Halachaהלכה

Rashi on Halakhic Authority and Tradition

These sources explore Rashi's understanding of how halakhic rulings are established and transmitted through rabbinic authority. The passages address the principle that practical halakhic interpretation is entrusted to qualified sages and judges, and that their determinations—whether declaring something permitted or forbidden—are binding on the community.

אִלּוּ הָיְתָה בַשָּׁמַיִם, הָיִיתָ צָרִיךְ לַעֲלוֹת אַחֲרֶיהָ לְלָמְדָהּ

23 sources · 22 verified

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Source 1 · Chazal· different author
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Niddah 9b

נדה ט׳ ב — ד"ה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר

Niddah 9b:8

Rabbi Eliezer holds that any woman whose menstrual cycles cease for three typical periods and then resume bleeding has sufficient time and does not retroactively transmit impurity, a ruling he supports with a precedent; when other Sages objected that decisions made under exigent circumstances prove nothing, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi later acknowledged the disagreement but nevertheless declared Rabbi Eliezer worthy of reliance in circumstances of pressing need.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כָּל אִשָּׁה שֶׁעָבְרוּ עָלֶיהָ וְכוּ׳. תַּנְיָא: אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לַחֲכָמִים: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרִיבָה אַחַת בְּהַיְתָלוֹ, שֶׁהִפְסִיקָה שָׁלֹשׁ עוֹנוֹת, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים וְאָמְרוּ: דַּיָּהּ שְׁעָתָהּ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵין שְׁעַת הַדְּחָק רְאָיָה. מַאי שְׁעַת הַדְּחָק? אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: שְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת הֲווֹ, אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: טְהָרוֹת אַפֵּישׁ (לַעֲבִידָא) [וַעֲבַדָא], וְחַשּׁוּ רַבָּנַן לְהֶפְסֵד דִּטְהָרוֹת. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַעֲשֶׂה, וְעָשָׂה רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּזְכַּר, אָמַר: כְּדַי הוּא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לִסְמוֹךְ עָלָיו בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק. מַאי ״לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּזְכַּר״? אִילֵּימָא לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּזְכַּר דְּאֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אֶלָּא כְּרַבָּנַן, בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק הֵיכִי עָבֵיד כְּוָותֵיהּ?

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to any woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles passed during which she saw no menstrual blood, if she experiences bleeding, her time is sufficient. Rabbi Yosei says: In the case of a pregnant woman and a nursing woman for whom three menstrual cycles passed during which they saw no menstrual blood, if she then saw blood her time is sufficient. Rabbi Eliezer cites a proof for his opinion. It is taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving a certain girl in the village of Hitlo who stopped menstruating for three typical menstrual cycles, after which she experienced menstruation. And the matter came before the Sages, and they said that her time is sufficient and she does not transmit impurity retroactively. The other Sages said to Rabbi Eliezer: Decisions rendered in exigent circumstances are no proof. The Gemara asks: What were the exigent circumstances? Some say that it was during the years of famine, and some say that the girl had handled many ritually pure items and the Sages were concerned for the loss of those pure items if they were ruled retroactively impure. The Sages taught in a baraita: There was an incident in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi acted by ruling that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. After he remembered that Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues disagree with him on this matter and that he had apparently ruled incorrectly, he nevertheless said: Rabbi Eliezer is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: After he remembered? If we say that this means after he remembered that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, but in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, if so, how could he act in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer even in exigent circumstances, since the halakha has been decided against him?

Source 2 · Chazal· different author
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Kiddushin 30

קידושין ל׳ — ד"ה ״אֱמֹר לַחׇכְמָה אֲחֹתִי אָתְּ וְגוֹ׳״ וְאוֹמֵר

Kiddushin 30:2

A father is obligated to marry his son to a woman, derived from Jeremiah 29:6, and regarding his daughter, he fulfills this by providing her dowry and suitable clothing to make her appealing for marriage; additionally, a father is obligated to teach his son a trade, which Hizkiyya derives from Ecclesiastes 9:9 by analogy—whether the verse refers literally to a wife or allegorically to Torah, just as a father must provide one, so too must he provide the other.

לְהַשִּׂיאוֹ אִשָּׁה. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״קְחוּ נָשִׁים וְהוֹלִידוּ בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת וּקְחוּ לִבְנֵיכֶם נָשִׁים וְאֶת בְּנוֹתֵיכֶם תְּנוּ לַאֲנָשִׁים״. בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּנוֹ – בְּיָדוֹ, אֶלָּא בִּתּוֹ – בְּיָדוֹ הִיא? הָכִי קָאָמַר לְהוּ: נִיתֵּן לַהּ מִידֵּי וְ[נַ]לְבְּשַׁיהּ וּנְכַסְּיַיהּ כִּי הֵיכִי דִּ[לְ]קִפְצוּ עֲלַהּ אִינָשֵׁי. לְלַמְּדוֹ אוּמָּנוּת. מְנָלַן? אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״רְאֵה חַיִּים עִם אִשָּׁה אֲשֶׁר אָהַבְתָּ״. אִם ״אִשָּׁה״ מַמָּשׁ הִיא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁחַיָּיב לְהַשִּׂיאוֹ אִשָּׁה – כָּךְ חַיָּיב לְלַמְּדוֹ אוּמָּנוּת. אִם תּוֹרָה הִיא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁחַיָּיב לְלַמְּדוֹ תּוֹרָה – כָּךְ חַיָּיב לְלַמְּדוֹ אוּמָּנוּת.

