Sources examine whether one who kidnaps a fellow Israelite incurs the capital penalty of geneivas nefashos upon abduction alone, or only upon subsequent sale or use of the victim. The classical rabbinic sources present competing views on the precise moment liability attaches.
אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ
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What the sources say
The two biblical passages that anchor this question point in different directions. Shemot 21:16 states that one who kidnaps a person — whether having sold him or still holding him — shall be put to death, appearing to impose liability on the act of abduction alone. Devarim 24:7, however, adds the elements of exploitation and sale: "If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren… and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall die," a formulation that implies liability requires more than mere abduction.
The Mishnah in Sanhedrin 85b directly structures this dispute around the verses. The anonymous first opinion holds that the kidnapper is not liable unless he brings the victim into his own domain — but says nothing of sale as an additional requirement. Rabbi Yehuda goes further, reading "and he exploited him and sold him" in Devarim 24:7 to require both bringing the victim into one's domain and making use of him before liability attaches — though even Rabbi Yehuda does not isolate sale alone as the trigger.
The Gemara in Sanhedrin 86a derives the prohibition against kidnapping itself from two separate verses — Rabbi Yoshiya from "You shall not steal" (Shemot 20:13) addressing the act of taking, and Rabbi Yochanan from "Do not sell him in the manner of a slave" (Vayikra 25:42) addressing the sale — and the Gemara reconciles them as speaking to two distinct negative commandments, one against the abduction and one against the sale, a framework that bears directly on what each stage of liability requires.
The Ramban (Shemot 21:16) draws on the Mishnah and baraita to spell out that Shemot 21:16 comes to teach that one who abducted but did not sell, or who sold but while the victim remained in the kidnapper's own domain, is exempt; full liability requires that the kidnapper both bring the victim into his domain and effectuate a sale, so that the victim is "found in his hand" — yet if the kidnapper physically lifted the victim onto his shoulder and sold him, that physical control constitutes the required domain.
Mishneh Torah, Laws of Theft ch. 9 codifies the outcome: a kidnapper is not liable for capital punishment until he kidnaps a Jew, brings him into his own domain, and then sells him — both the act of abduction into one's domain and the act of sale are necessary conditions for the capital penalty, though each act separately violates a distinct negative commandment.
Sefer HaChinukh (36:3) confirms this reading explicitly, stating that the violator is liable to strangulation only if he has already sold that soul — "since the explanation has come (Sanhedrin 85b) that the liability does not rest upon him until he sells" — and grounding that ruling in the verse in Shemot that names sale as part of the liability formula.
שמות כ״א:ט״ז
Exodus 21:16
The Torah states that one who steals a person and sells him, or is found in his possession, is subject to death. The verse's inclusion of both sale and possession is the central scriptural basis for analyzing whether kidnapping alone completes the offense.
וְגֹנֵ֨ב אִ֧ישׁ וּמְכָר֛וֹ וְנִמְצָ֥א בְיָד֖וֹ מ֥וֹת יוּמָֽת׃ {ס}
One who kidnaps another—whether having sold or still holding them—shall be put to death.
דברים כ״ד:ז׳
Deuteronomy 24:7
The Torah describes the kidnapping of a fellow Israelite, treating the taking and exploitation of the person as the prohibited conduct and imposing the death penalty. This verse is a key parallel to Exodus 21:16.
כִּי־יִמָּצֵ֣א אִ֗ישׁ גֹּנֵ֨ב נֶ֤פֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו֙ מִבְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל וְהִתְעַמֶּר־בּ֖וֹ וּמְכָר֑וֹ וּמֵת֙ הַגַּנָּ֣ב הַה֔וּא וּבִֽעַרְתָּ֥ הָרָ֖ע מִקִּרְבֶּֽךָ׃ {ס}
If anyone is found to have kidnapped—and then enslaved or sold—a fellow Israelite, that kidnapper shall die; thus you will sweep out evil from your midst.
