The core source of piggul is the pasuk describing a peace-offering eaten on the third day, which states that it is not accepted, is not credited to the one offering it, is piggul, and that the soul eating from it bears iniquity (Vayikra 7:18).
The Gemara in Zevachim reads this doubled verb as teaching that piggul arises from an intent held at the time of service regarding two forms of consumption — eating by a person and consumption by the altar — and that this applies beyond peace-offerings to all sacrifices through the phrase "from the flesh of his peace offerings," with "third day" establishing the paradigm of intent beyond the designated time (Zevachim 28b:10-12).
The Rambam codifies that this pasuk is understood through the oral tradition as referring specifically to one who forms, at the time of the offering, the intent to eat from it on the third day — beyond its proper time — and that the same rule applies to any sacrifice where such intent was formed during its service, whether regarding eating or burning (Mishneh Torah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit 13:2).
The Rambam further specifies that piggul applies only to an item that has a permitting act for both person and altar, and that the disqualifying intent can be formed during slaughter, during receiving the blood, or during its conveyance to the altar (Mishneh Torah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit 13:3), and he adds that when intent of time is mixed with other disqualifying intents such as place or change of designation in the Pesach or sin-offering, the sacrifice becomes merely invalid rather than piggul (Mishneh Torah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit 16:1).
Rashi on the pasuk explains that the verse addresses one who forms the intent to eat the offering on the third day already at the time of slaughter, rejecting the notion that the offering becomes retroactively disqualified only if actually eaten on the third day — the disqualification occurs at the moment of offering (Rashi on Vayikra 7:18).
The Sefer HaChinukh frames the prohibition as not eating piggul, defining piggul as a sacrifice where the offering priest held a disqualifying thought at the time of slaughter or offering — such as intending to eat from it, or to burn what requires burning, after its proper time — noting that the language of eating in the pasuk covers both human and altar consumption, and that one who eats from it bears iniquity (Sefer HaChinukh 144:1-2).
The Mishnah in Menachot applies the piggul framework to the meal-offering, ruling that if the handful is removed with intent to eat or burn its remainder on the next day, the offering is piggul and the one who eats it is liable for karet — unlike intent to consume it outside the Temple courtyard, which disqualifies the offering without the karet of piggul (Mishnah Menachot 1:1-3).
Mishnah Zevachim establishes the broader background of disqualifying factors in the service of offerings, such as reception of the blood by an unfit party, listing invalidations distinct from piggul itself (Mishnah Zevachim 2:1), while a related mishnah discusses the six intentions for which an offering may be slaughtered, establishing that the officiant's intent is what matters in the service (Mishnah Zevachim 4:6).
The Rambam further rules that one who deliberately eats an olive-sized portion of any disqualified offering, including piggul, is liable for lashes under the prohibition against eating any abhorrent thing (Mishneh Torah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit 18:3), and he traces the source of the Torah's warning against piggul and notar to the verse at the dedication offerings, "it shall not be eaten for it is holy," which warns against eating anything disqualified in sanctified matters (Mishneh Torah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit 18:10).
The Ramban, discussing the adjoining pasuk about burning the remainder on the third day, clarifies the chronology of when sacrificial meat must be eaten versus burned, distinguishing the prohibition of leaving meat over two full days from the piggul framework governing intent at the time of offering (Ramban on Vayikra 7:17).
Among the modern poskim, Ma'ayan Omer (Maayan Omer 11:5:1) addresses the dispute over whether piggul takes effect through mere thought or requires actual speech, drawing on the Rambam and Tosafot. Chazon Ish Menachos 22 explains that a person is not liable for piggul through an act of burning alone, since one act of burning cannot invalidate another, and raises the question of whether the disqualifying intent must involve both permitting acts together. Chazon Ish Kodashim Kama 42 discusses how the principle that the offering is saved from piggul invalidation can affect how an intention is classified. Chazon Ish Menachos 32 reasons about how an already-invalid loaf interacts with the sprinkling that would otherwise draw bread into piggul status.
The Achiezer takes up a dispute about whether piggul can take hold before all the permitting acts of an offering have been completed, engaging with Tosafot's position that piggul is distinguished by its requirement of burning, and in a separate responsum addresses Rashi's position on intent formed during the placing of blood as it relates to the scope of piggul and the atonement of the owners (Achiezer, Chelek 2 28, Achiezer, Chelek 2 30).
Tzitz Eliezer 10:14 argues that intending the sacrificial meat for an animal's consumption still constitutes piggul, rejecting any limitation of this rule to dogs specifically, and explains the scope of the rule by which mixed sacrificial intentions involving multiple acts of burning can invalidate an offering without rendering it piggul.