§ The baraita (29a) teaches that a father is commanded to marry his son to a woman. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this matter? As it is written: “Take wives and bear sons and daughters, and take wives for your sons and give your daughters to men” (Jeremiah 29:6). The Gemara analyzes this verse: Granted with regard to his son, this is in his power, i.e., he can instruct him to marry a woman, as a man is the active agent in a marriage. But with regard to his daughter, is this in his power? She must wait for a man to marry her. The Gemara answers: This is what Jeremiah was saying to them in the aforementioned verse: Her father should give her something for her dowry, and he should dress and cover her with suitable clothing so that men will leap to marry her. § The baraita further states that a father is commanded to teach his son a trade. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Ḥizkiyya said: As the verse states: “Enjoy life with the wife whom you love” (Ecclesiastes 9:9). If this verse is interpreted literally, and it is referring to an actual woman, then one can derive as follows: Just as a father is obligated to marry his son to a woman, so too, he is obligated to teach him a trade, as indicated by the term: Life. And if the wife mentioned in this verse is allegorical, and it is the Torah, then one should explain the verse in the following manner: Just as he is obligated to teach him Torah, so too, he is obligated to teach him a trade.

Source 3 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Deuteronomy 17:11

רש"י על דברים י״ז:י״א

Rashi on Deuteronomy 17:11

Rashi states that one must follow the instruction of the judges in matters they teach, including what they declare permitted or forbidden. This is a central Rashi passage for the authority of established halakhic interpretation.

אֲפִלּוּ אוֹמֵר לְךָ עַל יָמִין שֶׁהוּא שְׂמֹאל וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהוּא יָמִין, וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁאוֹמֵר לְךָ עַל יָמִין יָמִין וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שְׂמֹאל (ספרי):

Source 4 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Shabbat 23a

רש"י על שבת כ״ג א — ד"ה היכן צונו - הא לאו דאורייתא

Rashi on Shabbat 23a:7

The passage establishes that a particular halakha is not from the Torah itself but rather from the words of the Rabbis, deriving this rabbinic authority from the verse "You shall not turn aside from the word which they shall tell you.

היכן צונו - הא לאו דאורייתא היא אלא מדבריהם: מלא תסור - מן הדבר אשר יגידו לך וגו':

Where did He command us: Behold, it is not from the Torah, but rather from [the Rabbis'] words. From, "You shall not turn aside from the word which they shall tell you, etc."

Source 5 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Psalms 119:98

רש"י על תהילים קי״ט:צ״ח

Rashi on Psalms 119:98

Regarding Doeg and Ahitophel, it was said that a teaching did not come to them in accordance with the halakha (citing Sota 21).

עַל דּוֹאֵג וַאֲחִיתֹפֶל אָמְרוּ, דְּלָא אָתְיָא לְהוּ שְׁמַעְתָּא אֲלִיבָּא דְהִלְכְתָא (סוטה כא.).

Source 6 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Deuteronomy 30:12

רש"י על דברים ל׳:י״ב

Rashi on Deuteronomy 30:12

Rashi cites the rabbinic interpretation that Torah is not in heaven and explains that one should not seek to recover it through extraordinary means. The passage supports the principle that Torah’s practical interpretation is entrusted to human sages.

לא בשמים הוא. שֶׁאִלּוּ הָיְתָה בַשָּׁמַיִם, הָיִיתָ צָרִיךְ לַעֲלוֹת אַחֲרֶיהָ לְלָמְדָהּ:

לא בשמים הוא IT IS NOT IN HEAVEN — for were it in heaven it would still be your duty to go up after it and to learn it (Eruvin 55a).

Source 7 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Avodah Zarah 7a

רש"י על עבודה זרה ז׳ א — ד"ה מחלוקת דרבי מאיר ורבי יהודה בהגוזל

Rashi on Avodah Zarah 7a:4

A dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah regarding theft in Bava Kamma is later resolved in Bava Metzia by an anonymous teaching that rules in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah, illustrating the principle that whenever tannaim disagree and an anonymous mishna subsequently rules like one of them, the halakha follows that position, since the sages evidently accepted and found merit in that reasoning.