סנהדרין פ״ה ב — ד"ה מַתְנִי׳ הַגּוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב
Sanhedrin 85b:18
The Mishnah and Gemara discuss the law of one who steals a person, including the requirements of taking a person and selling him, and compare the relevant verses in Exodus and Deuteronomy. The sugya is foundational for distinguishing the completed capital offense from related acts of abduction or confinement.
מַתְנִי׳ הַגּוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ וְיִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהִתְעַמֵּר בּוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ״. הַגּוֹנֵב אֶת בְּנוֹ, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. גָּנַב מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו״ – אֶחָד הַגּוֹנֵב אֶת הָאִישׁ, וְאֶחָד הַגּוֹנֵב אֶת הָאִשָּׁה, וְאֶחָד גֵּר, וְאֶחָד עֶבֶד מְשׁוּחְרָר וְקָטָן – חַיָּיב. גְּנָבוֹ וְלֹא מְכָרוֹ, מְכָרוֹ וַעֲדַיִין יֶשְׁנוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ – פָּטוּר. מְכָרוֹ לְאָבִיו אוֹ לְאָחִיו אוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַקְּרוֹבִים – חַיָּיב. הַגּוֹנֵב אֶת הָעֲבָדִים – פָּטוּר.
MISHNA: One who abducts a Jewish person is not liable to be executed unless he brings the abductee into his domain. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable unless he brings him into his domain and exploits him, as it is stated: “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, and he exploited him and sold him, then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7). The phrase “exploited him” indicates using him for labor. With regard to one who abducts his own son and sells him, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. If one abducted one who is a half-slave half-freeman, i.e., a Canaanite slave who belonged to two owners and was emancipated by one of them, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. It is taught in another baraita that it is written: “If a man is found abducting a person of his brethren,” from which it is derived that whether he abducts a man, or whether he abducts a woman, or whether he abducts a convert, or whether he abducts an emancipated slave or a minor, he is liable. If he abducted another but did not sell him, or if he sold him but he remains in his domain, the abductor is exempt. If he sold him to the father of the abductee, or to his brother, or to one of his other relatives, the abductor is liable. One who abducts slaves is exempt.
סנהדרין פ״ו א — ד"ה תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת
Sanhedrin 86a:1
The continuation of the sugya analyzes the derivation and scope of the law of stealing a person, including how the Torah's different formulations define the punishable conduct. It is directly relevant to whether the taking itself or a later transaction completes the capital offense.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנִי שׁוֹנֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר ״מֵאֶחָיו״ – עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיאֶנּוּ מֵרְשׁוּת אֶחָיו, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ חַיָּיב?! תְּנִי: פָּטוּר. אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מִנַּיִן? רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה אָמַר: מִ״לֹּא תִגְנֹב״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מִ״לֹּא יִמָּכְרוּ מִמְכֶּרֶת עֶבֶד״. וְלָא פְּלִיגִי, מָר קָא חָשֵׁיב לָאו דִּגְנֵיבָה, וּמָר קָא חָשֵׁיב לָאו דִּמְכִירָה. אִיתְּמַר: עֵידֵי גְנֵיבָה וְעֵידֵי מְכִירָה בְּנֶפֶשׁ שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ, חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר: אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: נֶהֱרָגִין.
A tanna who recited mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall recited that baraita, where the tanna holds that one is liable for abducting another and selling him to the abductee’s father, before Rav Sheshet. Rav Sheshet said to him: I teach that Rabbi Shimon says: From the term “of his brethren” it is derived that there is no liability unless he removes the abductee from the domain of his brethren, and you say that one who sells the abductee to his father is liable? Emend the baraita and teach instead: He is exempt. § The Gemara asks: From where is a prohibition against abducting a person derived? Rabbi Yoshiya says that it is derived from the verse: “You shall not steal” (Exodus 20:13). Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is derived from the verse: “They shall not be sold as slaves” (Leviticus 25:42). The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree, as each requires both verses to derive the prohibition. One Sage, Rabbi Yoshiya, enumerates the prohibition against abduction, and one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, enumerates the prohibition against selling the abductee into slavery. It was stated: If the witnesses to the abduction and the witnesses to the sale of a person were rendered conspiring witnesses, Ḥizkiyya says: The typical sentence of conspiring witnesses is not implemented and they are not executed. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They are executed.
