The most direct Talmudic passage on change in the order of creation is Shabbat 53b–54a, where the Gemara recounts a miracle in which a man grew breasts to nurse his infant son, and the Amoraim disagree over how to evaluate it: Rav Yosef regards it as a mark of the man's greatness, while Abaye counters that it is precisely a sign of his diminished status, since 'the order of creation was altered on his behalf' (נִשְׁתַּנּוּ לוֹ סִדְרֵי בְרֵאשִׁית) — with Rav Yehuda adding that this shows how difficult it is for a person to earn his livelihood.
The theological underpinning of this stability is laid out in Shabbat 88a, where Reish Lakish teaches that the Holy One conditioned creation itself at the sixth day on Israel's acceptance of the Torah, threatening to return the world to chaos otherwise — so that the very continuity of the natural order is presented as contingent on a covenantal act.
A complementary approach appears in Avodah Zarah 54b–55a, where the Sages reply to philosophers who ask why God does not abolish idolatry by destroying objects of worship: 'The world follows its course (עוֹלָם כְּמִנְהָגוֹ נוֹהֵג),' and fools who sin will face judgment — articulating a principle that God does not routinely suspend the natural order even to punish wrongdoing.
Pesachim 54a supplies the classical rabbinic framework for how miracles fit within this stable order: ten phenomena — among them Miriam's well, the manna, the rainbow, the tablets, and the opening of the earth to swallow Korah's company — were built into creation at twilight of the sixth day, so that even apparent breaks in nature were pre-programmed from the outset.
רבינו בחיי, שמות יד כז draws out the implication of the word לְאֵיתָנוֹ (to its original condition): that God stipulated with the sea at creation that it would split, and concludes from this — and from the ten twilight-phenomena — that there is no change in nature from the six days of creation onward except what was willed from the beginning.
מורה נבוכים, חלק ב' הקדמה פרק כט, וראה עוד ערך נס similarly grounds this in the verse 'there is nothing new under the sun,' arguing that the Sages consistently treated it as a foundational principle that no genuine novelty enters the world, and that even future renewals were already latent in creation.
Derashot HaRan 2:11 develops this further on the level of plain meaning: when something changes through a miracle, it does not shift from its original state while remaining constitutionally the same; rather, God prepares the underlying constitution in advance — illustrated by Rivkah, whose barrenness was not simply overridden but whose physical constitution was rearranged through Yitzchak's prayer.
Gevurot Hashem, Second Introduction to Gevurot Hashem:36 pushes back against philosophical objections that change in heavenly bodies is impossible, asserting that Chazal, as masters of truth, hold the opposite — that Yehoshua could command the sun precisely because it is corporeal and he, possessing the intellectual Torah, could exercise dominion over it.
Sefat Emet, Chanuka frames the miracle of Chanukah within this same polarity: the four exiles operate through nature and physicality, of which it is written 'there is nothing new under the sun,' but a miracle, being above nature, brings genuine renewal — making Chanukah paradigmatically the festival of התחדשות.
Turning to practical halachic application, Igros Moshe (Igros Moshe EH 2:3) addresses the apparent contradiction between the Talmudic ruling that a ruptured testicle causes permanent infertility — rendering the individual a פְּצוּעַ דַּכָּא forbidden to marry into the congregation — and contemporary medicine's ability to treat such a condition and restore fertility, and concludes, on our reading of the cited page, that he explains this by distinguishing what the Gemara's ruling encompasses from what modern intervention actually does, engaging squarely with the question of whether changed biological outcomes reflect a genuine change in nature.
Mishneh Halachos (Mishneh Halachos 5:148) rules that it is far from appropriate to rely on claimed changes in nature (שִׁינּוּי הַטֶּבַע) to relax stringencies that Chazal established — specifically in the context of whether a pregnant woman before three months must observe the onah beinonit period — objecting strongly to using observed biological shifts as grounds for overriding established halachic rulings, a position reinforced in the companion responsum Mishneh Halachos 5:149, which rejects the argument that women now stop menstruating immediately upon conception as sufficient reason to alter the Shulchan Arukh's ruling.