The foundational principle underlying the question is stated in Pesachim 13b: כל העומד לזרוק כזרוק דמי — whatever stands ready to be sprinkled is treated legally as though it had already been sprinkled — a rule attributed there to Rabbi Shimon and applied by his son Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon.
Tosafot on Pesachim 13b probes the limits of this principle, raising the difficulty of whether it applies when the blood was received with an improper intention (shelo lishmah), and distinguishing between the status of the offering itself and that of items consecrated together with it, such as the show-loaves — concluding that the principle operates differently with respect to those accompanying items when the sprinkling was not performed properly.
The principle has practical consequences for the burning of hametz: Temurah 33b lists hametz on Pesach among those items that are burned, and Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 445:1 rules that hametz is destroyed by burning, crumbling and scattering to the wind, or casting into the sea, with the Rema recording the custom to burn it specifically, in keeping with the view that burning is the only valid form of destruction.
Mishnah Berurah 445 explains that the custom to burn hametz specifically follows those poskim who rule like Rabbi Yehudah that there is no valid destruction of hametz other than burning, derived by analogy to the burning of leftover sacrificial meat (notar).
The broader halachic category of items destined for burning appears in several contexts: Mishneh Torah, Leavened and Unleavened Bread 3:8 rules that even hametz that legally passes out of one's ownership still obligates its owner to destroy it whenever he finds it, and Mishneh Torah, Sacrificial Procedure 19:4 clarifies which priestly portions and sacrificial parts are fit for eating rather than for the altar-fire, bearing on what enters the category of items designated for burning.
The Gemara in Zevachim 77a records a dispute about limbs of a sin-offering intermingled with those of a burnt-offering: Rabbi Eliezer holds one may place them all on the altar and view the sin-offering flesh as mere wood, while the Sages require waiting for the form to decay before sending them to the place of burning — illustrating that the destination of an item for fire carries independent halachic weight.
Kerakh shel Romi 2 addresses the prohibition against burning sacred texts: as long as items retain their sanctity, it is an absolute prohibition to burn them in any manner whatsoever, rooted in the verse לא תעשון כן לה' אלהיכם, and he emphasizes that avoiding the degradation of sanctity must not come at the cost of violating that severe negative commandment.
Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 57 establishes that the prohibition of wanton destruction (bal tashchit) extends beyond trees to any needless destruction — such as burning a garment for no purpose — so that the act of burning must be purposeful and legally warranted to be permitted.
Peninei Halakhah, Shabbat 16:6 addresses a fire breaking out on Shabbat, ruling that when there is no danger to life, one may not extinguish it even if substantial property will be destroyed, since monetary loss does not override Shabbat — an application of the principle that items standing to be burned by fire carry a distinct legal status once destruction is underway.
Shoel uMeshiv Mahadura III 1:202 addresses a case in which a man entered a burning building to rescue property and was not seen again, applying the rules of fire and mortal danger to a concrete responsum on that question.
רש"י, יהשוע ז טו comments that what is designated for burning in that context refers specifically to the tent and movable property fit for burning, with Achan and his animals executed by stoning — showing that the legal category of "destined for fire" is determined by the nature of the item, not by a blanket rule.