ספר החינוך ל״ו — ד"ה דִּינֵי הַמִּצְוָה
Sefer HaChinukh 36:3
The Sefer HaChinukh presents the commandment prohibiting the theft of a person and discusses its legal parameters, including the role of selling or otherwise retaining the victim. It is useful for comparing the formal prohibition with the completed capital liability.
דִּינֵי הַמִּצְוָה, כְּגוֹן מַה שֶׁאָמְרוּ (הרמב"ם הלכות גנבה פ"ט הלכה ו') אֵין חִלּוּק בֵּין גָּדוֹל לְקָטָן וּבֵין אִישׁ לְאִשָּׁה, דְּנֶפֶשׁ מִכָּל מָקוֹם מַשְׁמַע. וְדִין הָאָב הַגּוֹנֵב בְּנוֹ אוֹ הָרַב אֶת תַּלְמִידוֹ, וְיֶתֶר פְּרָטֶיהָ מְבֹאָרִים בְּפֶרֶק י"א מִסַּנְהֶדְרִין. וְאִסּוּרָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת בְּכָל מָקוֹם בִּזְכָרִים וּנְקֵבוֹת. וְהָעוֹבֵר עָלֶיהָ וְגָנַב נֶפֶשׁ, חַיָּב חֶנֶק, וְהוּא שֶׁמָּכַר אוֹתוֹ נֶפֶשׁ, שֶׁכֵּן בָּא הַפֵּרוּשׁ (סנהדרין פ"ה ב') שֶׁאֵין הַחִיּוּב חָל עָלָיו עַד שֶׁיִּמָּכֵר, שֶׁכָּתוּב אַחֵר מְגַלֶּה עָלָיו, דִּכְתִיב וְגוֹנֵב אִישׁ וּמְכָרוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת (שמות כא טז)
The laws of the commandment — for example, that which they said (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Theft 9:6) [that] there is no difference between an adult and a child or between a man and a woman, as “a soul” implies all cases; the law of a father who steals his son or a master who steals his student; and the rest of its details — are [all] elucidated in Chapter Eleven of Sanhedrin. And its prohibition is practiced in every place and at all times. And one who transgresses it and steals a soul is liable for strangulation, and that is if he has already sold that soul. As so came the explanation (Sanhedrin 85b) that the liability does not rest upon him until he sells; since another verse reveals this, as it is written (Exodus 21:16), “And he steals a man and sells him [...], he will surely be killed.”
רמב"ן על שמות כ״א:ט״ז
Ramban on Exodus 21:16
The passage states that one who kidnaps a person is liable only if he brings the kidnapped person into his own domain; it is insufficient to steal the person without selling him, and if one sells him while the person remains in the seller's domain, the seller is exempt; however, if one lifts a child onto his shoulder and sells him to another, the kidnapper is liable because the child is found in his hand, and the kidnapper's courtyard does not acquire the child more than his hand does.
אֲבָל הַכָּתוּב הַזֶּה בָּא לְלַמֵּד עַל מַה שֶׁשָּׁנִינוּ (סנהדרין פה:) הַגּוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ, וְאָמַר בַּבָּרַיְתָא גְּנָבוֹ וְלֹא מְכָרוֹ, מְכָרוֹ וַעֲדַיִן הוּא בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ פָּטוּר. וְכֵן זֶה צָרִיךְ שֶׁיָּבִיא זֶה הַנִּגְנָב לִרְשׁוּתוֹ, וְכֵן אִם הִגְבִּיהַּ הַנַּעַר עַל כְּתֵפוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ לְאַחֵר חַיָּב הוּא, דְּהָא קָרֵינָא בֵהּ וְנִמְצָא בְיָדוֹ, וְלֹא תְּהֵא חֲצֵרוֹ קוֹנָה לוֹ יוֹתֵר מִיָּדוֹ:
משנה תורה, הלכות גניבה — ד"ה כָּל הַגּוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא
Mishneh Torah, Theft:9
The passage states that while kidnapping itself transgresses a negative commandment, a kidnapper incurs capital punishment (strangulation) only if he kidnaps a Jewish person, brings him into his own domain, makes use of him (even minimally), and then sells him; abduction alone is insufficient for capital liability.
