The Torah's own civil law already forbids a husband from diminishing his wife's sustenance, clothing, or marital due (Shemot 21:10-11), and the Mishneh Torah generalizes the ban on striking any person, man or woman, young or old, as a Torah prohibition derived a fortiori from the law against excessive lashes to a guilty party (Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 5:1).
Beyond the bare prohibition on hitting, the Mishneh Torah describes an affirmative standard for the home: a man must honor his wife more than himself, love her as himself, not cast excessive fear upon her, and speak to her gently rather than with anger or ill temper (Mishneh Torah, Marriage 15:19), and similarly warns against coarse speech and against forcing relations upon an unwilling wife, insisting that intimacy be by mutual will and joy (Mishneh Torah, Human Dispositions 5:4).
The Gemara in Eruvin states flatly that it is forbidden for a man to coerce his wife into marital relations, bringing a verse that one who 'hastens with his feet sins,' and adds that children born of such coercion are considered unworthy (Eruvin 100b).
Gittin 6b warns that one who imposes excessive fear upon his household will be led to grave sins — forbidden relations, bloodshed, and desecration of Shabbat — illustrating this through the concubine of Giv'ah, whose husband's harshness toward her ultimately brought the deaths of tens of thousands (Gittin 6b).
The broader obligation to intervene when another is endangered is drawn from Vayikra's command not to stand idly by the blood of one's fellow (Vayikra 19:16-18), which the Gemara in Sanhedrin applies to one who sees another pursued toward death or being dragged away, obligating rescue even at the pursuer's cost (Sanhedrin 73a), and the Mishneh Torah treats failure to save one being pursued to kill or to violate as neglecting a positive commandment and transgressing two prohibitions (Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 1:14).
Bereishit itself records Sarai's harsh treatment of Hagar and her flight (Bereishit 16:6-9), later repeated when Hagar and Yishmael are sent away (Bereishit 21:9-14), and the Radak reads Sarai's own words as an admission that she had wronged Hagar and that Avram bore responsibility for not restraining her mistreatment (Radak on Bereishit 16:5).
Devarim's law of the betrothed girl attacked in the field establishes that a victim who cried out with no one to save her bears no guilt, comparing her plight to a victim of murder (Devarim 22:25-27), and Kayin's killing of Hevel, met with the divine rebuke 'the voice of your brother's blood cries out to Me,' underscores that violence within the family is not hidden from account (Bereishit 4:8-10).
Ketubot's discussion of the husband's conjugal obligations, including the standards of frequency owed to a wife and the grounds on which she may compel divorce, situates marital relations as a mutual entitlement rather than something imposed (Ketubot 61a-62b).
On the specific practical question of reporting abuse, Rav Ovadia Yosef permits reporting to the police cases of child injury, domestic violence, threats to children, sexual misconduct, and similar danger (Ma'ayan Omer (Maayan Omer 10:1:13)), and in a separate responsum he guided a woman whose nonobservant husband cursed and used violence at home to pursue a shalom bayit case before a rabbinical court and to follow its ruling (Rav Ovadia Yosef (Maayan Omer 12:3:363)).
Among later poskim addressing abusive marriages directly, the Klausenberger Rebbe groups coercing a woman into marriage with rebellious and criminal conduct, invoking the command to love one's fellow and the image that one cannot live with a snake in the same basket (Divrei Yatziv (Divrei Yatziv EH 3)); the Beit Yitzchak considers whether a husband who is struck by his wife, or a wife struck by her husband, can be compelled toward divorce (Beit Yitzchak, Even HaEzer 2 9); and the Divrei Chaim likewise treats compelling a divorce where a party's conduct is intolerable (Divrei Chaim, Even HaEzer 2 20).
The Kaf HaChaim (Palagi) cautions that Friday afternoon and Shabbat evening are dangerous times for strife between husband and wife, urging a God-fearing man to restrain his anger and pursue peace rather than provoke conflict in the home (Kaf HaChaim (Palagi) 27:35).
Tzitz Eliezer treats the related question of whether to report abuse in a non-religious home or institution to the police, including repeated abuse of a minor by a parent (Tzitz Eliezer 19:52), while Avnei Yashfeh takes up whether a wife may report her husband's violence to police and whether she may later retract such a report (Avnei Yashfeh 7:118).
By contrast, Rav Menashe Klein argues that seeking a protective order through secular courts on allegations of abuse, threats, or child endangerment constitutes mesirah when those allegations are false or exaggerated, and that anything obtained through such proceedings is treated as stolen (Mishneh Halachos 14:222), a position that stands in tension with the more permissive approach to reporting genuine danger found elsewhere on this sheet.
The Shoel uMeshiv records an actual case of a wife fleeing her husband's home because his adult son had repeatedly assaulted her, illustrating how such claims of abuse were brought before a posek for adjudication (Shoel uMeshiv Mahadura III 1:285).