מחלוקת דרבי מאיר ורבי יהודה בהגוזל בב"ק ואחר כך סתם לן תנא בבבא מציעא כר' יהודה וכל מחלוקת שנחלקו תנאים ואח"כ סתם לנו במשנתנו כאחד מהן הלכה כמותו דכיון דסתמיה אחר המחלוקת ש"מ דקמו רבנן בטעמייהו ומסתברא טעמא דהאיך:

Source 8 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Eruvin 13b

רש"י על עירובין י״ג ב — ד"ה עלובין - סבלנין

Rashi on Eruvin 13b:11

Rashi explains the Talmudic account of the dispute between the schools of Hillel and Shammai and the eventual normative outcome. It illustrates how divergent interpretations become resolved into practical halakhah.

ושונין דבריהן ודברי בית שמאי - כשהיו ב"ש מביאין ראיה לדבריהם מן התורה וב"ה מביאין ראיה ממקרא אחר והיו ב"ה דורשין את המקרא של ב"ש למה בא ולא היה קל בעיניהם כאותה ששנינו במסכת ברכות (ד' י:) ב"ש אומרים בערב כל אדם יטה ויקרא ובבקר יעמוד שנאמר בשכבך ובקומך וב"ה אומרים כל אדם קורא כדרכו שנאמר ובלכתך בדרך אם כן למה נאמר בשכבך ובקומך בשעה שדרך בני אדם שוכבין ובשעה שדרך בני אדם עומדין:

Source 9 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Avot 1:1

רש"י על משנה אבות א׳:א׳

Rashi on Avot 1:1

Rashi’s commentary opens with the chain of transmission of Torah from Sinai through the sages. This provides foundational context for the phrase that a matter is halakhically established and known through received tradition.

משה קבל תורה מסיני וכו' [ולמדה לכל ישראל שנאמר ויכתב משה את השירה הזאת ביום ההוא וילמדה את בני ישראל ולמה נאמר ומסרה ליהושע ולא לאלעזר ולפנחס ולא לשבעים זקנים המתנבאים במחנה. שלא רצה למוסרה אלא למי שהי' ממית עצמו מנעוריו באהלי החכמה וקנה שם טוב בעולם וזהו יהושע שנאמר יהושע בן נון נער לא ימיש מתוך האהל ואע״פ שכתוב' על פנחס תורת אמת היתה בפיהו וגו']:

Source 10 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Leviticus 19:2

רש"י על ויקרא י״ט:ב׳

Rashi on Leviticus 19:2

Rashi explains the call to holiness as separation from forbidden sexual relationships and transgression. The comment illustrates Rashi’s characteristic movement from the verse to concrete halakhic boundaries.

קדשים תהיו. הֱווּ פְרוּשִׁים מִן הָעֲרָיוֹת וּמִן הָעֲבֵרָה, שֶׁכָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאַתָּה מוֹצֵא גֶדֶר עֶרְוָה אַתָּה מוֹצֵא קְדֻשָּׁה, אִשָּׁה זֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה וְגוֹ' אֲנִי ה' מְקַדִּשְׁכֶם (ויקרא כ"א), וְלֹא יְחַלֵּל זַרְעוֹ, אֲנִי ה' מְקַדְּשׁוֹ (שם), קְדֹשִׁים יִהְיוּ, אִשָּׁה זֹנָה וַחֲלָלָה (שם):

קדשים תהיו YE SHALL BE HOLY — This means, keep aloof from the forbidden sexual relations just mentioned and from sinful thoughts. [It is evident that this is the meaning of קדשים תהיו because] wherever you find in the Torah a command to fence yourself in against such relations you also find mention of “holiness". Examples are: (Leviticus 21:7) “[They shall not take] a wife that is a harlot, or a profane etc.", and in the next verse "for I, the Lord, who sanctifieth you, [am holy]"; (Leviticus 21:15) “Neither shall he profane his seed (by the forbidden unions mentioned in the preceding verses) for I the Lord do sanctify him"; (Leviticus 21:6) "They shall be holy… followed by (v. 7) "[they shall not take] a wife that is a harlot or a profane" (cf. Vayikra Rabbah 24:4-6).

Source 11 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Genesis 18:19

רש"י על בראשית י״ח:י״ט

Rashi on Genesis 18:19

Rashi explains that Abraham is chosen because he will command his household to keep the way of the Lord, doing righteousness and justice. This is a biblical passage where Rashi connects Abraham's mission with transmitting divine conduct and practice.