כָּל הַגּוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כ יג) (דברים ה טז) "לֹא תִגְנֹב". פָּסוּק זֶה הָאָמוּר בַּעֲשֶׂרֶת הַדְּבָרִים הִיא אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב נְפָשׁוֹת. וְכֵן הַמּוֹכְרוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁזֶּה בִּכְלַל (ויקרא כה מב) "לֹא יִמָּכְרוּ מִמְכֶּרֶת עָבֶד". וְאֵין לוֹקִין עַל שְׁנֵי לָאוִין אֵלּוּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא לָאו שֶׁנִּתָּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כד ז) "כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו" וְגוֹ' וּמִיתָתוֹ בְּחֶנֶק: אֵין הַגַּנָּב חַיָּב מִיתַת חֶנֶק עַד שֶׁיִּגְנֹב אֶת הַיִּשְׂרָאֵל וְיַכְנִיסֵנוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ וְיִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ וְיִמְכְּרֶנּוּ לַאֲחֵרִים שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כד ז) "וְהִתְעַמֶּר בּוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ". וַאֲפִלּוּ לֹא נִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ אֶלָּא בְּפָחוֹת מִשְּׁוֵה פְּרוּטָה כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּשְׁעַן עָלָיו אוֹ נִסְמַךְ בּוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַנִּגְנָב יָשֵׁן הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ:
Whoever kidnaps another person transgresses a negative commandment, as Exodus 20:13 states: "Do not steal." This verse is stated in the Ten Commandments and serves as a warning against kidnapping. Similarly, a person who sells a kidnapped person violates a negative commandment, for this is included in the adjuration, Leviticus 25:42: "Do not sell him in the manner a servant is sold." These two transgressions are not punished by lashing, because they involve capital punishment, as Deuteronomy 24:7 states: "When a person is found stealing one of his brethren... that thief shall die." He is to be executed by strangulation. A kidnapper is not liable for capital punishment unless he kidnaps a Jewish person, brings him into the kidnapper's own domain, makes use of him, and then sells him to others, as Deuteronomy, ibid. states: "And he makes use of him, and sells him." Even if he makes use of his services for a minor matter, not worth a p'rutah - e.g., he leaned on him or used him as a shield, even if the abducted person was asleep at that time - the kidnapper is considered to have made use of him.
הַגּוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ וְיִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כד) וְהִתְעַמֶּר בּוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ.
Same passage as Sanhedrin 85b:18
וְהִתְעַמֶּר בּוֹ, מַגִּיד שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיסֶנּוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ וְיִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: וְהִתְעַמֶּר בּוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ.
Same passage as Sanhedrin 85b:18
כָּל הַגּוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמות כ יג) (דברים ה טז) "לֹא תִגְנֹב". פָּסוּק זֶה הָאָמוּר בַּעֲשֶׂרֶת הַדְּבָרִים הִיא אַזְהָרָה לְגוֹנֵב נְפָשׁוֹת. וְכֵן הַמּוֹכְרוֹ עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַּעֲשֶׂה שֶׁזֶּה בִּכְלַל (ויקרא כה מב) "לֹא יִמָּכְרוּ מִמְכֶּרֶת עָבֶד". וְאֵין לוֹקִין עַל שְׁנֵי לָאוִין אֵלּוּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא לָאו שֶׁנִּתָּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כד ז) "כִּי יִמָּצֵא אִישׁ גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו" וְגוֹ' וּמִיתָתוֹ בְּחֶנֶק:
Same passage as Mishneh Torah, Theft:9
גְּנָבוֹ וְלֹא מְכָרוֹ, מְכָרוֹ וַעֲדַיִן יֶשְׁנוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, פָּטוּר . מְכָרוֹ לְאָבִיו אוֹ לְאָחִיו אוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַקְּרוֹבִים, חַיָּב.
