan Arukh Yalkut Yosef rules that a cheresh who speaks but cannot hear may serve as a sheliach tzibbur and read the Torah aloud for the congregation, and all the more so one who hears via a hearing aid, while one who neither hears nor speaks may not be counted among ten for a Torah reading with blessings though he may be counted for Kaddish (Kitzur Shulchan Arukh Yalkut Yosef, Orach Chaim 141:9, Kitzur Shulchan Arukh Yalkut Yosef, Orach Chaim 55:7). Rav Mordechai Eliyahu similarly holds that a cheresh or mute who speaks or hears partially may be joined for Kaddish so long as most of the quorum is of sound capacity, while one who neither hears nor speaks, like a shoteh, cannot be joined for any matter requiring kedusha (Maamar Mordechai Limot HaChol 11:5), and the Avnei Yashfeh likewise treats a person who became fully deaf and mute as a shoteh who cannot be counted toward a minyan even under pressing need (Avnei Yashfeh 6:5). Mishnah Berurah's discussion of completing a minyan with one who is asleep or otherwise not fully participating reflects the same underlying concern for genuine presence of mind in the quorum (Mishnah Berurah 55:31-32).
The pasuk forbidding cursing a cheresh teaches that the prohibition applies even though the deaf person cannot hear the curse, since the wrong lies in the curser's intent rather than in any harm caused (Vayikra 19:14), a point developed by Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, who explains that the Torah's inclusion of the cheresh specifically broadens the prohibition to a case where no practical harm or even distress results (Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch). The Ibn Ezra reads references to the deaf in this vein as pointing ultimately to spiritual deafness of the heart (Ibn Ezra), while Yeshayahu's vision of the end of days includes the opening of the ears of the deaf as part of the ultimate redemption (Yeshayahu 35:5).
Megillah 19b records the view that even after the fact a cheresh who read the Megillah without making it audible to his own ear has not fulfilled the obligation, following Rabbi Yosei's position on Shema, reinforcing that genuine hearing of oneself is integral to certain obligations (Megillah 19b:7).
Among the modern poskim, Rav Moshe Sternbuch permits calling to the Torah a deaf person who hears through a hearing aid, ultimately relying on the value of hearing the electronically reproduced Torah reading and on the benefit of Torah study, though he notes that having the deaf person quietly recite along with the reader would suffice (Teshuvos V'hanhagos 2:83). Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that a deaf person should not write sifrei Torah, tefillin, or mezuzot, though a knowledgeable deaf woman may be trusted to examine herself, and states that in practice it is preferable that a deaf person not serve as a sofer for sacred writings (Igros Moshe YD 4:49).
The Klausenberger Rebbe, addressing the classification of deafness, explains in the name of the Rambam that deafness caused by illness or injury may dull the mind because of the accompanying pain, unlike congenital deafness in a person who can still speak, since the capacity for speech indicates that some residual capacity for hearing remains (Divrei Yatziv CM 78).