למען אשר יצוה. לְפִי שֶׁהוּא מְצַוֶּה אֶת בָּנָיו עָלַי לִשְׁמֹר דְּרָכַי. וְאִם תְּפָרְשֵׁהוּ כְתַרְגּוּמוֹ, יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי בוֹ שֶׁיְּצַוֶּה אֶת בָּנָיו וְגוֹ', אֵין לְמַעַן נוֹפֵל עַל הַלָּשׁוֹן: יצוה. לְשׁוֹן הוֹוֶה, כְמוֹ כָּכָה יַעֲשֶׂה אִיּוֹב (איוב א'): למען הביא. כָּךְ הוּא מְצַוֶּה לְבָנָיו, שִׁמְרוּ דֶּרֶך ה' כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבִיא ה' עַל אַבְרָהָם וְגוֹ'; עַל בֵּית אַבְרָהָם לֹא נֶאֱמַר אֶלָּא עַל אַבְרָהָם, לָמַדְנוּ, כָּל הַמַּעֲמִיד בֵּן צַדִּיק כְּאִלוּ אֵינוֹ מֵת:

למען אשר יצוה BECAUSE HE WILL GIVE HIS CHILDREN CHARGE CONCERNING ME TO KEEP MY WAYS. If, however, you explain it as the Targum, “I know “of” him that he will command his sons etc.”, then the word למען does not fit into the sense. יצוה HE WILL COMMAND — This form of the verb (the imperfect) expresses frequentative action, as (Job 1.5) "This Job used to do" (יַעֲשֶׂה) למען הביא IN ORDER THAT [THE LORD] MAY BRING — Thus will he ever command his children saying “Keep the way of the Lord in order that the Lord may bring upon Abraham etc.” Since it does not say here ‘‘upon the house of Abraham”, but upon Abraham himself, we may infer that he who trains up a righteous son is as though he never dies (Genesis Rabbah 49:4).

Source 12 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Niddah 9a

רש"י על נדה ט׳ א — ד"ה וסתות דאורייתא - אותה בדיקה שהצריכוה

Rashi on Niddah 9a:5

Rashi clarifies the legal categories and practical implications in the Talmudic discussion of ritual purity and niddah. It exemplifies his close explanation of halakhic terminology.

וסתות דאורייתא - אותה בדיקה שהצריכוה לאשה להבדק בשעת וסתה דבר תורה הוא הלכה למשה מסיני דאורח בזמנו בא ואם בא יום וסתה ולא בדקה מחזקינן לה טמאה לקמן בפרק כל היד (נדה דף טז.) וקא מבעיא לן אם לא בדקה ביום וסתה בימי עיבורה מהו:

Source 13 · Rishonim
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Rashi on Sukkah 2a

רש"י על סוכה ב׳ א — ד"ה ושאינה גבוהה עשרה - בגמרא מפרש

Rashi on Sukkah 2a:2

Rashi explains the definition of a valid sukkah and the legal significance of its physical structure. This is a clear example of Rashi translating a halakhic principle into practical parameters.

ושחמתה מרובה מצלתה - המועט בטל ברוב והרי הוא כמי שאינו ועל שם הסכך קרויה סוכה: סוכה מדאורייתא - דעשרים אמה דילה ילפינן מדאורייתא וקודם שנשנית המשנה נאמרה שיעורה מסיני: סוכה דנפישי מילתה - ואין דומין תקנותיהן זו לזו וצריך לשנות הלשון לכל תקנה ותקנה כגון בגבוהה ימעט וכשאינה גבוהה יגביה ושאין לה שלש דפנות יעשה לה ושחמתה מרובה יוסיף סכך הלכך פסיק ותני פסולה דמצי למיכללינהו לכולהו בהך פסולה דקיימא לן (פסחים דף ג:) ישנה אדם לתלמידו דרך קצרה:

And the sunlight be more than the shade - The minority is nullifed by the majority, and it is as if it is not there, and from the name סכך the סוכה is called. [Showing it is very important]. Sukkah [Which is] MiDoraysa- That its twenty Amos, is learned [through an exegesis] from the Torah, And from before the Misnah was taught, its שיעור (lit. measurements) was already ''said'' (i.e. comes from, through the rule of the halacha principle: "taught to Moshe at Sinai") from Sinai. Sukkah with many statements - ...and the methods of repairing each are different, so it was necessary to change the wording for each method of repair. For example, if it is too tall, lower it, or if it is not tall enough, raise it, or if it does not have three walls, build one, or if its sunlight is greater than its shade, add sekhakh. Thus it was concise and taught "invalid," since we are able to encompass everything with "invalid," as we hold (Pesakhim 3b), "A person shall teach his student in a concise way."

Source 14 · Rishonim
Verified

Rashi on Pesachim 6b

רש"י על פסחים ו׳ ב — ד"ה הבודק צריך שיבטל - בלבו סמוך

Rashi on Pesachim 6b:12

One who searches for chametz must nullify it in his heart immediately before the search, stating that all chametz in his house should be nullified, because he is burning whatever is found; the nullification is effective even though he guards his house together with his other possessions, since his guarding occurs without conscious intent regarding the chametz specifically—but once he consciously focuses his attention on it and cares about it, he transgresses the prohibitions of bal yirah and bal yimtzah if he delays even a moment in burning it, whereas after nullifying it he does not transgress because the Torah commanded only its nullification, not destruction.