Same passage as Sanhedrin 85b:18
אֵין הַגַּנָּב חַיָּב מִיתַת חֶנֶק עַד שֶׁיִּגְנֹב אֶת הַיִּשְׂרָאֵל וְיַכְנִיסֵנוּ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ וְיִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ וְיִמְכְּרֶנּוּ לַאֲחֵרִים שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כד ז) "וְהִתְעַמֶּר בּוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ". גְּנָבוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוֹ לִרְשׁוּתוֹ וְנִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ וְלֹא מְכָרוֹ אוֹ מְכָרוֹ קֹדֶם שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ אוֹ נִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בּוֹ וּמְכָרוֹ לְאֶחָד מִקְּרוֹבָיו שֶׁל גָּנוּב כְּגוֹן שֶׁמְּכָרוֹ לְאָבִיו אוֹ לְאָחִיו הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כד ז) "גֹּנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מֵאֶחָיו" עַד שֶׁיַּבְדִּילֶנּוּ מֵאֶחָיו וּמִקְּרוֹבָיו בַּמְּכִירָה.
Same passage as Mishneh Torah, Theft:9
הגונב בנו, מאי טעמא דרבנן, אמר אביי דאמר קרא כי ימצא פרט למצוי... א"ל אנא מונמצא בידו קאמינא. אמר רבא הלכך הני מיקרי דרדקי ומתנו רבנן כמצויין בידן דמו ופטירי... אזהרה לגונב נפש מנין, רבי יאשיה אמר מלא תגנב, רבי יוחנן אמר מלא ימכרו ממכרת עבד, ולא פליגי, מר קא חשיב לאו דגניבה ומר קא חשיב לאו דמכירה...
from our library copy — not yet checked against the original
Filed under: מכירה
Filed under: ספק נפשות
Jewish law prohibits charging interest (neshekh and tarbit) on loans to fellow Jews, particularly to the poor. Sources define prohibited forms of interest and establish this as a fundamental obligation rooted in Torah and developed through rabbinic interpretation.
Sources address whether milking an animal on Shabbat is permitted when done to relieve the animal's suffering rather than to collect milk for human use. The sources establish the principle of tza'ar ba'alei chayim (preventing animal suffering) as a basis for certain Shabbat exceptions, while also distinguishing between actions whose primary purpose is animal relief and those undertaken for human benefit.
Sources explore the halakhic and ethical principles governing how one should dress, encompassing practical laws of modesty, dignity, and respectful conduct. The sources address dress as an expression of character, the importance of modest covering, and specific regulations regarding gender-appropriate clothing and public appearance.
Sources examine whether a child below bar mitzvah is obligated to return lost property (hashavas aveidah), addressing the minor's legal capacity, the distinction between personal obligation and parental responsibility, and the conditions under which a minor's acquisition of a found object differs from an adult's.
Jewish law establishes a comprehensive framework for handling found items, balancing the finder's obligation to identify and return property against practical considerations such as identifying marks, public announcement requirements, and the owner's presumed despair of recovery. The sources span Torah, Mishnaic, Talmudic, and Rabbinic codifications of these duties.
Jewish law addresses when an owner must compensate another for improvements or benefits received without consent. The sources examine the principle of unjust enrichment (זה נהנה וזה לא חסר) through cases of unauthorized planting, enhancement of property, and the broader obligation to avoid retaining unearned benefit.