הבודק צריך שיבטל - בלבו סמוך לבדיקה מיד ואומר כל חמירא דאיכא בביתא הדין ליבטיל: מאי טעמא - הרי מבער כל הנמצא: וכי תימא כיון דמנטר להו אגב ביתיה - עם שאר ממונו הוא משמרן שכשהוא נועל ביתו לשומרו נמצא משמר כל מה שבתוכו הלכך חשיבי ושימור דלאו אדעתא דידיה הוא מי מחשבי ליה: ודעתו עליה - חשובה היא בעיניו וחס עליה לשורפה ומשהה אפילו רגע אחד ונמצא עובר עליה בבל יראה ובבל ימצא אבל משבטלה אינו עובר דלא כתב אלא תשביתו:

Source 15 · Rishonim
Verified

Rashi on Exodus 12:6

רש"י על שמות י״ב:ו׳

Rashi on Exodus 12:6

The phrase "and it shall be in your keeping" indicates examination, requiring the paschal lamb to be inspected for blemishes during the four days before slaughter (Pesachim 96a); Rabbi Matya ben Cheresh explains that God commanded taking the lamb four days before slaughter—rather than just before, as in later generations—because the Israelites in Egypt lacked merit through mitzvot and needed two commandments (the blood of the paschal lamb and circumcision) to be redeemed, as indicated by references to "two kinds of blood" in Ezekiel and the covenant blood in Zechariah.

והיה לכם למשמרת. זֶהוּ לְשׁוֹן בִּקּוּר, שֶׁטָּעוּן בִּקּוּר מִמּוּם אַרְבָּעָה יָמִים קֹדֶם שְׁחִיטָה (פסחים צ"ו). וּמִפְּנֵי מָה הִקְדִּים לְקִיחָתוֹ לִשְׁחִיטָתוֹ אַרְבָּעָה יָמִים, מַה שֶּׁלֹּא צִוָּה כֵן בְּפֶסַח דּוֹרוֹת? הָיָה רַ' מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ אוֹמֵר, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר "וָאֶעֱבֹר עָלַיִךְ וָאֶרְאֵךְ וְהִנֵּה עִתֵּךְ עֵת דּוֹדִים" (יחזקאל ט"ז) – הִגִּיעָה שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּעְתִּי לְאַבְרָהָם שֶׁאֶגְאַל אֶת בָּנָיו, וְלֹא הָיוּ בְיָדָם מִצְווֹת לְהִתְעַסֵּק בָּהֶם כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּגָּאֲלוּ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "וְאַתְּ עֵרוֹם וְעֶרְיָה" (שם), וְנָתַן לָהֶם שְׁתֵּי מִצְווֹת, דַּם פֶּסַח וְדַם מִילָה, שֶׁמָּלוּ בְאוֹתוֹ הַלַּיְלָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "מִתְבּוֹסֶסֶת בְּדָמָיִךְ" (שם) – בִּשְׁנֵי דָּמִים, וְאוֹמֵר "גַּם אַתְּ בְּדַם בְּרִיתֵךְ שִׁלַּחְתִּי אֲסִירַיִךְ מִבּוֹר אֵין מַיִם בּוֹ" (זכריה ט'); וּלְפִי שֶׁהָיוּ שְׁטוּפִין בֶּאֱלִילִים אָמַר לָהֶם משכו וקחו לכם, מִשְׁכוּ יְדֵיכֶם מֵאֱלִילִים, וּקְחוּ לָכֶם צֹאן שֶׁל מִצְוָה (מכילתא):

והיה לכם למשמרת AND IT SHALL BE IN YOUR KEEPING (or watching) — This expresses the idea of examining, and the text therefore implies that it requires examination against any blemish during the four days before slaughter (Pesachim 96a). And why did He order that it should be taken from the flock four days before its slaughter, something which He did not command in respect to the paschal-lamb that was offered by succeeding generations? Rabbi Mathia, the son of Cheresh, said, in answer: Behold, it (Scripture) says, (Ezekiel 16:8) “And I passed over thee (an allusion to God’s passing over the Israelites in Egypt) and looked upon thee, and behold, thy time was the time of love” — there had arrived the time to fulfil the oath which I had sworn to Abraham to redeem his children. They, however, possessed no divine commands in which to engage in order that they should merit to be redeemed — as it is said (Ezekiel 16:7) “thou wast naked and bare” (i. e. bare of all merit earned through the fulfilment of God’s commands). He therefore gave them two commands, relating respectively to the blood of the paschal-lamb and the blood of the circumcision — for that night they circumcised themselves, as it is said (Ezekiel 16:6) “[When I passed over thee] I saw thee wallowing in thy bloods (בְּדָמַיִךְ is plural)” i. e. in two kinds of blood. Further it states, (Zechariah 9:11) “As for thee, also, because of the blood of the covenant I released thy prisoners out of the pit wherin there is no water”. And yet another reply to this question is, that because they were sunk in idolatry and had no merit gained by the practice of a divine command, He said unto them, (v. 21) משכו “Draw” — withdraw your hands from idols; וקחו לכם צאן “and take unto yourselves a lamb” to fulfil a divine command (Mekhilta).

Source 16 · Rishonim
Verified

Rashi on Berakhot 28a

רש"י על ברכות כ״ח א — ד"ה כי חלפי רבנן – תלמידים היוצאים

Rashi on Berakhot 28a:16

The passage explains a Talmudic discussion where one sage questions another about a single teaching attributed to Rabbi Yochanan, asking whether it is the only teaching he learned from him or whether it is new to him (meaning he thought someone else had stated it), to which the other responds that it is indeed new to him because he was uncertain whether Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi had stated it.

כי חלפי רבנן – תלמידים היוצאים מבית ר' נתן: מאן אמר הלכה בי מדרשא – מי מבני הישיבה אמר בבית המדרש שהלכה כר' יהודה: חדא היא לך או חדת היא לך – אחת היא לך שלא למדת דבר משמו של ר' יוחנן אלא זו בלבד לכך חביבה היא לך או חדשה היא לך שהיית סבור שאחד מן האחרים אמרה: ה"ג א"ל חדת היא לי דמספקא לי בר' יהושע בן לוי – סבור הייתי שרבי יהושע בן לוי אמרה:

Source 17 · Rishonim
Verified

Rashi on Kiddushin 30a

רש"י על קידושין ל׳ א — ד"ה זבולון בן דן - תלמיד שהיה

Rashi on Kiddushin 30a:3

If a father does not teach his son Mishnah, the father has no obligation beyond Scripture, from which point onward the son must study on his own; the obligation extends to teaching Torah but not Nevi'im and Ketuvim, exemplified by Zebulun ben Dan whom his grandfather taught, and the Gemara asks to what point one is obligated to teach Torah in one's generations, to which Rav Yehudah answers: to one's son and grandson.

אינו מלמדו משנה - אין חובת בנו עליו אלא במקרא מכאן ואילך ילמד הוא לעצמו: תורה - ולא נביאים וכתובים: כזבולון בן דן שלמדו אבי אביו - ועד היכן נמי דקאמרי' הכי קאמרי' עד היכן אדם חייב ללמוד תורה בדורותיו אמר רב יהודה לבנו ולבן בנו:

Source 18 · Acharonim
Verified

Sdei Chemed, Maarechet Alef 98

שדי חמד, מערכת האל"ף צ״ח — ד"ה אין למדין הלכה מפי משנה ב"ב

Sdei Chemed, Maarechet Alef 98

One does not learn halakha from the words of a Mishna if it contradicts the general principles transmitted by Chazal, but if it does not contradict those principles, one certainly does learn from it.

אין למדין הלכה מפי משנה ב"ב ק"א ונדה ד' ז' ועיין להתוי"ט פ"ג דפאה משנה ו' ופשוט דה"ד אם סותר איזה מהכללים דאם אינו סותר הכללים שמסרו לנו רז"ל פשיטא ודאי דלמדין וכ' רשב"א בח"א סי' של"ה ועיין מש"ל באות צ"ה בשם זה הים גדול באות ע"ב ועיין להרבנים מקנ"א במ"ב אות כ"ד אהל יעקב אות ל"ג ומש"ש בההיא דאלו עוברין ד' מ"ח ר' אומר הלכה כר"א לא זכר תשו' הרשב"א הנ"ל עי"ש:

Source 19 · Acharonim
Verified

Sdei Chemed, Maarechet Alef 226

שדי חמד, מערכת האל"ף רכ״ו — ד"ה אין סדר למשנה כתב הרב יד

Sdei Chemed, Maarechet Alef 226

The Yad Malachi cites the Nechpah Bakesef as teaching that one does not apply the principle "there is no fixed order to the Mishnah" except where the Amoraim themselves dispute the matter, and this approach is followed by the Shaar HaTzur and discussed with qualifications in the Michtav LeChizkiyahu and by the Magen Avraham, with related discussion in Nedarim and the Haran and Rosh.

אין סדר למשנה כתב הרב יד מלאכי באות כ"ח בשם הרב נחפה בכסף דלא אמרינן הכי אלא היכא דהאמוראים מסתפקים בדבר עי"ש ונמשך בזה הרב שער החצר סי' תק"ל ועיין מ"ש לפקפק בכלל זה בס' מכתב לחזקיהו בח' השיטה ד' ה' ע"ד ובד' ז' ולהרב מקנה אברהם במ"ב אות ט"ו ועיין נדרים ד' ד"ן בהר"ן ד"ה ולענין הלכה ובהרא"ש ר"פ כל בשר:

Source 20 · Acharonim
Verified

Levush, Orach Chayim 34:3

לבוש מלכות, Orach Chayim ל״ד:ג׳ — ד"ה מכל מקום לא יעשה כן להניח

Levush, Orach Chayim 34:3

The passage states that only one widely recognized for piety should lay two pairs of tefillin, since the common practice follows Rashi; it then cites evidence of ancient tefillin found at the grave of Yechezkel that matched Rashi's and the Rambam's order, and explains that when writing tefillin of Rav Tam one must also follow the Torah's order as Rashi and Rambam do, with specific instructions for arranging the parshiyos on a single parchment in shel yad.

מכל מקום לא יעשה כן להניח שני זוגי תפילין אלא מי שמוחזק ומפורסם בחסידות, דאי לא כן הוי יוהרא, דהא כולי עלמא נוהגין כרש״י. ועוד, ששלחו כתב מארץ ישראל שנפלה הבימה שעל קבר יחזקאל הנביא, ומצאו שם תפילין ישנים מאוד והיו כסדר רש״י והרמב״ם. והנוהגין בשתי התפילין שכתבנו, גם כשכותב אותם של ר״ת צריך גם כן לכותבן כסדר שהם כתובים בתורה כמו לרש״י והרמב״ם, שבכתיבה הכל מודים שצריך לכותבן כסדרן בתורה. לפיכך בשל יד, שהם בקלף אחד, יכתוב קדש והיה כי יביאך, ויניח חלק מקום פרשת והיה אם שמוע, ויכתוב שמע בסוף הקלף, ואחר כך יכתוב והיה אם שמוע על המקום שהניח חלק, דסדר הנחתן בבתים בשל יד ושל ראש שוין הם.

Source 21 · Acharonim
External

Igros Moshe YD 1:97

אגרות משה, יו"ד א׳:צ״ז

Igros Moshe YD 1:97

A temporary dental filling (blombe) placed to seal a tooth cavity for a month or longer is discussed regarding whether it constitutes a halachic barrier during ritual immersion.

בדבר בלאמבע שמניחין לסתום בנקב השן על משך חדש ויותר לפעמים

On this pageThe cited passage discusses whether a temporary dental filling (referred to as a "blombe") constitutes a halachic barrier (chatzitzah) for ritual immersion (tevilah). The author rules that since the temporary filling is meant to remain in place for a designated, known period of time before being replaced, the woman does not object to its presence during this interval, and thus it does not act as a chatzitzah. The passage discusses whether temporary dental fillings constitute a chatzitzah (halachic barrier) during ritual immersion. It analyzes the concepts of 'majority' (rov) versus 'minority' (miut) and whether the individual 'objects' (makpid) to the item's presence, comparing this to temporary objects discussed by the Nodeh B'Yehudah and Chatam Sofer. The author argues that because a woman must always be prepared to perform an unexpected hefsek taharah, any temporary filling she intends to remove is considered a chatzitzah. The passage discusses the halachic definitions of chatzitzah (interposition) during ritual immersion, specifically analyzing the Noda BiYehuda and Chatam Sofer regarding objects that are temporarily removed. It debates whether removing an object for a specific physical function (such as removing a ring during childbirth to make way for the baby) constitutes a halachic 'kapda' (insistence/bother) that would render it an invalidating interposition.

Igros Moshe YD 1:97 — page scan on HebrewBooks
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Source 22 · Acharonim· different author
Verified

recovered from “Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 25:2

Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat

שולחן ערוך, חושן משפט כ״ה — ד"ה דיין שטעה מתי חוזר ומתי משלם

Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 25:1

A judge who errs in evident and known matters explicitly stated in the Mishna, Gemara, or Codifiers' rulings must have the verdict reversed and the case adjudicated according to law; however, if reversal is impossible—such as when the recipient has fled abroad or refuses to return the money, or when the judge's decision regarding ritual status (pure/impure, kosher/non-kosher) has already been carried out—the judge is exempt from compensation since the damage was not intentional.

דיין שטעה מתי חוזר ומתי משלם. ובו ה סעיפים: כל דיין שדן דיני ממונות וטעה אם טעה בדברים הגלוים והידועים כגון דינים המפורשים במשנה או בגמרא או בדברי הפוסקים חוזר הדין ודנין אותו כהלכה: הגה מיהו י"א דאם נראה לדיין ולבני דורו מכח ראיות מוכרחות שאין הדין כמו שהוזכר בפוסקים יכול לחלוק עליו מאחר שאינו נזכר בגמרא (טור) בשם הרא"ש מ"מ אין להקל בדבר שהחמירו בו החבורים שנתפשטו ברוב ישראל אם לא שקבל מרבותיו שאין נוהגין באותה חומרא (פסקי מהרא"י סי' רמ"א) ואם א"א לחזור כגון שהלך זה שנטל הממון שלא כדין למדינת הים או שהוא אלם או שטימא דבר הטהור או שהורה בכשרה שהיא טריפה והאכילוהו לכלבים וכיוצא בזה הרי אלו פטור מלשלם אע"פ שגרם להזיק לא נתכוין להזיק: הגה ויש חולקין (טור בשם הרא"ש) ועוד פוסקים ולענין הוראות איסור והיתר אם הגיע להוראה אע"פ שאינו סמוך דינו כמומחה (נ"י ר"פ אד"מ) ועיין בי"ד סי' רמ"ב מדין הסמיכות בזמן הזה:

Every Judge who adjudicated monetary cases and gave an erroneous decision — [the law is that] if he erred in evident and known matters, e.g., laws that are explicitly stated in the Mishna or in the Gemara or in the rulings of the Codifiers, the verdict is reversed and it [the case] is adjudicated in accordance with the law. Gloss: Yet some say that if it appears to the Judge and to his contemporaries on the strength of indisputable proof that the law does not accord with that mentioned in the Codifiers, he can differ with it, since it is [a law that is] not mentioned [explicitly] in the Gemara. Nevertheless, one should not adopt a leniency in a matter that the [authors of] the [former] compilations [on Hebrew Law] that have spread among the large majority of Israelites were stringent, unless one has it on tradition from his teachers that we do not adopt that stringency. However, if it is impossibe to reverse [the verdict], e.g., where the one who received the money illegally [as a result of the erroneous decision] left for abroad or [in a case] where he is a stern individual [and refuses to return the money] or where [the Judge] pronounced aught that, is 'clean,' 'unclean,' or gave a decision regarding a Kosher animal that it is Terefah and they gave it to the dogs to eat, or anything similar to this, — [the law is that] these are [cases where] he [the Judge] is exempt from making compensation and although he was the cause of the damage, he did not cause damage intentionally. Gloss: And some differ [with this opinion]. And with regards to decisions in ritual law, — if he [the Judge] has attained [the age of] ordination, although he is not [officially] ordained, his legal status is as that of an authoritative [Judge]. , Y.D. § 242 on the law of Ordination nowadays.

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Source 23 · Acharonim· different author
Verified

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 253:2

שולחן ערוך, אורח חיים רנ״ג

Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 253:2

A kirah (stove) that is swept clean and has its opening blocked may have a pot removed from it even on Shabbat and replaced while it is still boiling, provided it remains in the hand of the person and is not set down on the ground, with intent to return it; one may replace it on top of the kirah but not inside it, and in an oven it is forbidden to return the pot even if swept and blocked, and the same applies to a kofach (low stove) if it was heated with peat and wood.

כירה שהיא גרופה וקטומה ונטל הקדירה מעליה אפילו בשבת מותר להחזירה כל זמן שהיא רותחת: הגה ועודה בידו (טור) ולא הניחה על גבי קרקע הגה ודעתו להחזירה (טור) ודוקא על גבה אבל לתוכה אסור ובתנור אסור להחזיר אפי' הוא גרוף וקטום והוא הדין לכופח אם הסיקו בגפת ועצים:

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Tefillahתפילה

The Torah Obligation of Reciting Shema

Sources establish that the recitation of Shema is a Torah-level commandment (deoraisa), based on the biblical passage in Deuteronomy and elaborated through rabbinic interpretation and halakhic codes. The sources address the obligation's timing, the requirement of proper intention, and the consequences of doubt regarding its fulfillment.

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Machshavaמחשבה

Bein Adam L'Chaveiro and Bein Adam L'Makom

These sources examine the relationship between interpersonal obligations and duties toward God, ranging from their practical distinction in atonement to their deeper theological integration as expressions of a unified divine will. Classical sources debate whether these categories are separate realms requiring different remedies, or inseparable dimensions of a sanctified life.

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Machshavaמחשבה

The Inner Spiritual Meaning of Jewish Months

Acharonim and Chassidic masters explore how each month of the Jewish calendar carries distinct spiritual qualities and divine influence. Drawing on classical sources from Sefer Yetzirah through the Maharal and Hasidic teachers, these texts reveal how the Jewish people's mastery over sacred time reflects their unique relationship with the divine.

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Halachaהלכה

Can Artificial Intelligence Serve as a Posek?

These sources explore the essential qualifications and nature of halakhic authority in Jewish law. They establish that a posek must be a living human being grounded in an unbroken chain of transmission, possess personal moral responsibility, and engage in authentic spiritual reasoning—qualities that challenge whether an artificial system could issue binding halakhic rulings.

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Chassidusחסידות

Chai Elul: Chabad Farbrengen and Teshuvah

Sources exploring the spiritual practices and theological foundations of Chai Elul in Chabad tradition, including the significance of farbrengen gatherings, themes of return and renewal, and the inner work of teshuvah during the month of Elul.

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